Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

For two years, Defendant and two others, engaged in sexual acts with eight children. Defendant photographed and videotaped those sexual acts. Child 1, then in sixth grade, testified that Defendant forced him to watch pornographic videos, and threatened to kill Child 1’s family if he told anyone. Child 1 and Child 7, then in third grade, described specific sexual acts. Child 6 testified that Defendant provided the children with liquor and cigarettes. After two children told their mother about Defendant’s conduct, police executed a search warrant on Defendant’s home and seized electronics that captured Defendant’s sexual exploits on the children. Defendant was charged with seven counts of Sexual Exploitation of a Child and/or Attempted Sexual Exploitation of a Child, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and (e); and two counts of possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A. Defense witnesses testified that Defendant engaged in activities at night that he would not be able to remember, such as preparing food and talking in his sleep. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions, upholding the district court’s decision to allow the children to testify by closed circuit television; admission of evidence pertaining to Defendant’s: grooming activity, sexual assaults on children, activity with children, and attempted production of child pornography; and the imposition of a 2,880-month sentence. View "United States v. Cox" on Justia Law

Defendant pointed a gun at an agent for a vehicle repossession company and threatened to shoot him and was indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). At his arraignment, Defendant acknowledged his presence in federal court, but challenged the court’s jurisdiction, stated that the government was “trying to charge [him] with” a “commercial crime” and that the government could not be the victim of a commercial crime. Defendant asked the judge if he was “forcing [Defendant] to contract,” and referred to himself as a “flesh and blood living being,” whose detention on “U.S. soil” was unconstitutional. Weeks later, Defendant’s appointed counsel moved to withdraw after Defendant became “combative” during a meeting. Defendant told the court that he was present “on special appearance, [as a] third-party intervenor,” claimed that he was a “beneficiary and executor to the legal estate of the decedent,” and made other irrational statements. The court ordered new counsel. Days before trial, Defendant filed a pro se notice reiterating his jurisdictional challenge as a “Moorish American National.” After his conviction, Defendant challenged the court’s failure to order, sua sponte, a mental competency evaluation (18 U.S.C. 4241(a)). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Defendant’s arguments "correspond to meritless rhetoric frequently espoused by tax protesters, sovereign citizens, and self-proclaimed Moorish-Americans." Defendant expressed "fringe" views but did not exhibit irrational behavior before or during trial or “act in a way that called his competency into question.” View "United States v. Coleman" on Justia Law

In 1998, a jury convicted Coley of attempted murder, two counts each of kidnapping and aggravated robbery, and three counts of aggravated murder (with the felony-murder aggravating circumstance attached to each count). He was sentenced to death. After unsuccessfully pursuing state-court relief, he unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief in 2003. In 2017, Coley filed a new federal habeas petition. The Sixth Circuit denied Coley permission to file a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, based on his argument that the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision, Hurst v. Florida, rendered Ohio’s death-penalty scheme unconstitutional. Even if Hurst announced “a new rule of constitutional law,” the Supreme Court has not “made [Hurst] retroactive to cases on collateral review.” While not all second-in-time petitions are “second or successive,” it “cannot be that every new legal rule, including those not made retroactive on collateral review, also constitutes a new factual predicate,” and Coley has not shown that the facts underlying his claim “would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence” that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty. View "In re: Coley" on Justia Law

Three of Hand’s four wives died, two as victims of violent, unsolved home invasions. The death of Hand’s fourth wife, Jill, occurred while he was at home. Hand confronted and shot the intruder, who turned out to be his friend and employee Welch. An investigation revealed a plot between the men to kill all three women in order to receive life insurance proceeds. Hand was convicted of the aggravated murders of Jill and Welch, with death-penalty specifications, conspiracy to commit the aggravated murders, and an attempt to escape police custody after he was arrested. The jury recommended and the judge imposed the death penalty. After unsuccessful state appeals and post-conviction proceedings, Hand unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit rejected several claims involving the adequacy of the voir dire at his trial to screen jurors because of pretrial publicity and ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to the voir dire; ineffective assistance claims related to mitigation evidence and the reintroduction of evidence of guilt during the sentencing phase; and the adequacy of evidence supporting the death penalty specifications. View "Hand v. Houk" on Justia Law

The Laniers were involved in a scheme fraudulently to obtain government contracts reserved for businesses owned by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals or by service-disabled veterans. During deliberations at their trial, a juror contacted assistant district attorney Nelson—a social acquaintance and a state prosecutor not involved with the Laniers's federal case. Nelson called the district court and told the judge that Juror 11 called her and said that there was a “problem” with the deliberations. According to the district judge’s account, Nelson told Juror 11 that they could not discuss deliberations and that Juror 11 should alert the judge. No juror alerted court personnel to problems with the deliberations. The court officer reported that the jury was “clearly divided ... and they’re angry with each other.” The jury convicted the Laniers of conspiracy to commit wire fraud; wire fraud; and major fraud against the U.S. Defendants unsuccessfully requested to interview the jurors and moved for a mistrial, stating that the jury had been at an impasse but then returned a verdict after a juror contacted a third party. No one ever interviewed Juror 11 about the telephone call nor interviewed any other juror about whether Juror 11 discussed the call with other jurors. Although the district court talked by phone with Nelson and counsel interviewed her after the trial, no one questioned Nelson in open court or under oath. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded for a Remmer hearing. View "United States v. Lanier" on Justia Law

In 2005, Defendant pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute cocaine hydrochloride, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). The Probation Office determined that Defendant was to be held accountable for conspiring to distribute at least 12 kilograms of cocaine hydrochloride; under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1(a), Defendant was classified as a career offender with an enhanced offense level based on his prior felony convictions for controlled substances. Defendant’s offense level was reduced three levels for his acceptance of responsibility. His guideline range for imprisonment according to the 2004 Sentencing Guidelines was 262-327 months but section 841(b)(1)(A) required imposition of a minimum term of life due to Defendant’s prior felony controlled substance convictions, U.S.S.G. 5G1.1(b). The government moved for a downward departure based on Defendant’s substantial assistance. The court granted that motion and imposed a sentence of 211 months. In 2015, Defendant moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and Guidelines Amendments 780, 782, and 788, arguing that the court departed downward from a guideline range of life and that this guideline range of life was lowered by Amendment 780. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion Defendant’s sentence was based on Defendant’s status as a career offender, not on a drug quantity; Defendant is ineligible for the reduction. View "United States v. Cook" on Justia Law

During the execution of a warrant to arrest Penney while he was selling 200 pounds of marijuana, Penney fired shots, injuring two federal agents. In 2005, Penney was convicted of 15 drug and firearm offenses and an attempt to kill a federal agent. The SIxth Circuit affirmed Penney’s sentence of 895 months’ imprisonment. In 2011, Penney’s counsel filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his sentence, which was denied as meritless. The court denied Penney’s pro se motion to amend because he was represented by counsel and no order of substitution had been entered. While Penney’s appeal was pending, he moved to amend the judgment, arguing that denial of his motion to amend created a “manifest miscarriage of justice” because “valid claims of actual innocence and unauthorized detention [could] trump time and procedural bars.” The court denied the motion and denied a certificate of appealability. The Supreme Court denied Penney’s certiorari petition. In 2015, Penney’s counsel moved for relief from judgment under FRCP 60(b)(1) and (6), arguing that the court erred when it denied Penney’s motion to amend. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of the motion. The miscarriage of justice exception applies to untimely Rule 60(b) motions and motions to amend but Penney failed to make the required showing of actual innocence. View "Penney v. United States" on Justia Law

Duke was sentenced to a 156-month term of imprisonment for conspiracy to commit wire fraud but failed to self-surrender. A warrant issued for his arrest, a new indictment was filed, charging Duke with failure to surrender for a sentence, and Duke was arrested. At the arraignment, defense counsel requested that Duke be transferred to the prison to which he had originally been designated to report or to a prison in Milan, Michigan. The government opposed Duke’s request, instead requesting that Duke be transferred to a local facility. Duke “yelled ‘you f**cking b**ch’ and ran towards the government attorney.” He “grabbed the victim by the back of the victim’s head[,] struck the victim with his fist several times[, and] smashed the victim’s head into a table repeatedly. The victim’s legs were pushed into the table during the attack, causing bruising.” People within the courtroom “subdued” Duke, who was convicted for the assault. At sentencing, the court determined that the table was a “dangerous weapon” under the Guidelines Manual, triggering sentencing enhancements. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his 97-month sentence, rejecting an argument that those enhancements constitute impermissible double counting for the same conduct. View "United States v. Duke" on Justia Law

In 1999, 12-year-old C.M. left home. Her sister and her sister’s boyfriend searched the neighborhood. Returning home, they found C.M. disoriented. C.M. stated that she had been at the neighboring Mills house and Mills had smoked marijuana with her and fondled her. They confronted Mills in front of his sons and contacted the Lewisburg, Tennessee police. Mills was indicted. The Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) reported that semen was found in C.M.’s underwear. C.M. then stated that Mills had engaged in sexual intercourse with her. A DNA analysis by Jenkins indicated a 0.3% chance that the DNA belonged to a Caucasian other than Mills but contradicted C.M.’s claims about Valium and marijuana. Mills was convicted of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and casual exchange of a controlled substance. In a habeas proceeding, the Federal Public Defender sent the evidence to a private DNA laboratory, SERI, which was unable to retest the same portions of the underwear. Using the “same analysis techniques” on an adjacent section, SERI concluded that it contained semen from two males, neither was Mills. After serving 11 years in prison, Mills was released. The state overturned Mills’s convictions. Mills suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, and 1985, against the Assistant District Attorney General, Jenkins, and a police investigator, in their individual and official capacities; the TBI Director in his official capacity; Marshall County; and the city, was dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed dismissal of claims against Jenkins for malicious prosecution, fabrication of evidence, and a Brady claim. Jenkins may be able to provide evidence that SERI's analytic methods differed, that the evidence available was not exculpatory, or that her actions were negligent at worst. View "Mills v. Barnard" on Justia Law

Fontana, in his 50s, posed as a 16-year-old to chat with a 15-year-old female living near Detroit. Fontana claimed that his computer’s camera was broken and convinced his victim to take off her shirt. He recorded this act, then used the threat of publishing this recording online to force her to perform sexual acts, which he recorded and used as additional leverage. He forced her to be in front of her web camera at certain times, to sleep in a certain position, to ask for permission to go out, and to convince a 14-year-old friend to perform sexual acts for him. The girl’s mother contacted the police. Following extradition from Canada on 12 child pornography-related charges, Fontana pleaded guilty to four charges. Applying 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), the judge considered that, after Fontana’s arrest, investigators discovered images of up to 50 victims, including minors, none of whom were the basis for Fontana’s extradition. Fontana argued that consideration of the additional victims violated the U.S.-Canada extradition treaty’s “specialty” requirement that he only be detained, tried, or punished for the crimes for which he was extradited. The Sixth Circuit rejected the argument. The treaty does not preclude taking into account activity that is not the basis of the extradition in determining punishment for the crimes on which the extradition was based, at least as long as such consideration did not affect the statutory range of that punishment. View "United States v. Fontana" on Justia Law