Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained via a search warrant. The court held that the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress where the evidence failed to establish a fair probability that drug activity was occurring at the residence at the time the search warrant was executed. Furthermore, the good faith exception did not apply because no reasonable officer would believe that the affidavit established probable cause to search the residence at the time the affidavit was executed. The court also held that the district court erred in admitting a recorded telephone call because it constituted inadmissible hearsay. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Christian" on Justia Law

Dr. Paulus, a cardiologist at Ashland, Kentucky’s KDMC, was first in the nation in billing Medicare for angiograms. His annual salary was around $2.5 million, under KDMC’s per-procedure compensation package. In 2008, HHS received an anonymous complaint that Paulus was defrauding Medicare and Medicaid by performing medically unnecessary procedures, 42 U.S.C. 1320c-5(a)(1), 1395y(a)(1), placing stents into arteries that were not blocked, with the encouragement of KDMC. An anti-fraud contractor selected 19 angiograms for an audit and concluded that in seven cases, the blockage was insufficient to warrant a stent. Medicare denied reimbursement for those procedures and continued investigating. A private insurer did its own review and concluded that at least half the stents ordered by Paulus were not medically necessary. The Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure subpoenaed records and concluded that Paulus had diagnosed patients with severe stenosis where none was apparent from the angiograms. Paulus had retired; he voluntarily surrendered his medical license. A jury convicted Paulus on 10 false-statement counts and on the healthcare fraud count. It acquitted him on five false-statement counts. The court set aside the guilty verdicts and granted Paulus a new trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The degree of stenosis is a fact capable of proof. A doctor who deliberately inflates the blockage he sees on an angiogram has told a lie; if he does so to bill a more expensive procedure, then he has also committed fraud. View "United States v. Paulus" on Justia Law

Following Columbus, Ohio robberies, the government obtained an arrest warrant against Satterwhite for interstate robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951; felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g); and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Satterwhite was arrested. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3161 (Speedy Trial Act), “[a]ny information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons.” The deadline in Satterwhite’s case was February 22, 2016. The parties filed six joint motions for waiver and to extend the period while the parties discussed a plea agreement. The court granted these motions, extending the time until August 21. On October 7, the government filed an information and an executed plea agreement, including a binding recommended sentence of 240 months. On November 29, Satterwhite was arraigned. The court accepted Satterwhite’s plea and sentenced Satterwhite to 240 months of imprisonment, noting that Satterwhite’s advisory sentencing range was 471 months. Satterwhite did not challenge the untimely filing of the information. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the time limits for the government to file an information or indictment after arresting a defendant are jurisdictional. A defendant who fails to timely move for dismissal on the basis of an untimely indictment waives his right to move for dismissal under the speedy indictment provision. View "United States v. Satterwhite" on Justia Law

Susany conspired with Courtney and Quinn to obtain explosives to crack safes at jewelry and coin shops. They planned to finance their purchase of explosives by breaking into shops. Susany and Quinn met with an FBI confidential informant to discuss procuring explosives, then met again to talk about the informant participating the in break-ins. Susany, Courtney, and the informant planned the details of a break-in. In the early hours of April 19, 2013, Susany, Courtney, and the informant arrived at the store. Courtney served as a lookout. Susany cut the phone line and activated a jamming device to block the alarm system's cellular backup. Officers arrived and arrested them shortly after the alarm was cut. Susany pled guilty to conspiracy to knowingly receive and transport explosive materials, 18 U.S.C. 371, 842(a)(3)(A), and 844(a). The district court imposed a sentence of 21 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. While the district court erred in failed to reduce Susany’s base offense level by three points under USSG 2X1.1(b)(2), the error was harmless. That Guideline applies when the defendant and the co-conspirators have not completed all the acts necessary for the substantive offense. The court instead granted a three-level downward variance based on the nature and circumstances of the offense and reduced Susany’s base offense level to 10, yielding a Guidelines range of 21-27 months; the error resulted in a lower range than would have resulted under the correct calculation. View "United States v. Susany" on Justia Law

On March 31, 2014, the government obtained a single 30-day electronic surveillance order authorizing the wiretapping of cell phones used by Williams (TT1), and TT2 used by Cooper. The government intercepted Cooper’s TT2 calls for two weeks, including a call on April 12. Cooper made no more calls on TT2; the government confirmed this through a confidential informant on April 14 and ended its TT2 surveillance. On April 16, the government provided the TT2 wiretap recordings to the district court to be sealed. The government did not intercept any conversations from TT1 because Williams had stopped using it. When the government charged Cooper with drug trafficking, he twice unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence gathered directly or derivatively from the TT2 wiretap, citing the Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. 2518(1)(c), claiming that the TT2 application did not establish the necessity for the wiretap and that the government did not seal the TT2 recording “immediately” and requesting a “Franks” hearing on his claim that the TT2 application’s supporting affidavit had material misrepresentations and omissions. Cooper entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to 396 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the application included a 52-page affidavit, prepared by a knowledgeable officer, stating that the government had been investigating Cooper and his drug-trafficking organization for six months, during which traditional investigative methods had been attempted. Statements cited by Cooper were not misleading; the government complied with section 2518. View "United States v. Jamal Cooper" on Justia Law

At the age of 19, Barcus had sex with a 12-year-old girl. He pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated sexual battery against a victim less than 13 years old in Tennessee, spent three years in prison, is subject to “community supervision for life” under Tennessee law, and is required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). After his release from prison, Barcus cut off his ankle monitoring bracelet and fled to Texas. He went to Kentucky but failed to register as required. Arrested, Barcus pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender under SORNA, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The PSR classified Barcus as a Tier III sex offender, which corresponds to a base level of 16, and recommended special conditions of supervised release, including mental health and drug treatment, participation in a sex offender treatment program, psychosexual assessment, and complete polygraph testing. The district court adopted the PSR calculations and sentenced Barcus to a within-guidelines term of 30 months in prison with a five-year term of supervised release with the special sex offender conditions. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence. The district court incorrectly classified him as a Tier III sex offender because his qualifying Tennessee conviction is broader than the comparable offense under SORNA. The comparable federal offense requires Barcus to have acted with intent; the Tennessee offense does not. View "United States v. Barcus" on Justia Law

Officers obtained a search warrant for Robinson’s Ohio apartment after observing him sell drugs outside and making controlled buys from him. When the officers arrived to execute the warrant, Robinson fled and was chased, tackled, and subdued. Police then seized fentanyl, marijuana, and methamphetamine, plus three scales, a blender, packaging materials, three cell phones, and a bag of needles, from the apartment. Two women and a young child were present during the search. Robinson pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). His pre-sentence report calculated a total offense level of 19. Because Robinson’s criminal history spanned 19 years and yielded a total score of 26, he was assigned to Criminal History Category VI. Robinson faced a statutory maximum of 20 years in prison, but his advisory Guidelines range was 63-78 months. The district court sentenced Robinson to 118 months, invoking its discretion to increase a sentence based on the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors rather than a specific Guidelines provision. Robinson argued that the court gave excessive weight to certain factors including his continued drug use and recidivism, and to the community-wide harm caused by the opioid epidemic. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The district court was not indifferent to the sympathetic aspects of Robinson's personal history. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In 1996, at Madison Correctional Institution, Stojetz and other inmates stormed a unit housing juvenile offenders. After overpowering the guard, they proceeded to the cell of 17-year-old Watkins and attacked him. Watkins initially escaped but was cornered and stabbed to death by Stojetz and another inmate. Trial evidence indicated that Stojetz and his accomplices (members of the Aryan Brotherhood) killed Watkins, who was black, due in part to his race. Stojetz was charged with aggravated murder with prior calculation with a death-penalty specification--committing aggravated murder while a prisoner in a detention facility. The court accepted the jury's death-sentence recommendation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas corpus relief, rejecting Stojetz’s claims that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to: question prospective jurors about their views on race; life qualify the jury; accurately describe the nature of mitigating evidence during voir dire; investigate and present evidence; request voir dire of jurors concerning publicity during the trial; object to allegedly improper jury instructions and to incidents of prosecutorial misconduct; and object to opinion evidence regarding, Stojetz’s intent. The court also rejected claims of prosecutorial misconduct by failing to disclose Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction medical records to show that Stojetz’s throat was cut by another inmate; that the district court abused its discretion in denying a request for access to the grand-jury transcripts; that Stojetz was actually innocent of aggravated murder; and that his death sentence was arbitrary. View "Stojetz v. Ishee" on Justia Law

In 1996, at Madison Correctional Institution, Stojetz and other inmates stormed a unit housing juvenile offenders. After overpowering the guard, they proceeded to the cell of 17-year-old Watkins and attacked him. Watkins initially escaped but was cornered and stabbed to death by Stojetz and another inmate. Trial evidence indicated that Stojetz and his accomplices (members of the Aryan Brotherhood) killed Watkins, who was black, due in part to his race. Stojetz was charged with aggravated murder with prior calculation with a death-penalty specification--committing aggravated murder while a prisoner in a detention facility. The court accepted the jury's death-sentence recommendation. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas corpus relief, rejecting Stojetz’s claims that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to: question prospective jurors about their views on race; life qualify the jury; accurately describe the nature of mitigating evidence during voir dire; investigate and present evidence; request voir dire of jurors concerning publicity during the trial; object to allegedly improper jury instructions and to incidents of prosecutorial misconduct; and object to opinion evidence regarding, Stojetz’s intent. The court also rejected claims of prosecutorial misconduct by failing to disclose Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction medical records to show that Stojetz’s throat was cut by another inmate; that the district court abused its discretion in denying a request for access to the grand-jury transcripts; that Stojetz was actually innocent of aggravated murder; and that his death sentence was arbitrary. View "Stojetz v. Ishee" on Justia Law

In 2008, a jury convicted Cradler of violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which prohibits convicted felons from possessing a firearm. This offense typically carries a maximum imprisonment penalty of 10 years. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), a defendant who violates section 922(g)(1) after being convicted of at least three violent felonies or serious drug offenses becomes subject to a mandatory minimum imprisonment penalty of 15 years, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The court sentenced Cradler under the ACCA, to a term of 222 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in 2011. In 2014, Cradler moved, under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his sentence in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013 Descamps decision. He argued that his convictions for sexual battery and third-degree burglary no longer qualified as violent felonies. The government conceded that it lacked the requisite information to support the argument that Cradler’s sexual battery conviction qualifies as a violent felony. The Sixth Circuit granted relief, first declining to address whether Cradler’s motion was timely or procedurally defaulted. FInding the Tennessee third-degree burglary statute divisible, the court applied a modified categorical approach, examined documents pertaining to Cradler’s conviction, and concluded the statute criminalizes more conduct than generic burglary and does not qualify as the enumerated offense of “burglary.” In so holding, the court abrogated a 2006 Sixth Circuit decision. View "Cradler v. United States" on Justia Law