Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Officer Turner responded to reports that a woman was intoxicated at Wal-Mart. Turner found the woman, Lakes, who was “clearly under the influence.” Lakes stated that she was with Lewis, who was in his truck and would drive her home. Officers approached Lewis’s truck. It was dark outside and the windows were tinted. Turner looked inside and saw Lewis asleep on the passenger side. Officer Cloyd and Lakes went to the front-passenger side; either Cloyd or Lakes opened the door. The interior light went on, causing Lewis to startle and enabling Turner to see that Lewis had a clear plastic baggie on his lap. Lewis tossed the baggie over the console onto the back floorboard. Turner suspected that the baggie contained marijuana, shined his flashlight onto it, and observed that it contained “like a bluish color stuff.” Turner opened the door, inspected the bag closely, and saw that it contained pills. Lewis appeared to be under the influence. Lewis and Lake were arrested. The bag was tested; it contained 493 oxycodone and 5 Xanax. Four Xanax pills were found on Lewis’s person. Lewis was indicted under 18 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Lewis’s motion to suppress. The officers’ purpose was to find Lakes a safe ride home, they were not investigating a crime. Lewis’s subsequent behavior gave Turner probable cause to search the truck under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Defendant is a member of the Saginaw Chippewa Tribal Nation. Before his arrest and incarceration, he resided on the Isabella Reservation in Mt. Pleasant, Michigan with his wife and his step-daughter, B.J. Defendant repeatedly sexually abused B.J. and his nieces for several years when the three were young children. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of life in prison for three counts of aggravated sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. 2241(c), one count of sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. 2242(2), and one count of abusive sexual contact, 18 U.S.C. 2244(a)(2); 15 years in prison for two counts of sexual abuse of a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2243(a); and three years in prison for one count of abusive sexual contact, 18 U.S.C. 2244(a)(2). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, upholding the admission of evidence of his past sexual assaults pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 403 and that his victims witnessed him physically assault his wife pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403. View "United States v. Mandoka" on Justia Law

The government sought forfeiture (21 U.S.C. 881(a)(4),(6), (7); 18 U.S.C. 981) of bank accounts, real properties, vehicles, and $91,500 in U.S. currency, related to its investigation into Salouha and Sbeih. Salouha allegedly illegally sold prescription drugs through his Ohio pharmacies, 21 U.S.C. 841. Salouha and Sbeih allegedly laundered the receipts through their accounts, 18 U.S.C. 1956. Sbeih and his wife filed verified claims to seven of the personal bank accounts. Sbeih was indicted but failed to appear. The court issued an arrest warrant, lifted the stay on the civil forfeiture case and scheduled a status conference. Sbeih’s counsel sought permission for Sbeih not to attend, as he was in Israel. Sbeih alleged that he was in danger of losing his Jerusalem permanent residency permit if he left Israel. The court granted the motion. The government moved to strike Sbeih’s claim under the fugitive disentitlement statute, 28 U.S.C. 2466. The court waited to see whether the Salouhas, Sbeih’s codefendants, were able to reenter the country, but ultimately granted the government’s motion to strike Sbeih’s claim and ordered forfeiture. While section 2466 requires the government to prove that the claimants had a specific intent of avoiding criminal prosecution in deciding to remain outside the U.S., it does not require that that intent be the sole or principal intent. In this case, however, government did not meet its burden of proving that Sbeih was not returning to the U.S. to avoid prosecution View "United States v. $525,695.24" on Justia Law

The government sought forfeiture (21 U.S.C. 881(a)(4),(6), (7); 18 U.S.C. 981) of bank accounts, real properties, vehicles, and $91,500 in U.S. currency, related to its investigation into Salouha and Sbeih. Salouha allegedly illegally sold prescription drugs through his Ohio pharmacies; Salouha and Sbeih allegedly laundered the receipts. Salouha and his wife claimed several assets. Salouha was indicted but failed to appear. The court issued an arrest warrant. Permission for Salouha to attend a status conference regarding the forfeiture via telephone was denied. Salouha, his pregnant wife and four children, had moved to Gaza after the asset seizure; travel restrictions made their return difficult. Salouha did not attend. The government moved to strike his claims under the fugitive disentitlement statute, 28 U.S.C. 2466. The court waited to see whether Salouha could return with the help of the State Department. Salouha did not to respond. The court struck the claims but did not order forfeiture. Seven months later, the court approved a Stipulated Settlement Agreement and Decree of Forfeiture, under which Salouha’s wife withdrew her claims to all but a house and car. The remaining properties, claimed by the Sbeihs, were ordered forfeited the following month. Weeks later the Salouhas unsuccessfully moved to vacate the judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The district court properly credited the government's uncontested statements, and relied on the knowledge of Mrs. Salouha’s return, to conclude that Salouha was deliberately staying outside U.S. jurisdiction to avoid prosecution. View "United States v. $525,695.24" on Justia Law

Ferguson pled guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The court found that at least three of Ferguson’s eight Tennessee convictions were violent felonies that triggered the Armed Career Criminal Act’s 15-year mandatory minimum sentence, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Ferguson’s three aggravated burglary convictions no longer count; Tennessee’s aggravated burglary statute sweeps more broadly than the generic definition. Ferguson’s five burglary convictions do trigger ACCA. Tennessee’s burglary statute provides that: A person commits burglary who, without the effective consent of the property owner: (1) Enters a building other than a habitation (or any portion thereof) not open to the public, with intent to commit a felony, theft or assault; (2) Remains concealed, with the intent to commit a felony, theft or assault, in a building; (3) Enters a building and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft or assault; or (4) Enters any freight or passenger car, automobile, truck, trailer, boat, airplane or other motor vehicle with intent to commit a felony, theft or assault or commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft or assault. The Supreme Court defines “generic burglary” as “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” View "United States v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

Sylvester was indicted on February 26, 2003. There were multiple superseding indictments. Sylvester went to trial on September 13, 2005 and was convicted of possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense, felon in possession of a firearm, possession of marijuana, possession with intent to distribute oxycodone, diazepam, hydrocodone, and codeine, using interstate travel to acquire and transport five kilograms of cocaine, traveling in interstate commerce to acquire five kilograms of cocaine, and conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Sylvester moved to vacate his sentence (28 U.S.C. 2255), arguing that his trial and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to pursue Speedy Trial Act claims. The district court dismissed, finding that Sylvester failed to show that he was prejudiced. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Because the Speedy Trial Act was violated and those violations would have led to a dismissal of the charges brought under the First and Second Superseding Indictments, Sylvester’s counsel rendered deficient performance, however, there is no evidence of prosecutorial bad faith and Sylvester did not show that the court would have dismissed the charges with prejudice. View "Sylvester v. United States" on Justia Law

Sumpter spent a month in the Wayne County Jail in Detroit and underwent four strip searches that she alleges violated her Fourth Amendment rights. Three searches occurred in the jail’s Registry, where inmates are routinely strip-searched when first arriving or returning to jail. Corporal Graham conducted the three Registry searches; no male deputies were present. Each time, Graham escorted plaintiff into the Registry with as many as five other women. The room’s window was covered, preventing anyone outside the Registry from observing the searches. Inside, Graham instructed the inmates to undress and to shake their hair, open their mouths, lift their breasts, and squat and cough, while Graham visually inspected for hidden contraband. The fourth search occurred in plaintiff’s cellblock. After searching the cells for contraband, an unidentified female guard gathered the inmates in the common area and conducted a group strip search. According to plaintiff, the strip search took place in view of the guards’ central command post inside the cellblock, called the “Bubble.” During this search, plaintiff purportedly saw male guards inside the Bubble. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of Sumpter’s purported class action suit. Periodically conducting group strip searches when the number of inmates waiting to be processed makes individual searches imprudent does not violate clearly established Fourth Amendment law. View "Sumpter v. Wayne County" on Justia Law

In 1998, Tibbetts was convicted of murder, aggravated murder, and aggravated robbery and was sentenced to death. Tibbetts filed his first habeas petition in 2003, challenging “the administration of the death penalty by lethal injection.” A Magistrate determined found the claim meritless. Tibbetts did not object to this ruling, abandoning that claim. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition. Tibbetts filed his second habeas petition in 2014, listing 10 grounds for relief, all relating to execution by lethal injection under Ohio law. The district court determined that this was a second-or-successive petition, over which it lacked jurisdiction, and transferred it to the Sixth Circuit, which dismissed. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act limits the authority of federal courts to grant relief to individuals who previously filed a habeas petition; petitioners challenging state court judgments must seek authorization in a federal appeals court before filing a “second or successive” petition in district court, 28 U.S.C. 2244(b). A second-or-successive petition stating claims that were presented in a prior petition “shall be dismissed.” Tibbetts argued that he could not raise his lethal-injection challenge until the state adopted the revised execution protocol. Tibbetts raised such a general claim in his first petition, none of the newly arising circumstances identified in his second petition are necessary to a general claim that his sentence to death by lethal injection is unconstitutional. View "In re: Tibbetts" on Justia Law

Tanner, convicted of murder in 2000, unsuccessfully sought habeas relief, arguing that the Michigan Supreme Court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent when it upheld the denial of funding for a defense serology or DNA expert, and when it held that there was sufficient evidence to convict Tanner. The Sixth Circuit granted relief. Tanner was convicted based on insufficient evidence. The inculpatory evidence establishes, at best, “reasonable speculation” that Tanner was in the crime scene’s parking lot around the time of the murder and that she was last in possession of the murder weapon approximately a month before the murder. The court noted contradictory testimony; the lack of evidence that Tanner entered the building or that the knife was in her possession near the time of the murder. The blood found at the scene matched Tanner’s blood type and PMG subtype. Millions of people share Tanner’s blood type and PGM subtype and there is no way of knowing whether the blood belonged to the perpetrator or to one of the people who gathered after the murder. An unidentified woman’s blood was on the victim’s shirt. The victim was killed during a struggle and the blood did not come from Tanner or from any of her hypothesized accomplices. View "Tanner v. Yukins" on Justia Law

In 1986, Thompson, having served 12 years of a life sentence for an unrelated murder for hire, killed his prison-farm supervisor, stole his possessions, and fled. Thompson was captured and convicted of murder, robbery, and escape. Thompson was granted a retrial on direct appeal, then pleaded guilty to all three counts to avoid jury sentencing. A state court held that Commonwealth was entitled to jury sentencing despite the plea agreement. The jury returned a death-penalty verdict. In state post-conviction proceedings, Thompson succeeded on his claim that the trial court had failed to hold a mandatory competency hearing but was unsuccessful on his other claims for relief. After the trial court held the required competency hearing and found that Thompson had been competent to plead guilty, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed Thompson’s convictions and sentences. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of Thompson’s federal habeas corpus petition raising claims that the jury improperly considered extraneous evidence when it discussed a news account about another violent criminal who had committed a murder after earning parole at age 70; that jury instructions violated the Supreme Court’s 1988 holding, Mills v. Maryland, because they stated that the “verdict” had to be returned unanimously but did not expressly state that unanimity was not required for a juror to find a mitigating factor; and the Kentucky Supreme Court did not adequately conduct a comparative-proportionality review in assessing whether Thompson’s death sentence was excessive or disproportionate. View "Thompson v. Parker" on Justia Law