Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Woodside, a Florida resident, participated in a 24-person conspiracy to distribute pain pills in Middle Tennessee. He pled guilty under 21 U.S.C. 841 and 846. The Sixth Circuit vacated his 170-month so that the district court might better explain the quantity of drugs attributable to him. On remand, the district court, without further hearing, imposed the same sentence and explained its reasoning—including the drug quantity on which it based Woodside’s sentence—in a written amended judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Woodside’s argument that the district court erred by not affording him a new sentencing hearing and violated 18 U.S.C. 3553(c) by not stating the new explanation for his sentence “in open court.” The limited remand did not entitle Woodside to a new sentencing hearing or new procedures. Even if the district court erroneously attributed to Woodside drugs sold by others, Woodside would still have been sentenced according to the same base-offense level; any error was therefore harmless. View "United States v. Woodside" on Justia Law

In 2006, Gilmore pleaded guilty to federal offenses and began serving a 188-month sentence. South Carolina, planning to charge Gilmore with assault and battery and failure to pay child support, filed a detainer, requesting that the Federal Bureau of Prisons notify it before releasing him. The Bureau notified Gilmore under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. If he asked South Carolina to resolve the charges, the state would need to try him within 180 days. The Bureau notified the Solicitor of Richland County, South Carolina that Gilmore requested final disposition. Months later, that office replied that it “ha[d] no charges pending” and speculated that any charges originated in the Sheriff’s Department. The Bureau forwarded Gilmore’s request to the Magistrate Court. No one responded. Four years later, South Carolina sent another detainer request for failure to pay child support. Gilmore wrote the South Carolina judge that he had tried to resolve the matter for years; the detainers made it difficult for him to complete rehabilitative programs. No one responded. Gilmore filed federal habeas petitions. The South Carolina district court transferred both petitions to the Eastern District of Kentucky, which dismissed them. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. In naming the federal warden, Gilmore sued the wrong official--South Carolina was responsible for the alleged harm. The court noted that Gilmore should determine whether a violation of the Act states a cognizable federal habeas claim; whether exhaustion applies; and whether any limitation on a criminal charge applies. View "Gilmore v. Ebbert" on Justia Law

Nakhleh entered a post office with an open package. An employee stated that he would have to tape his box closed and that she could not give him free tape. Nakhleh left to buy tape, returned, and sealed his package but had lost his shipping label. Nakhleh accused the workers of hiding it but eventually looked inside the box and found the label. Nakhleh refused to touch the label because “it’s got pollutant on it.” Another customer eventually affixed the label and taped the box. The post office then processed Nakhleh’s package. Nakhleh left but returned and asked for his package. When an employee stated that she could not return his package because it had been processed, Nakhleh became loud and irate. He paced, taking photos and asking employees for their names. Employees were unable to serve other customers and called the police. Officers arrived and asked Nakhleh what he needed from his package. Nakhleh replied (twice), “What if it’s a bomb?” The post office was closed for two hours while a Postal Inspector examined the package. Nakhleh was found guilty of causing a disturbance in a post office, 18 U.S.C. 3061(c)(4)(B), sentenced to six months’ probation with anger management treatment and fined $1,000. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence that Nakhleh engaged in “conduct which create[d] loud and unusual noise” in the post office and that interfered with postal operations. View "United States v. Nakhleh" on Justia Law

Farrad was released from custody. Months later, informants reported observing Farrad in possession of firearms. Officer Garrison, using an undercover account, became Farrad's Facebook friend. Farrad’s Facebook photos included one showing what appeared to be three handguns on a closed toilet lid, uploaded on October 7, 2013. Execution of a warrant to search Facebook’s records yielded photos showing a person who looks like Farrad holding what appears to be a gun; others show a close-up hand holding what appears to be a gun. None show a date or unique distinguishing feature. The person in the photos has distinctive tattoos. Facebook records revealed that the photos were uploaded on October 11. Farrad was charged with having, “on or about October 11, 2013, . . . knowingly possess[ed] . . . a firearm.” The government argued that the photos were self-authenticating business records under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6). Defense counsel argued that the photos did not authenticate who took the pictures or when they were taken. The court admitted the photos. Garrison testified that criminals are likely to upload photos of criminal deeds soon after committing those deeds. Hinkle testified about the similarities between the photos and a real gun. No witness claimed to have seen Farrad with a gun. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Farrad’s conviction. The district court’s error in deeming the photographs self-authenticating business records was harmless because admission was proper under Rule 901(a). Hinkle was qualified, his testimony was relevant and reliable. Admitting Garrison’s testimony was harmless error because defense counsel did not argue a “date theory.” View "United States v. Farrad" on Justia Law

Slusser pleaded guilty in 2011 as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), waiving his right to “file any motions or pleadings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255 or to collaterally attack [his] conviction[] and/or resulting sentence,” except challenges involving ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. The court determined that he had at least three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses and sentenced him to 180 months under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), noting a 1994 burglary, 2011 delivery of cocaine, and 1999 aggravated assault and burglary. Slusser did not appeal. In 2012, Slusser filed an unsuccessful section 2255 motion, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. The Seventh Circuit declined to issue a certificate of appealability. Slusser filed an application in 2016 for authorization to file a second or successive section 2255 motion, citing the Supreme Court's invalidation of ACCA's residual clause in Johnson v. United States (2015). The Seventh Circuit allowed the filing. The district court denied his motion and certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In his negotiated plea agreement, Slusser waived his right to argued that his 1999 Tennessee conviction for Class C aggravated assault no longer qualifies as a “violent felony.” View "Slusser v. United States" on Justia Law

Williams, a CPA, was manager or co-owner of Sexton’s Kentucky companies. Flynn was the office manager. From 2006-2010, they secured loans by misrepresenting the businesses’ assets and the identity of the true borrowers. The total amount disbursed from the banks was $8,160,400. Sexton and Williams submitted applications for higher loan amounts ($13,600,000 and $13,800,000) toward the end of the time period involved, but those funds were never disbursed. In 2016, the three and a bank loan officer were charged with conspiracy to commit bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349 and 18 U.S.C. 1344(1) (Count 1) and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2. The indictment also alleged forfeiture to the U.S. under 18 U.S.C. 981(a)(1)(C), 982(a)(2)(A), and 28 U.S.C. 2461(c). Sexton pleaded guilty to Count 1. The government moved to dismiss Counts 2–24. Sexton’s PSR gave Sexton a four-level increase for being an organizer or leader under USSG 3B1.1(a); one criminal history point under USSG 4A1.1(c), 4A1.2(m), and 4A1.2(f) for a 2005 California sentence for willful infliction of corporal injury to which Sexton pleaded nolo contendere; and two criminal history points under USSG 4A1.1(d) for committing the instant offense while on probation for the California sentence. Sexton’s guideline imprisonment range was 97–121 months. The court sentenced Sexton to 109 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed that sentence and orders that he pay $2,637,058.32 in restitution and forfeit property to the government, including a money judgment of $2,534,912. View "United States v. Sexton" on Justia Law

Maynard and others stole over 700 pounds of blasting agent from a Revelation Energy job site. He pled guilty to possessing an explosive as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 842(i)(1). Relying on Maynard’s prior convictions for second-degree assault under extreme emotional disturbance in Kentucky and assault during the commission of a felony in West Virginia, the Presentence Report calculated his base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines as 24. Maynard argued that neither of the two underlying convictions was a “crime of violence.” The court sustained Maynard’s objection to the West Virginia offense but rejected his objection regarding the Kentucky offense and sentenced him to a below-Guidelines 108 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Guidelines label as a “crime of violence” any federal or state law offense punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(1). The court applied a categorical approach and examined Kentucky’s assault under extreme emotional disturbance statute, which requires that the defendant intentionally cause a physical injury in committing the underlying assault. Extreme emotional disturbance does not negate the intent elements of first or second-degree assault under Kentucky law. View "United States v. Maynard" on Justia Law

Fleming pleaded guilty to possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), stipulating that his base offense level would be 24, based on his possession of at least 500 grams but less than 2 kilograms of cocaine. The United States Sentencing Guidelines recommended a sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment. At his sentencing hearing, the district court doubled that, based in large part on a brief local news article that described a recent surge in drug overdose deaths, mostly due to powerful opioids like fentanyl. Neither the article, nor the underlying Ohio state report on which it was based, were provided to the parties before the sentencing hearing. Nor was Fleming notified before the hearing that the court planned to consider the article or the issues it addressed. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence as procedurally unreasonable because the court denied Fleming a meaningful opportunity to comment on information that led to a substantial increase in his sentence. View "United States v. Fleming" on Justia Law

Montgomery pled guilty as a felon in possession of ammunition. He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment plus three years of supervised release. Months after his release the government alleged that Montgomery had been charged with domestic assault and had “possessed/used a controlled substance (marijuana).” The government recommended that Montgomery’s supervised release be revoked with a suggested imprisonment range of 21–27 months, classifying his possession offense as a Grade B violation. Montgomery failed to appear. The court ordered his arrest. The government amended its Petition, adding driving with a suspended/revoked license and theft of property less than $500. Montgomery was arrested and argued that his simple possession conviction was a Grade C violation because it is punishable by less than a year in prison, although 21 U.S.C. 844 provides for an enhanced maximum sentence of two years if the defendant has a prior drug conviction. He claimed that 21 U.S.C. 851 required the government to charge him under section 844 and enhance his sentence under section 851(a)(1) in order to take into account his prior convictions. Because Montgomery was not charged under section 844, he argued, the court could only look to the “basic” one-year sentence for simple possession when classifying his violation. The court concluded that Montgomery committed a Grade B violation and sentenced him to 21 months’ imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; a defendant need not have been formally charged under section 844 and enhanced under section 851, because whether the defendant experienced a separate formal prosecution at all for the conduct is irrelevant. View "United States v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

The Warden appealed the district court's conditional grant of petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254 and petitioner cross-appealed the denial of relief on several alternative claims. The Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan courts adjudicated petitioner's claims on the merits, so the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) elevated standard of review applied. The court affirmed the district court's grant of habeas relief based on petitioner's Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims where the state conceded that petitioner's statements to the police were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights and the error was not harmless, and trial counsel's failure to challenge the admission of the statements constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The court also held that the prosecutor's comments on petitioner's post-Miranda silence violated due process; reversed the denial of petitioner's Doyle claim; and affirmed the district court's holding that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction. View "Hendrix v. Palmer" on Justia Law