Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Porter, the mayor of Paintsville, Kentucky, steered business and contracts to companies owned by his co-defendant, Crace, and ensured payment of a fraudulent invoice to Crace’s company, in return for payments disguised as loans. Porter was charged with theft concerning programs receiving federal funds, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(A), and bribery concerning such programs, section 666(a)(1)(B) and was sentenced to 48 months of imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the conviction under section 666(a)(1)(B) was unsupported by sufficient evidence and that the admission of a witness’s prior statements to investigators and the admission of another witness’s deposition testimony violated his confrontation rights. A conviction under section 666(a)(1)(B) does not require evidence of a quid pro quo “in connection with” any “official act.” It is enough if a defendant corruptly solicits anything of value with the intent to be influenced or rewarded in connection with some transaction involving property or services worth $5000 or more. Testimony concerning prior statements to investigators did not violate Porter’s confrontation rights because they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The government sufficiently demonstrated the unavailability of the deposition witness to testify at trial, so no Confrontation Clause violation occurred. View "United States v. Porter" on Justia Law

In May, Amerson was wounded in a gunbattle between cars. Officers recovered spent casings and seized a handgun that tested positive for Amerson’s DNA. In August, officers responded to another car gunfight and found one car abandoned with bullet holes. It belonged to the girlfriend of Amerson’s friend, Bolden, and was often seen outside Amerson’s apartment. Witnesses reported seeing two black males and a white female leave that car; the female retrieved a walker for a black male who had a severe limp. At Amerson’s residence, officers observed Amerson, a black male, with his leg elevated, having been shot three weeks before; he used a walker. They searched the apartment, with the lessee's consent, and found a loaded semiautomatic rifle, a loaded semiautomatic pistol, and ammunition. While in custody, Amerson called his girlfriend and asked her to claim ownership of the rifle and threatened Bolden’s girlfriend. Amerson pleaded guilty as a felon possessing the rifle and pistol. The government agreed not to charge him with the May incident but argued that Amerson’s uncharged handgun possession was “part of the same course of conduct.” The district court agreed, nearly doubling Amerson’s sentencing range. The Sixth Circuit reversed. For non-contemporaneous illegal firearm possessions to be considered part of the same course of conduct, they must be connected by strong evidence of similarity. Amerson did attempt to obstruct justice (USSG 3C1.1) by taking a substantial step toward having someone claim his rifle. View "United States v. Amerson" on Justia Law

In May, Amerson was wounded in a gunbattle between cars. Officers recovered spent casings and seized a handgun that tested positive for Amerson’s DNA. In August, officers responded to another car gunfight and found one car abandoned with bullet holes. It belonged to the girlfriend of Amerson’s friend, Bolden, and was often seen outside Amerson’s apartment. Witnesses reported seeing two black males and a white female leave that car; the female retrieved a walker for a black male who had a severe limp. At Amerson’s residence, officers observed Amerson, a black male, with his leg elevated, having been shot three weeks before; he used a walker. They searched the apartment, with the lessee's consent, and found a loaded semiautomatic rifle, a loaded semiautomatic pistol, and ammunition. While in custody, Amerson called his girlfriend and asked her to claim ownership of the rifle and threatened Bolden’s girlfriend. Amerson pleaded guilty as a felon possessing the rifle and pistol. The government agreed not to charge him with the May incident but argued that Amerson’s uncharged handgun possession was “part of the same course of conduct.” The district court agreed, nearly doubling Amerson’s sentencing range. The Sixth Circuit reversed. For non-contemporaneous illegal firearm possessions to be considered part of the same course of conduct, they must be connected by strong evidence of similarity. Amerson did attempt to obstruct justice (USSG 3C1.1) by taking a substantial step toward having someone claim his rifle. View "United States v. Amerson" on Justia Law

In January 2015, Perez pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i), imposes a mandatory minimum sentence for defendants convicted of violating section 922(g) who have three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. The presentence report identified: a 1987 New York conviction for second-degree robbery; a 2003 Ohio conviction for attempted intimidation; a 2003 Ohio conviction for attempted felonious assault; a 2011 Ohio conviction for burglary; and a 2011 Ohio conviction for attempted felonious assault. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 210-month sentence and the rejection of his post-conviction claim for relief. While his convictions for Ohio attempted intimidation and Ohio burglary no longer qualify as ACCA predicates because they turned on the residual clause, which the Supreme Court invalidated on vagueness grounds in 2015, the New York robbery conviction remains a violent felony under ACCA’s elements clause. That conviction amounted to a crime of violence; it requires the defendant to “use[] or threaten[] the immediate use of physical force upon another person.” View "Perez v. United States" on Justia Law

In January 2015, Perez pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i), imposes a mandatory minimum sentence for defendants convicted of violating section 922(g) who have three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. The presentence report identified: a 1987 New York conviction for second-degree robbery; a 2003 Ohio conviction for attempted intimidation; a 2003 Ohio conviction for attempted felonious assault; a 2011 Ohio conviction for burglary; and a 2011 Ohio conviction for attempted felonious assault. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 210-month sentence and the rejection of his post-conviction claim for relief. While his convictions for Ohio attempted intimidation and Ohio burglary no longer qualify as ACCA predicates because they turned on the residual clause, which the Supreme Court invalidated on vagueness grounds in 2015, the New York robbery conviction remains a violent felony under ACCA’s elements clause. That conviction amounted to a crime of violence; it requires the defendant to “use[] or threaten[] the immediate use of physical force upon another person.” View "Perez v. United States" on Justia Law

On December 15, Louisville Detective Evans submitted an affidavit for a warrant to search the house at 668 Eastlawn, stating: In July 2015, officers learned from a “reliable confidential informant” (CS1) that Hines was “selling large amounts of heroin” out of 668 Eastlawn, owned by Hines’s mother. On December 14, CS1 informed Evans that CS1 had seen heroin at 668 Eastlawn that day. Evans received further information “from another reliable confidential source” (CS2) that Hines had contacted him and proposed meeting to discuss incoming heroin. After meeting with Hines, CS2 informed Evans that Hines wanted CS2 to meet at 668 Eastlawn the following day, where Hines would provide CS2 with heroin. CS2 stated he had received heroin from Hines numerous times at 668 Eastlawn. Officers set up surveillance, saw Hines leave the house and drive to the meeting, “in a manner consistent with narcotics traffickers,” “opposite of traffic down a one-way street before entering a dark, narrow alley.” Evans independently investigated Hines’s significant history as a drug trafficker and summarized it in the affidavit. The state judge signed a warrant, which was executed that day. Officers recovered 3.72 pounds of cocaine, 2.08 pounds of heroin, $16,085 in cash, and a digital scale. Charged under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), Hines successfully moved to suppress the evidence. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the totality of the circumstances provided probable cause despite the lack of additional information about the informants. View "United States v. Hines" on Justia Law

Rayyan watched online content that glorified ISIS, calling a video entitled “Kill them wherever you find them” “the best.” He featured a photo depicting a jihad-inspired execution on his Twitter account. The FBI monitored Rayyan and noticed that Rayyan had purchased a gun, having filled out a federal form declaring that he did not use illegal drugs. Police stopped Rayyan for speeding and found the revolver and marijuana in the car. Rayyan did not have a concealed pistol license or a medical marijuana card. He admitted that he had smoked marijuana regularly. He later downloaded more ISIS propaganda and tried, unsuccessfully, to buy another firearm, again declaring he was not a habitual drug user. Rayyan went to a firing range, rented an AK-47, and posted a photo of himself online holding it and making a pro-ISIS hand gesture. An undercover FBI employee posing as an ISIS sympathizer messaged him. Rayyan described planning an attack on a nearby church and stated he “regret[ted] not doing it” and wanted to “do . . . jihad” and to murder a police officer. He pled guilty under 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6), for making a false statement while purchasing a firearm, and 922(g)(3), which prohibits a person who regularly uses an unlawful controlled substance from possessing a firearm. The probation office recommended a 15-21 month sentence. The court sentenced him to 60 months due to the risk he posed to the public, the need to deter others, and the severity of his crime. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the 33-page explanation of the sentence. View "United States v. Rayyan" on Justia Law

Rayyan watched online content that glorified ISIS, calling a video entitled “Kill them wherever you find them” “the best.” He featured a photo depicting a jihad-inspired execution on his Twitter account. The FBI monitored Rayyan and noticed that Rayyan had purchased a gun, having filled out a federal form declaring that he did not use illegal drugs. Police stopped Rayyan for speeding and found the revolver and marijuana in the car. Rayyan did not have a concealed pistol license or a medical marijuana card. He admitted that he had smoked marijuana regularly. He later downloaded more ISIS propaganda and tried, unsuccessfully, to buy another firearm, again declaring he was not a habitual drug user. Rayyan went to a firing range, rented an AK-47, and posted a photo of himself online holding it and making a pro-ISIS hand gesture. An undercover FBI employee posing as an ISIS sympathizer messaged him. Rayyan described planning an attack on a nearby church and stated he “regret[ted] not doing it” and wanted to “do . . . jihad” and to murder a police officer. He pled guilty under 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(6), for making a false statement while purchasing a firearm, and 922(g)(3), which prohibits a person who regularly uses an unlawful controlled substance from possessing a firearm. The probation office recommended a 15-21 month sentence. The court sentenced him to 60 months due to the risk he posed to the public, the need to deter others, and the severity of his crime. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting the 33-page explanation of the sentence. View "United States v. Rayyan" on Justia Law

Bergrin’s cousin, Paul, was an infamous defense lawyer, advising clients: “No witness, no case.” Paul was convicted of murdering witnesses, overseeing mortgage fraud and drug trafficking, and violating federal racketeering laws; he was sentenced to life in prison. Bergrin sought revenge and sent an email to Paul’s daughter, saying he was “[l]ess than 1 hour from” Brokos’s home, that he “will be stopping by” the FBI agent in charge of Paul’s case, and that Brokos “will never sleep at night again.” She shared the email. The government charged Bergrin with threatening a federal officer, sending threats in interstate commerce, and cyberstalking. Over the next six months, Bergrin cycled through five sets of lawyers, who disagreed about his competence. The district court referred Bergrin to the Bureau of Prisons for an in-custody evaluation, held a hearing, found Bergrin incompetent, 18 U.S.C. 4241(d), and recommitted him. A second psychiatric report said that Bergrin was competent. During the hearing, Bergrin insisted his attorney was “working ... against” him. The court found that Bergrin was delusional and dismissed the case without prejudice, releasing Bergrin. Bergrin insisted that he “would rather be incarcerated" than declared incompetent. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, after finding that it had jurisdiction. Bergrin remained in custody for 22 months, longer than the court would have sentenced Bergrin had he been convicted. “On this record, it is hard to say who is gaming whom.” View "United States v. Bergrin" on Justia Law

Bergrin’s cousin, Paul, was an infamous defense lawyer, advising clients: “No witness, no case.” Paul was convicted of murdering witnesses, overseeing mortgage fraud and drug trafficking, and violating federal racketeering laws; he was sentenced to life in prison. Bergrin sought revenge and sent an email to Paul’s daughter, saying he was “[l]ess than 1 hour from” Brokos’s home, that he “will be stopping by” the FBI agent in charge of Paul’s case, and that Brokos “will never sleep at night again.” She shared the email. The government charged Bergrin with threatening a federal officer, sending threats in interstate commerce, and cyberstalking. Over the next six months, Bergrin cycled through five sets of lawyers, who disagreed about his competence. The district court referred Bergrin to the Bureau of Prisons for an in-custody evaluation, held a hearing, found Bergrin incompetent, 18 U.S.C. 4241(d), and recommitted him. A second psychiatric report said that Bergrin was competent. During the hearing, Bergrin insisted his attorney was “working ... against” him. The court found that Bergrin was delusional and dismissed the case without prejudice, releasing Bergrin. Bergrin insisted that he “would rather be incarcerated" than declared incompetent. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, after finding that it had jurisdiction. Bergrin remained in custody for 22 months, longer than the court would have sentenced Bergrin had he been convicted. “On this record, it is hard to say who is gaming whom.” View "United States v. Bergrin" on Justia Law