Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2010, the defendants formed PremierTox, a urinalysis testing company: Doctors Peavler and Wood owned a substance abuse treatment company, SelfRefind; Doctor Bertram previously worked for SelfRefind. Bottom and Walters owned a drug testing service and laboratory. Physicians at clinics ordered urinalysis tests to check if their patients used illicit drugs and to monitor their medications. PremierTox was to receive those urine samples, perform the testing, and report back. In October 2010, SelfRefind began to send frozen urine samples to PremierTox for testing, but PremierTox did not have the correct equipment. In 2011, after PremierTox bought the necessary, expensive machines, they broke down. Urine samples from SelfRefind piled up. PremierTox started testing them between February and April 2011 and finished testing them in October. Over the same period, it tested and billed for fresh samples as they came in, aiming for a 48-hour turnaround. PremierTox billed insurers, saying nothing about the delays. The defendants were charged with 99 counts of health care fraud and with conspiracy. A jury acquitted them of conspiracy and 82 of the health care fraud charges and convicted them of 17 health care fraud charges. The trial judge imposed sentences of 13-21 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions. A reasonable jury could find that the defendants violated 18 U.S.C. 1347 by requesting reimbursement for tests that were not medically necessary. View "United States v. Walters" on Justia Law

Davis is incarcerated for the assault and murder of Marsha Blakely. His conviction was based on the testimony of an eye-witness, Avery, who changed his story several times before trial. Corroborating evidence permitted the jury to credit Avery’s trial testimony that implicated Davis. Years later, Avery recanted his testimony, claiming that he did not witness Blakely’s murder and that he admitted this to the prosecutor before testifying against Davis. Davis filed a successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, based on the prosecution’s alleged knowing presentation of Avery’s perjured testimony at trial. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Davis’s petition, which was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations. Davis’s petition was untimely and he cannot show a credible claim of actual innocence to overcome the statute of limitations. For a petitioner to establish entitlement to the actual-innocence exception, he must support his allegations of constitutional error with new, reliable evidence, such as exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence, that was not presented at trial. Davis has not undermined the evidence that corroborates Avery’s trial testimony, and his only proof of innocence, Avery’s recantation affidavit, is unreliable and, in the circumstances, insufficient to establish innocence. View "Davis v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged Michigan’s statutory scheme for resentencing individuals who were convicted of first-degree murder and received mandatory sentences of life without parole for acts they committed as children. Plaintiff’s 2016 amended complaint (SAC) addressed the Supreme Court’s decisions in Miller v. Alabama (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, (2016), and Michigan’s 2014 amendments to its juvenile sentencing scheme. The SAC included allegations that Michigan’s policies and procedures governing parole deny Plaintiffs a meaningful opportunity for release in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count IV); that deprivation of Plaintiffs’ good time and disciplinary credits in Section 769.25a(6) violates the Ex Post Facto Clause (Count V); and Defendants have failed to provide the Plaintiffs with access to programming, education, training, and rehabilitation opportunities in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count VI). The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Counts IV, V, and VI. On remand, the district court granted Plaintiffs summary judgment on Count V and class certification, and ordered permanent injunctive relief that prohibited Defendants from enforcing or applying the credit elimination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that Mich. Comp. Laws 769.25a(4)(c), which was enacted in 2014 and eliminates credits for individuals who were sentenced to mandatory life without parole for juvenile first-degree murder convictions, unconstitutional. View "Hill v. Snyder" on Justia Law

After Maslonka robbed two banks to support his drug habit, he pleaded guilty in Michigan state court to armed robbery as a third habitual offender. During his plea-negotiation process, Maslonka began to cooperate with federal authorities in a separate federal investigation. Maslonka did not cooperate to the full satisfaction of the federal authorities. The state prosecutor withdrew the favorable plea offer. Maslonka brought a habeas corpus petition. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief. Even assuming Maslonka’s attorney was constitutionally deficient, Maslonka has not shown that this deficiency prejudiced him. Maslonka has not shown a reasonable probability that his counsel could have persuaded the state prosecutor not to cancel Maslonka’s plea. The court noted that the Supreme Court has not fully answered the “difficult question” of “the duty and responsibilities of defense counsel in the plea bargaining process” and rejected an argument that a counsel’s mere physical absence from a critical stage of a proceeding, based on the counsel’s own failure to be present rather than any denial by the state, can constitute a constructive denial of counsel under Supreme Court precedent. View "Maslonka v. Hoffner" on Justia Law

Harrington was convicted in 2009 of seven drug offenses, including conspiring to manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute heroin and at least 50 grams of cocaine base, resulting in death (Count 1); and distributing heroin, resulting in death (Count 7). Citing 21 U.S.C. 841 and 851, the government filed notice that Harrington was subject to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment by reason of a 2002 felony drug conviction. The district court sentenced Harrington to concurrent terms of life in prison on Counts 1 and 7, and 360 months on each remaining count. In 2014, the Supreme Court held, in Burrage, that where use of the drug distributed by the defendant is not an independently sufficient cause of the victim’s death or serious bodily injury, a defendant cannot be liable under the penalty enhancement provision unless such use was a but-for cause of the death or injury. Harrington unsuccessfully sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241. In 2017, Harrington filed a second petition. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit vacated. Harrington’s claim is properly construed as one of actual innocence. Because Burrage is retroactive, Harrington is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him, if given the proper jury instruction. View "Harrington v. Ormond" on Justia Law

Thomas is a Michigan state prisoner who was convicted of several crimes, including assault with intent to commit murder, after he participated in a violent 2005 home invasion. Thomas unsuccessfully challenged in state court his conviction for assault with intent to commit murder, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support that conviction. He then filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, which the district court denied. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The state presented sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have found that Thomas assaulted Harrison, with an actual intent to kill Harrison, in circumstances where a successful killing would have been murder. The Michigan courts stated that “[n]o actual physical injury is required for the elements of the crime to be established,” and that “[a]n assault may be established by showing . . . an unlawful act that places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.” Any inconsistency in interpreting Michigan law is not a ground for federal habeas relief. “Bottom line, Thomas’s case was not an “extreme malfunction[]” of the Michigan criminal justice system.” View "Thomas v. Stephenson" on Justia Law

From 2012-2015, Bradley and others drove patients to Detroit doctors, paid them for their prescription refills, and stored the pills in various places, including a house Bradley owned. Bradley recruited O’Neal to live in the stash house and accept pill deliveries. She received deliveries of 300 pills (usually oxycodone) every day. Other participants handled similar amounts. The group shipped pills to Buchanan in Nashville, who sold the pills to redistributors. Buchanan deposited the payments into bank accounts that belonged to Bradley, Bradley’s wife, and Jones. An indictment charged 18 individuals with conspiring to possess with intent to distribute oxycodone and oxymorphone, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. Count 2 charged Bradley, Buchanan, and two others with conspiring to launder the operation’s proceeds, 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)(h). Bradley pleaded guilty. The court ordered Bradley to forfeit currency and real property that he used in the conspiracy and at least a million dollars in cash, 21 U.S.C. 853(d), reasoning that the gross proceeds of the drug-distribution and money-laundering schemes reached a million dollars. The order applied the million-dollar judgment jointly and severally to Bradley and his co-defendants. The court sentenced Bradley to 17 years. The Sixth Circuit upheld the reasonableness of his sentence and found no plain error in the drug-quantity determinations but concluded that precedent forbids the joint-and-several nature of the forfeiture order. View "United States v. Bradley" on Justia Law

In 2012, Raines pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). The court concluded that Raines was subject to a statutory minimum term of 180 months of imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B), because he had a 1991 Michigan conviction for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, a 2002 federal conviction for distributing cocaine base, and a 2002 federal conviction for collecting credit by extortionate means. The Sixth Circuit affirmed a sentence of 180 months of imprisonment. In 2016, Raines filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate, citing Johnson v. United States (2015), which held the ACCA’s residual clause to be unconstitutionally vague. The district court rejected that argument, reasoning that Raines’s assault conviction qualified under the ACCA’s force clause, his drug-distribution conviction qualified as a serious drug offense, and his extortion conviction qualified under the ACCA’s enumerated-crimes clause. After holding that Raines’s Johnson claim was properly before the court on appeal, the Sixth Circuit vacated. Raines’s 2002 conviction under 18 U.S.C. 894(a)(1), for collecting credit by extortionate means should not have been counted as a violent felony under the ACCA because it is not covered by the use-of-force clause and it is not equivalent to the generic crime of “extortion.” View "Raines v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2004, Defendant was convicted for felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)(e); his statutory maximum sentence was 10 years’ imprisonment. The court sentenced Defendant to 24 years, under the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), which overrode the statutory maximum and required a minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment. While incarcerated, Defendant was convicted for conspiracy to distribute heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(b)(1)(C); possession of heroin by an inmate, 18 U.S.C. 1791(d)(1)(C); and conspiracy, section 371, and was sentenced to an additional 151 months, to be served consecutively to his existing term. In 2015, the Supreme Court invalidated the ACCA’s residual clause and later held that the rule applies retroactively. Defendant sought resentencing under 18 U.S.C. 2255. The court found the motion meritorious, but rather than conducting a full resentencing proceeding, corrected Defendant’s sentence by memorandum opinion. Defendant had already served 12 years. His Guidelines range, absent the ACCA enhancement, was 51-63 months. Believing that a period of over-incarceration can be calculated and credited toward a consecutive sentence, Defendant asked the court to impose a Guidelines-range sentence--a specific term of months. The court instead imposed a corrected sentence of “time served.” The Sixth Circuit vacated. The district court could not lawfully impose a sentence of more than 10 years’ imprisonment; “time served” equated to a term in excess of the statutory maximum. The sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Nichols" on Justia Law

Smith was confronted in her yard by McGowan and Jones, who pointed a gun. Shots were fired. Smith’s boyfriend, Goldston, ran to protect her. McGowan ran away. Goldston chased him and returned with a sawed-off shotgun. The ensuing confrontation was video-recorded by a neighbor. Goldston paced with the gun, “waving it around in a threatening manner.” Jones tried to grab the gun. When a police officer arrived, the men ran into the woods. The officer gave chase, finding a sawed-off shotgun in the woods. Goldston, charged with possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), raised a defense of justification but was convicted. The district court increased Goldston’s sentencing level for possession of an operable firearm in connection with an aggravated assault and found that Goldston was an armed career criminal,18 U.S.C. 924(e). Goldston had seven prior felony drug convictions under Tenn. Code. 39-17-417(a) involving Schedule II controlled substances: five for sale or delivery and two for possession with intent to resell. Goldston’s total offense level under the ACCA produced an advisory guideline range of 262-327 months in prison, with a mandatory minimum of 15 years. The district court, based on 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), sentenced Goldston to 240 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Goldston’s argument that he should not have been classified as an armed career criminal, as the term “deliver” in Tennessee law is broader than the term “distribute” in ACCA’s definition of “serious drug offense.” View "United States v. Goldston" on Justia Law