Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Brown arrived to pick up Hamilton for what he thought was a date. Hamilton’s boyfriend, Stewart, was waiting for him. A struggle ensued. Shots were fired. The men grappled down an apartment stairwell building and out the door. At the end of a trail of blood, Brown lay dead with several gunshot wounds in his chest. Stewart was gone. Michigan charged Stewart and Hamilton with felony murder, felon in possession of a firearm, armed robbery, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. The evidence at a joint trial showed that Stewart and Hamilton planned to rob Brown. The jury found Stewart guilty. The court sentenced him to life for the first-degree felony murder conviction, two years for the felony-firearm conviction, and 25-50 years for the armed robbery and conspiracy convictions. The jury also found Hamilton guilty. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Stewart’s conviction, finding some claims forfeited, others without error, and still others harmless. The federal district court granted habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The state court properly found that any of Hamilton’s statements that were admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause were cumulative of properly admitted evidence and not outcome-determinative. Given the judge’s curative instructions, prosecutorial statements about credibility did not deprive Steward of due process. View "Stewart v. Trierweiler" on Justia Law

In 2004, when the Sentencing Guidelines were deemed mandatory, Raybon pleaded guilty to distributing more than 50 grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), agreeing that he qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, based on a prior drug trafficking conviction and a conviction for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. The career offender designation increased his guidelines range to 262-327 months’ imprisonment (from 140-175 months). The Sixth Circuit affirmed a sentence 295 months’ imprisonment. Ten years later, under a different regime of “effectively advisory” Guidelines, Raybon moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 based on the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Johnson, which invalidated the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), as unconstitutionally void for vagueness. Raybon argued that his predicate conviction for assault with intent to do great bodily harm no longer qualified as a crime of violence under an identically-worded residual clause in the career offender guideline. The district court denied the motion as untimely. The Sixth Circuit affirmed; whether the 2015 Johnson decision applies to identical language in the mandatory guidelines is an open question. Raybon’s appeal was not based on a right newly established by the Supreme Court in 2015. View "Raybon v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1986, Black shot his girlfriend Angela’s ex-husband. Black pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two years at a Davidson County, Tennessee, workhouse. In 1988, while on a weekend furlough, Black entered Angela’s home, shot Angela as she slept, and then shot Angela’s nine-year-old and six-year-old children, killing all three. Black returned to the workhouse before officers discovered the bodies. Black’s trial and post-conviction proceedings have spanned nearly 30 years. In 2000, Black filed an unsuccessful federal habeas petition, claiming that his mental retardation precluded the imposition of the death penalty. After two remands, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. While the Supreme Court and the Tennessee courts have recently recognized limitations imposed by the Eighth Amendment on the power of states to execute mentally retarded persons, those developments do not give Black a reprieve from his death sentence. The court rejected Black’s claims that the district court erred in perceiving the remand to be a limited remand; erred in denying Black an evidentiary hearing; erred in failing to apply a summary-judgment standard in ruling on Black’s Atkins claim; and erred in its merits determination regarding relief under the Supreme Court’s "Atkins" standard. Black did not meet his burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he has significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that manifested before Black turned 18. View "Black v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Attorney King approached Terry, a supposed drug dealer, at a strip club. King offered to help Terry launder drug money. Terry, actually a confidential informant, told the police, who arranged several meetings that Terry secretly recorded. Terry told King that he had drugs shipped in from Mexico but that he didn’t sell the product at the “street level.” None Terry's statements were true. King proposed to imitate what he had seen on Breaking Bad: One option was to use a “cash heavy” entertainment business. He also suggested funneling money through his IOLTA trust account used by attorneys to hold client money: King would provide fictitious legal services, deduct payments from the account, and return the remaining money to Terry. They agreed to the IOLTA account approach. Terry gave King $20,000. King promised to deposit it in his IOLTA account. King gave Terry a check for $2,000 in February and another for the same amount in March. King was convicted of two counts of money laundering and one count of attempted money laundering and was sentenced to 44 months in prison. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the introduction of recorded conversations between him and the informant violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses and that the court improperly allowed the prosecution to ask him about his prior arrest for cocaine possession. View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

Edwards was killed in 1991. In 1999, Defendant, incarcerated on unrelated charges, contacted Chattanooga Police, stating he had information related to the unsolved murder. Detective Mathis interviewed Defendant. Defendant was not under arrest or charged with Edwards’ murder at the time of his recorded confession. Mathis testified he did not promise anything in return for the confession; that Defendant waived his right to remain silent and to an attorney; that he talked with Defendant for some time before reading him his Miranda rights because Defendant stated that he had heard about the murder, not that he was involved; and that he told Defendant that he would tell the district attorney’s office that Defendant had come forward and cooperated. Defendant testified that he asked to speak with his attorney but that Mathis stated he did not need an attorney and that Mathis promised him that Defendant would not be charged with the murder and promised to speak with Defendant’s parole officer and the district attorney about other cases in return for cooperation. A jury convicted him of first-degree felony murder and aggravated robbery. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal; state courts denied post-conviction relief. The district court denied petitions for federal habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The state court’s ruling was objectively reasonable in finding that Defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes. An individual who is not in Miranda custody has no constitutional right to counsel. View "Schreane v. Ebbert" on Justia Law

Perry conditionally pled guilty to conspiring to possess narcotics with intent to distribute. On appeal, Perry argued that the activities indicating drug sales that were observed over the seven weeks before the issuance of the search warrant were stale evidence because the activities were not individually dated. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of his motion to suppress. Even without specific dates, the amount of suspicious activity observed within the seven weeks in connection with Perry’s apartment was enough to support probable cause. The court noted several complaints from concerned residents about drug sales being conducted in the apartment complex and in a black Chevrolet Impala and naming Perry and his girlfriend as the sellers; Perry had several prior drug charges; an officer observed Perry exchange money and packages, which appeared to contain marijuana, at a fence; the officer observed multiple additional transactions involving Perry and his girlfriend that appeared to be drug transactions. The officer stated that his observations occurred between October 15 and December 3—two to 51 days before the probable-cause determination; his observations of heavy car and foot traffic, repeated transactions, and one particular transaction, all suggested that apartment four was home to a sizeable ongoing drug business. View "United States v. Perry" on Justia Law

Ataya pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit health care fraud and wire fraud. In his plea agreement, he relinquished any right to appeal his conviction or sentence “on any grounds.” Atatya nonetheless appealed. The Sixth Circuit directed the parties to brief the question of whether Ataya entered into the plea agreement as a whole knowingly and voluntarily. Ataya understood and accepted the appellate waiver’s consequences, but if he misunderstood the conviction’s key consequences, that undermines the knowingness of the appellate waiver. The district court did not inform Ataya, as Rule 11 requires, that the plea agreement required him to pay restitution and a special assessment and to forfeit the proceeds of his fraud; neither the plea agreement nor the district court mentioned that Ataya, who became a naturalized citizen after the alleged frauds, might face denaturalization as a result of his conviction. Invalidation of the agreement will require him to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” View "United States v. Ataya" on Justia Law

Albaadani came to the U.S. via Saudi Arabia at age 17. In 2015, an order of removal was issued against him because his former wife ceased to sponsor his request for citizenship. Albaadani wants to return to his birthplace, but because Yemen was in a state of “war and political conflict,” no travel documents have been issued. Albaadani was detained for six months, after which he was released subject to monitoring with a GPS ankle monitor. The Immigration and Naturalization Service received a tamper alert on Albaadani’s ankle monitor. When an agent called Albaadani, Albaadani refused to go to an enforcement office and became verbally abusive toward the agent. He was sentenced to nine months of imprisonment for tampering with a GPS ankle monitor, 18 U.S.C. 1361. Albaadani argued that his sentence was based on the impermissible factors of gender and national origin. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, stating that some of the district court’s comments, taken out of context, could appear to be influenced by Albaadani’s national origin, but the court’s explicit and complete reliance on serious threats and photographs attributed to Albaadani indicate that the sentence, viewed as a whole, did not create the appearance of having been based on gender or national origin. View "United States v. Albaadani" on Justia Law

Harold Persaud, M.D., a cardiologist in private practice, was charged with one count of health-care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347, 14 counts of making false statements relating to health-care matters, 18 U.S.C. 1035, and one count of money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1957. The grand jury also returned a forfeiture finding, requiring Persaud to forfeit all property linked to the charges, including $343,634.671 seized from bank accounts associated with Persaud and his wife. At trial, the government presented 34 witnesses, including 11 physicians, eight patients, and four nurses. The defense relied on five witnesses, including an expert cardiologist, two referring physicians, and a coding expert. The jury convicted Persaud on all charges, except for one false-statement count. The jury concluded that the $343,634.67 seized from the Persauds’ bank accounts was forfeitable; the $250,188.42 seized from Persaud’s wife’s account was related to his money-laundering conviction; and Persaud’s scheme generated gross proceeds of $2,100,000. The district court sentenced Persaud to 20 years of imprisonment, a $1,500 special assessment, and restitution of $5,486,857.03, which consists of money damages to be paid to Persaud’s patients, their private insurers, and the government. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The jury was entitled to accept the view of the government’s experts over those of Persaud’s experts. View "United States v. Persaud" on Justia Law

Schock was charged with four counts of sexually exploiting a child, 18 U.S.C. 2251, based on four incidents of Schock taking sexually explicit pictures of a six- to eight-year-old victim. The indictment did not identify the victim or the total number of victims. Schock was also charged with possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A, based on sexually explicit pictures of other children. He agreed to plead guilty to a single incident and that the court could consider all uncharged conduct at sentencing. The PSR started from a base offense level of 32 and recommended enhancements that resulted in a Guidelines range of 360 months’ to life imprisonment: four points (2G2.1(b)(1)(A)) because the victim was under age 12; two points (2G2.1(b)(5)) because the victim was a relative; five points because the offense of conviction was a covered sex crime; and, because Shock’s relevant conduct included more than one victim, two points pursuant to 2G2.1(d)(1)’s adoption of the multiple-count enhancement. The district court imposed a 240-month sentence, citing Schock’s age (66), acceptance of responsibility, and low risk of re-offense. The Sixth Circuit vacated the sentence. The district court erred by finding, on this record, that Schock’s exploitation of Victim 1 (pre-charge conduct) constituted relevant conduct and, therefore, erred in applying the 2G2.1 enhancement. The court also requested clarification of the extent of the incarceration costs that the court intended to impose. View "United States v. Schock" on Justia Law