Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Aaron Porter entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and was sentenced to 43 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. He reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress a firearm found inside of his backpack. On appeal, to the Tenth Circuit, he argued that the Denver police conducted a warrantless search of his backpack and that the district court erred in finding that: (1) he had abandoned the backpack; and (2) the firearm would have been discovered pursuant to an inventory search. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Porter's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Porter" on Justia Law

Petitioner-Appellant Anthony Santucci appealed the denial of his petition for habeas relief. In 2014, a military jury convicted Santucci of rape, forcible sodomy, battery, and adultery. He argued a court-martial trial judge deprived him of his Fifth Amendment right to due process by failing to instruct the jury on an affirmative defense and issuing unconstitutional propensity instructions at his trial. The U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals (the “ACCA”) agreed with Santucci that the court-martial tribunal erred on both issues; nevertheless, it found these errors were harmless and affirmed Santucci’s convictions. In his habeas petition, Santucci argued, in relevant part, that the ACCA misapplied the harmless error standard by failing to review the cumulative impact of the erroneous instructions. Because, in his view, the military tribunals deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial, Santucci contended that the district court was authorized to review the merits of his claims. On habeas review, the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas denied Santucci’s petition, finding that the ACCA had fully and fairly considered his claims. Santucci appealed again, but to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the federal district court should have adjudicated his constitutional claims on the merits. Had the court done so, Santucci contended habeas corpus relief would have been appropriate because the erroneous instructions, viewed cumulatively, prejudiced him beyond a reasonable doubt. The Tenth Circuit affirmed: "Santucci points to nothing in the ACCA’s analysis that causes us to question whether its thorough review encompassed his cumulative-error argument. Rather, he seeks to relitigate his contentions against a finding of harmless error that were already considered—and rejected—by the ACCA ... we cannot fault the ACCA’s analysis—much less subject it to full merits review—simply because it viewed this evidence differently than Mr. Santucci. In the habeas context, the district court was in no position to reevaluate evidence when it was already presented to the military court—nor are we." View "Santucci v. Commandant" on Justia Law

In 2013, Sergeant Robert Motyka, a Denver police officer, shot Michael Valdez, who was lying unarmed on the ground and surrendering. In the ensuing lawsuit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a jury awarded Valdez $131,000 from Sergeant Motyka for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment1 and $2,400,000 from the City and County of Denver (“Denver”) for failure to train its officers. The district court awarded $1,132,327.40 in attorney fees and $18,199.60 in costs to Valdez’s lawyers. The Tenth Circuit addressed three appeals arising from this litigation. Denver challenged the district court's: (1) denial of its motion for summary judgment; (2) reversal of a discovery order and permission for Valdez to present additional municipal liability theories; and (3) jury instructions on municipal liability. Valdez cross-appealed the district court's grant of qualified immunity to Lieutenant John Macdonald, another Denver police officer who shot at him. And Sergeant Motyka and Denver contend that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs. The Tenth Circuit: (1) affirmed the judgment against Denver; (2) affirmed qualified immunity because Valdez did not show the court erred in this respect; and (3) affirmed the attorney fee award but reversed costs, finding the district court did not explain its award after finding Valdez had not substantiated them. The case was remanded for the district court to reexamine whether costs should be awarded. View "Valdez v. City and County of Denver" on Justia Law

Defendant Lougary Eddington appeals the 84-month sentence he received after pleading guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition. The sentence was at the bottom of the 84-105-month Guidelines range, as calculated by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. Eddington contended the district court erred in imposing this sentence because it: (1) improperly applied a four-level enhancement to his base offense level for possessing ammunition “in connection with another felony offense” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B); and (2) failed to adequately consider the need to avoid sentencing disparities between Eddington and one of his codefendants. After review, the Tenth Circuit determined Eddington waived his challenge to the district court’s consideration of sentencing disparities, but that the district court procedurally erred when it applied a four-level enhancement. Accordingly, the Court vacated Eddington’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Eddington" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Hunsaker was one of 19 alleged co-conspirators charged in a 23-count indictment in Oklahoma relating to drug trafficking. Defendant was charged in two counts: Count 1 charged him with conspiring to traffic 500 grams or more of methamphetamine; and Count 18 charged him with possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. Defendant pled guilty to both counts without a plea agreement. The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) described Defendant as the “second in command” of a drug trafficking organization [DTO], concluded he was a “manager or supervisor” of the DTO, and recommended a 3-level enhancement to his offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) (2018). Over Defendant’s objection, the district court agreed with the PSR’s 3-level enhancement under § 3B1.1(b). Defendant’s advisory guideline range was 168 to 210 months; the district court sentenced Defendant to 168 months’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed, challenging his characterization as the “manager or supervisor” of a drug conspiracy as that phrase was used in § 3B1.1(b). Reviewing the district court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard and the application of those facts to the guidelines de novo, the Tenth Circuit reversed. The Court found the undisputed evidence did not establish by a preponderance that Defendant was a “manager or supervisor” subject to a 3-level enhancement to his offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate Defendant’s sentence and resentence him. View "United States v. Hunsaker" on Justia Law

Two expert witnesses testified about the credibility of defendant-appellant Russell Griffith, and the jury later found him guilty of sexually abusing his stepdaughter. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals involved the impact of that opinion testimony on the jury’s finding of guilt. The Court assessed the likely impact based on the parties’ theories and the trial evidence and found both sides focused mainly on the credibility of the stepdaughter rather than Griffith himself. "The focus on the stepdaughter’s credibility softened whatever impact would otherwise have existed from the expert testimony on Mr. Griffith’s credibility." The Court determined the resulting impact was not enough to substantially affect the jury’s finding of guilt. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the convictions. View "United States v. Griffith" on Justia Law

Five individuals were convicted of murder under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (“VICAR”) Act: Arturo Garcia, Billy Garcia, Edward Troup, Andrew Gallegos, and Joe Gallegos. The five were members of the Syndicato de Nuevo México (“SNM”), a violent gang operating in and from New Mexico state prisons. After a joint trial, a jury convicted Billy Garcia, Troup, and Joe Gallegos for the 2001 SNM-ordered in-prison murders; Arturo Garcia and Troup for a 2007 SNM-ordered in-prison murder; and Andrew Gallegos and Joe Gallegos for a 2012 out-of-prison murder and conspiracy to murder. All five defendants separately appealed. Because their appeals arose from the same trial and raised many of the same or overlapping issues, the Tenth Circuit addressed them together. As relevant here, Count 1 alleged Billy Garcia, Troup, Joe Gallegos, and two others murdered Frank Castillo in 2001. Count 2 alleged that, on the same day, Billy Garcia and four others murdered Ronaldo Garza. Count 3 alleged that, in June 2007, Arturo Garcia, Troup, and three others murdered Freddie Sanchez. Counts 4 and 5 alleged Andrew Gallegos and Joe Gallegos conspired to murder and murdered Adrian Burns. Count 13 charged Joe Gallegos with assault of Jose Gomez with a dangerous weapon. And Counts 14 and 15 alleged Joe Gallegos and several others conspired to murder and attempted to murder Gomez. Counts 1 through 5 and 13 through 15 were charged pursuant to VICAR. Finally, Count 16 charged Joe Gallegos and others with the non-VICAR crime of witness tampering based on an attempt to prevent Gomez from testifying against Joe Gallegos. Because the Government failed to provide evidence from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Andrew Gallegos and Joe Gallegos conspired to murder and murdered Burns for a VICAR purpose, the Tenth Circuit vacated the convictions on counts 4 and 5; the Court affirmed the convictions on Counts 1 through 3. View "United States v. Garcia (Arturo)" on Justia Law

Defendant Nathan Pehrson was convicted on charges of diverting hydromorphone, a synthetic opioid known as "Dilaudid," while working as a nurse in a surgical trauma unit in early 2018. Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court erred in allowing expert witness Dr. Ryan Paulsen to testify that the drug test on Defendant’s hair indicated that he had most likely ingested hydromorphone, and in allowing Dr. Richard Cox, who was not qualified as an expert, to give opinion testimony regarding Defendant’s diversion of the drug from its intended use for patients. The Tenth Circuit did not find the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of Dr. Paulsen and any error in allowing the opinion testimony of Dr. Cox was harmless. View "United States v. Pehrson" on Justia Law

Defendant Eusebio DeVargas was indicted on two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He moved ti dismiss his indictment, arguing that neither of his two previous felony convictions could have served as predicate offenses under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) because his civil rights were fully restored after he completed the sentences for each of those convictions. DeVargas also moved to suppress evidence that was seized at his residence at the time of his arrest, as well as post-arrest statements that he made to a law enforcement officer. After the district court denied both of his motions, DeVargas pleaded guilty to a single count of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition and, under the terms of his plea agreement, reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss and his motions to suppress. The Tenth Circuit rejected DeVargas’s arguments and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Devargas" on Justia Law

A district court revoked defendant-appellant Donald Booker’s supervised release and sentenced him to twenty-four months in prison. Booker appealed, arguing the district court erroneously based his sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release on retribution. After review, the Tenth Circuit determined district courts could not modify or revoke a term of supervised release based on the need for retribution. Because the district court quoted from a 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factor representing retribution, the district court erred. “But even assuming this error was plain, Mr. Booker has not shown that it affected his substantial rights because we conclude there is no reasonable probability that his sentence would have been shorter had the court not erred.” Accordinlgly, the Court affirmed Booker’s twenty-four-month sentence. View "United States v. Booker" on Justia Law