Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Morris pled guilty to the distribution of cocaine base. The plea agreement specified a Guidelines range of 30-37 months in prison. Because an amendment lowering the applicable drug sentencing guidelines was about to become effective, the government did not oppose a two-level downward variance, resulting in a range of 24-30 months. The agreement stated that Morris could withdraw his plea if the court were to impose a sentence higher than 37 months. Morris had two Michigan felony domestic violence convictions under M.C.L. 750.81(2). Under that statute, the first two domestic assault convictions are misdemeanor offenses, subsequent violations are felonies. The court utilized the “modified categorical approach,” examining the transcripts from Morris’s convictions and finding that both qualified as crimes of violence, so that he was a career offender. Morris withdrew his plea, proceeded to trial, and was convicted. The career offender designation resulted in a guidelines range of 210-262 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his sentence of 180 months of imprisonment. Domestic assault includes a risk of confrontation at least equivalent to that associated with burglary, so the conviction constitutes a crime of violence under the Guidelines’ residual clause. The conviction does not qualify under the elements clause; Michigan’s definition of battery does not include an element of “physical force” as defined by the Court in Johnson. View "United States v. Morris" on Justia Law

Morris pled guilty to the distribution of cocaine base. The plea agreement specified a Guidelines range of 30-37 months in prison. Because an amendment lowering the applicable drug sentencing guidelines was about to become effective, the government did not oppose a two-level downward variance, resulting in a range of 24-30 months. The agreement stated that Morris could withdraw his plea if the court were to impose a sentence higher than 37 months. Morris had two Michigan felony domestic violence convictions under M.C.L. 750.81(2). Under that statute, the first two domestic assault convictions are misdemeanor offenses, subsequent violations are felonies. The court utilized the “modified categorical approach,” examining the transcripts from Morris’s convictions and finding that both qualified as crimes of violence, so that he was a career offender. Morris withdrew his plea, proceeded to trial, and was convicted. The career offender designation resulted in a guidelines range of 210-262 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his sentence of 180 months of imprisonment. Domestic assault includes a risk of confrontation at least equivalent to that associated with burglary, so the conviction constitutes a crime of violence under the Guidelines’ residual clause. The conviction does not qualify under the elements clause; Michigan’s definition of battery does not include an element of “physical force” as defined by the Court in Johnson. View "United States v. Morris" on Justia Law

Counts 1-4 and 6 alleged Bacon sold firearms to prohibited persons, 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(1). Counts 5 and 7 charged Bacon with possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, 18 U.S.C. 922(k). Bacon entered guilty pleas to Counts 1 and 5. The prosecution agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Bacon testified that he purchased the Count 1 firearm and sold it from his Grand Rapids home "with reasonable cause to know that [the purchaser was] a felon.” The government proffered that the Count 1 purchaser had been convicted of a felony and that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce. Bacon confirmed that he sold the Count 5 firearm, a semiautomatic pistol with an obliterated serial number, to a prohibited person at the same house, and had removed the serial number. The government proffered that the Count 5 firearm was manufactured in Ohio. Defense counsel stipulated to all facts proffered by the government and confirmed that Bacon was “satisfied” with the record. The court sentenced Bacon to 60 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Bacon’s arguments that the sections under which he was convicted exceeded Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. The interstate commerce element, which Bacon admitted when entering his plea, ensures that the firearms affected interstate commerce and saves the statute from any jurisdictional defects. View "United States v. Bacon" on Justia Law

Counts 1-4 and 6 alleged Bacon sold firearms to prohibited persons, 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(1). Counts 5 and 7 charged Bacon with possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, 18 U.S.C. 922(k). Bacon entered guilty pleas to Counts 1 and 5. The prosecution agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Bacon testified that he purchased the Count 1 firearm and sold it from his Grand Rapids home "with reasonable cause to know that [the purchaser was] a felon.” The government proffered that the Count 1 purchaser had been convicted of a felony and that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce. Bacon confirmed that he sold the Count 5 firearm, a semiautomatic pistol with an obliterated serial number, to a prohibited person at the same house, and had removed the serial number. The government proffered that the Count 5 firearm was manufactured in Ohio. Defense counsel stipulated to all facts proffered by the government and confirmed that Bacon was “satisfied” with the record. The court sentenced Bacon to 60 months. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting Bacon’s arguments that the sections under which he was convicted exceeded Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. The interstate commerce element, which Bacon admitted when entering his plea, ensures that the firearms affected interstate commerce and saves the statute from any jurisdictional defects. View "United States v. Bacon" on Justia Law

Westine completed a 235-month sentence for securities fraud, and, within months, began offering investments in oil wells. Prospective investors were promised their “[f]irst monthly check within 90 days.” Investors never received royalties; they complained to the Kentucky Department of Financial Institutions, which concluded that the companies were selling unlawful securities and obtained a restraining order. Westine and Ramer, his partner, began winding down the companies and transitioning to new companies that collected over $2 million from 138 investors, who never received checks. Ramer oversaw call centers, developed a promotional video that boasted a fictional production capacity of 75 barrels per day, and organized a trip, during which investors were introduced to another co-conspirator, Cornell, who provided a tour of his oil facility, to create an appearance of legitimacy. Defendants began to shift operations to a new company, and, in less than two months, collected $242,233 from 12 investors. Defendants were charged with 29 counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341; conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h); and securities fraud, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b). A jury found each Defendant guilty. The court sentenced Westine to 480 months’ and Ramer to 156 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the admission of “prior acts” evidence and rejecting various hearsay challenges. Given the evidence against the Defendants, later-discovered evidence that Cornell was running a side deal is insufficient to warrant remand. View "United States v. Ramer" on Justia Law

Westine completed a 235-month sentence for securities fraud, and, within months, began offering investments in oil wells. Prospective investors were promised their “[f]irst monthly check within 90 days.” Investors never received royalties; they complained to the Kentucky Department of Financial Institutions, which concluded that the companies were selling unlawful securities and obtained a restraining order. Westine and Ramer, his partner, began winding down the companies and transitioning to new companies that collected over $2 million from 138 investors, who never received checks. Ramer oversaw call centers, developed a promotional video that boasted a fictional production capacity of 75 barrels per day, and organized a trip, during which investors were introduced to another co-conspirator, Cornell, who provided a tour of his oil facility, to create an appearance of legitimacy. Defendants began to shift operations to a new company, and, in less than two months, collected $242,233 from 12 investors. Defendants were charged with 29 counts of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341; conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h); and securities fraud, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b). A jury found each Defendant guilty. The court sentenced Westine to 480 months’ and Ramer to 156 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the admission of “prior acts” evidence and rejecting various hearsay challenges. Given the evidence against the Defendants, later-discovered evidence that Cornell was running a side deal is insufficient to warrant remand. View "United States v. Ramer" on Justia Law

Michael, a licensed pharmacist at Chapmanville's Aracoma Pharmacy, separately co-owns another West Virginia pharmacy and one in Pennsylvania. The government suspected that Michael used the pharmacies to distribute on-demand prescription drugs, worth more than $4 million, over the Internet. A grand jury returned a multi-count indictment. Count 7 charged Michael with fraudulently submitting a claim for payment to Humana for dispensing medication that was never dispensed (18 U.S.C. 1347). Count 8 charged him with committing aggravated identity theft by using the “identifying information” of a doctor and a patient “in relation to the [health care fraud] offense” (18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1), (c)(11)). Michael had submitted a claim to Humana indicating that A.S. (doctor) had prescribed Lovaza for P.R., including the doctor’s National Provider Identifier and the patient’s name and birth date. A.S. was not P.R.’s doctor and did not issue the prescription. Section 1028A requires a person to “assume the identity” of someone else; the district court held that the statute covered only “impersonation,” and dismissed Count 8. The Sixth Circuit reversed. To “use” a means of identification is to “convert to one’s service” or “employ” the means of identification. Michael used A.S. and P.R.’s identifying information to fashion a fraudulent submission, making the misuse of these means of identification “during and in relation to” healthcare fraud. View "United States v. Michael" on Justia Law

Michael, a licensed pharmacist at Chapmanville's Aracoma Pharmacy, separately co-owns another West Virginia pharmacy and one in Pennsylvania. The government suspected that Michael used the pharmacies to distribute on-demand prescription drugs, worth more than $4 million, over the Internet. A grand jury returned a multi-count indictment. Count 7 charged Michael with fraudulently submitting a claim for payment to Humana for dispensing medication that was never dispensed (18 U.S.C. 1347). Count 8 charged him with committing aggravated identity theft by using the “identifying information” of a doctor and a patient “in relation to the [health care fraud] offense” (18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1), (c)(11)). Michael had submitted a claim to Humana indicating that A.S. (doctor) had prescribed Lovaza for P.R., including the doctor’s National Provider Identifier and the patient’s name and birth date. A.S. was not P.R.’s doctor and did not issue the prescription. Section 1028A requires a person to “assume the identity” of someone else; the district court held that the statute covered only “impersonation,” and dismissed Count 8. The Sixth Circuit reversed. To “use” a means of identification is to “convert to one’s service” or “employ” the means of identification. Michael used A.S. and P.R.’s identifying information to fashion a fraudulent submission, making the misuse of these means of identification “during and in relation to” healthcare fraud. View "United States v. Michael" on Justia Law

Higdon pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 15 years in prison as an armed career criminal based in part on a 1984 North Carolina conviction for discharging a firearm into an occupied structure. The offense requires an application of force to an occupied structure, but not to the occupants themselves. Higdon did not appeal but moved to set aside his sentence after the Supreme Court invalidated the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the offense was not a “violent felony” under the Act's remaining provisions because it does not involve the use “of physical force against the person of another,” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Under the North Carolina statute, the projectile can miss the structure’s occupants altogether—with no physical force applied to the person of anyone—and yet the shooting can satisfy all the elements of the offense. The elements might satisfy a requirement that the defendant act recklessly, but that requirement is separate from the one that the force be used “against the person of another.” View "Higdon v. United States" on Justia Law

Higdon pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 15 years in prison as an armed career criminal based in part on a 1984 North Carolina conviction for discharging a firearm into an occupied structure. The offense requires an application of force to an occupied structure, but not to the occupants themselves. Higdon did not appeal but moved to set aside his sentence after the Supreme Court invalidated the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that the offense was not a “violent felony” under the Act's remaining provisions because it does not involve the use “of physical force against the person of another,” 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Under the North Carolina statute, the projectile can miss the structure’s occupants altogether—with no physical force applied to the person of anyone—and yet the shooting can satisfy all the elements of the offense. The elements might satisfy a requirement that the defendant act recklessly, but that requirement is separate from the one that the force be used “against the person of another.” View "Higdon v. United States" on Justia Law