Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Price pleaded guilty to bank robbery and was sentenced to 60 months of imprisonment plus three years of supervised release. Price began his first term of supervised release on July 21, 2017. Two urine samples collected the next week tested positive for cocaine. Price admitted the violation. At the recommendation of the probation officer, the court took no action. When Price tested positive for cocaine use on July 28 and August 7, the probation officer recommended revocation. Price admitted using cocaine, pleaded guilty to violating two conditions of his supervised release, and asked that he be allowed to participate in inpatient substance abuse treatment in lieu of incarceration. Ultimately, the district court revoked Price’s supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months of imprisonment plus 12 months of supervised release. Price argued that it was substantively unreasonable to have imposed a term of incarceration rather than ordering residential inpatient substance abuse treatment and that the new term of supervised release was procedurally unreasonable because it exceeded the maximum length permitted by 18 U.S.C. 3583(h). The Sixth Circuit affirmed Price’s custodial sentence but agreed that section 3583(h) must be interpreted to require that the maximum term of supervised release be reduced by the aggregate of all post-revocation terms of imprisonment related to the same underlying offense; under this interpretation, 10 months was the maximum term of supervised release that could follow the 24-month term of imprisonment imposed in this case. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

In 2001, Davis pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) based on three prior Tennessee aggravated assault convictions. Davis’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. In 2016, Davis filed a petition for habeas corpus, citing the Supreme Court’s 2015 “Johnson” holding, which invalidated ACCA’s residual clause and arguing that his aggravated assault convictions were no longer ACCA predicate crimes. The district court agreed, noting that the Sixth Circuit had already concluded in 2011 (McMurray) that reckless aggravated assault did not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA’s use-of-force clause The court determined that Davis could have been sentenced only under ACCA’s residual clause and was entitled to “Johnson” relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Tennessee reckless aggravated assault, section 39-13-102(a)(1), under which Davis was convicted is a crime of violence under ACCA’s use-of-force clause. The court noted that in 2016 the Supreme Court (Voisine) overruled McMurray by holding that the ACCA’s use-of-force clause encompassed reckless conduct. View "Davis v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2004, Jackson was convicted of armed bank robbery, carrying and brandishing a firearm during the bank robbery, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Based on two prior convictions for Ohio aggravated robbery and one for Ohio attempted robbery, the court designated Jackson an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), and sentenced him to 360 months. In 2015, the Supreme Court invalidated the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause (Johnson). Jackson moved to vacate his sentence. In 2016, the Seventh Circuit held that Johnson’s logic applied to the Sentencing Guidelines’ residual clause. Nevertheless, at Jackson’s subsequent resentencing, the court found that his prior convictions were crimes of violence under the Guidelines and resentenced Jackson to 346 months. In 2017, the Supreme Court (Beckles) upheld the Guidelines’ residual clause, abrogating the Seventh Circuit decision. Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 798, deleting the Guidelines residual clause, was not in effect at Jackson’s 2016 resentencing. The Seventh Circuit then held that Jackson’s earlier convictions amounted to crimes of violence under the residual clause but that the court committed procedural error by failing to explain the sentence. On remand, Jackson argued that he should be subject to the 2016 guidelines, without the residual clause. The court disagreed and resentenced Jackson to 244 months.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. When a court of appeals reverses a sentence imposed “in violation of law,” it must remand for resentencing under the guidelines in effect at the time of the previous sentencing. The Commission did not make the amendment retroactive and characterized the deletion not as “clarifying” but as a “matter of policy.” While deleting the residual clause resolved an ambiguity, it did not clarify existing law but eliminated that law and made new law. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Robinson and two cohorts sold the victim a large amount of crack cocaine on credit, beat the victim when he was unable to pay, and, extorted from the victim’s parents for roughly $1,000. A Michigan jury convicted Robinson of extortion, delivery of a controlled substance, unlawful imprisonment, and aggravated assault. Based on his Presentence Investigation Report, the sentencing court scored multiple variables that went beyond the elements of the offenses for which Robinson was convicted, including the number of victims and exploitation of a vulnerable victim, resulting in higher minimum-sentence ranges than would have been warranted without those judge-found facts. The judge imposed concurrent sentences, the longest being 38-480 months for the delivery-of-a-controlled-substance conviction. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. The Sixth Circuit conditionally granted habeas relief, limited to Robinson’s sentence. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment’s jury guarantee to mean that “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime . . . must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt,” Alleyne v. United States (2013). The Michigan court violated Robinson’s Sixth Amendment right by using judge-found facts to score sentencing variables that increased his mandatory minimum sentence,“ which “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” View "Robinson v. Woods" on Justia Law

Convicted on drug and weapons charges in 1996, Charles received a sentence of 35 years. Charles obtained a sentence reduction, to 24 years plus four months) under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) following the Sentencing Commission’s change to the crack cocaine guideline. The Sixth Circuit reversed. As a career offender, Charles was ineligible for the reduction. On remand, the district court reimposed Charles’ original 35-year sentence. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that its previous decision gave the district court “the opening to correct an illegality” through a new sentencing. The order stated clearly that the remand was “for purposes of entering an order that rejects Charles’ section 3582(c)(2) motion.” A district court must respect the scope of the remand. Section 3582(c)(2) limits who is eligible for relief. As a career offender, Charles was ineligible, Charles’ sentence is not “illegal” in a way that permits relief by the courts from this final sentence. Although the Supreme Court has held that facts elevating a crime’s penalty, such as drug quantities, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, those decisions do not apply to final sentences like this one. The court recognized that Charles has achieved “[a]n extraordinary record,” of rehabilitation and of “good works.”Executive clemency provides Charles another avenue for relief. View "United States v. Charles" on Justia Law

Ayers, an experienced Kentucky criminal-defense attorney, was indicted in 2008 on five counts of failing to file state tax returns. Ayers represented himself throughout the 21 months between his indictment and trial, but never formally elected to do so. He never waived his right to counsel on the record, filed a notice of appearance, or moved to be allowed to proceed pro se. The court allegedly failed to inform him at his arraignment that he had a right to counsel and never subsequently sought to determine whether Ayers’s self-representation was a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing waiver of his right to counsel. When Ayers asked for a continuance a day before trial was scheduled to begin so that he could hire an attorney with whom he attested he was already in negotiations, the court denied his request and forced him to proceed pro se. Ayers was convicted. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. The Kentucky Supreme Court acted contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it held that trial courts need not “obtain a waiver of counsel” before allowing “experienced criminal trial attorneys” to represent themselves. Applying de novo review, the court concluded that Ayers did not validly waive his right to counsel. View "Ayers v. Hall" on Justia Law

Raja, a citizen of Pakistan, first entered the U.S. in 1990 without inspection. In 1996, Raja pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance and was sentenced to three-23.5 months’ imprisonment. He served 90 days in a Pennsylvania prison. Nonetheless, in 1998, Raja was granted lawful-permanent-resident status. In 2007, Raja traveled to Pakistan to visit his family. Upon his return, he was detained after officials discovered his conviction. Raja admitted to the conviction and to providing a fraudulent Social Security number to the officers at the time of his 1995 arrest. The government initiated removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). An IJ found Raja removable for a controlled-substance offense and ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility because he had never lawfully adjusted to lawful-permanent-resident status due to his prior conviction. The BIA dismissed Raja’s appeal. The Sixth Circuit denied relief, finding the Pennsylvania statute under which Raja was convicted divisible; the portion of the statute under which he was charged is a categorical match to 21 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and is a controlled substance offense under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) under the “modified categorical approach.” View "Raja v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Lobbins was detained at the Davidson County Criminal Justice Center, awaiting trial on federal charges related to his gang membership. Another gang member, Churchwell, was awaiting trial on state charges of murdering a Vanderbilt professor. Churchwell boasted about committing the murder. Inmate Boyd relayed that information to a state prosecutor. Churchwell heard about Boyd’s cooperation and said that he was “going to have Maurice f***ed up.” Lobbins entered Boyd’s cell with a shank and repeatedly stabbed him. The government added a federal charge for witness tampering, 18 U.S.C. 1512(a)(2)(A) and 1512(a)(2)(C). The Sixth Circuit affirmed Lobbins’s convictions. Lobbins then unsuccessfully moved to vacate his witness tampering sentence.The Sixth Circuit reversed. The “reasonable likelihood” standard applies to section 1512(a)(2)(C) but the district court instructed the jury to apply a lower standard: whether, absent the attack, Boyd “might” have spoken to a federal officer. The Vanderbilt murders were investigated and prosecuted by the state. Boyd spoke to a state prosecutor, not a federal one; there was no evidence that Boyd was reasonably likely to talk to a federal official. The statute requires the likelihood of “communication” to a federal official about “the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense.” That Lobbins and Boyd were federal detainees does not support any inference that Boyd was likely to talk to a federal official about Churchwell. Had the jury been properly instructed, it would have probably voted to acquit. A defense lawyer’s failure to object to an erroneous jury instruction that materially lightens the government’s burden of proof is typically deficient performance. View "Lobbins v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2006, English was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct based on sexual intercourse with a 17-year-old acquaintance while she was asleep. The court sentenced English to 21-180 months’ imprisonment. English has been released. After the trial,“Juror A” revealed that her father had sexually abused her at age eight. English was granted a new trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, reinstating English’s conviction. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. A state court denied post-judgment relief. The Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court denied discretionary review, using routine language. English's federal habeas petition was dismissed. The Sixth Circuit concluded that deference to the state courts was improper because the district court failed to make the requisite determination that English’s federal claim had been adjudicated on the merits and applied de novo review. The court found that reasonable jurists could disagree on whether English was denied a fair trial. English made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Juror A’s failure to disclose; the evidence that Juror A would have known that her past abuse was relevant at voir dire; and inconsistencies in her account at the evidentiary hearing, all indicate deliberate concealment, permitting an inference of bias. View "English v. Berghuis" on Justia Law

In 1981, at 18 months old, Carter was removed from his mother, who suffered from schizophrenia. After several foster homes, Carter was adopted when he was 10 years old. In 1997, Carter went to live with his adoptive grandmother, Prince. He was subsequently incarcerated. Carter was released from jail, let himself into Prince’s home, and killed her. He took extensive measures to cover the crime, took money, and left, stopping to steal a license plate. Prince had been stabbed 18 times, had suffered blunt-force head trauma, and had been anally raped. Semen was identified as Carter’s. Carter was detained and, after his Miranda warnings, confessed. At a pre-trial competency hearing, Carter was shackled because he had attempted to commit suicide several times. The court concluded that Carter was competent based upon the testimony of a court-appointed licensed psychologist. Carter entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The defense expert, Dr. King. noted “several subtle signs of a psychotic disorder, ”including inappropriate laughter, auditory and visual hallucinations, and Carter’s musing about killing his lawyer. The judge again found Carter competent, noting that even King acknowledged that the issue was borderline. Carter interrupted opening statements to express his desire to plead guilty and insist that he did not want to attend the trial. After asking whether he would be removed if he “acted up,” he lunged at the judge. Defense counsel stipulated that Carter would monitor the proceedings via television. In 1998, Carter was convicted of aggravated murder and was sentenced to death. Carter unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief, alleging that he was incompetent at trial and that his attorneys were constitutionally ineffective. The Supreme Court of Ohio explicitly recognized Carter’s suicide attempts, his “disagreements with counsel[,]” his desire to “enter a plea and get it over[,]” and his “lung[ing] at the judge.” While Carter’s evidence of incompetence may be “enough,” the question is whether such evidence compels a determination of incompetence. Carter failed to carry his burden under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). View "Carter v. Bogan" on Justia Law