Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Simmons pleaded guilty to Transportation with Intent to Engage in Criminal Sexual Activity and was sentenced to 210 months of imprisonment and a lifetime of supervised release. After beginning his supervised release, Simmons choked, punched, and threatened to throw hot grease at his mother. Simmons held both his mother and his girlfriend against their will as he trashed his mother's apartment and threw hot grease. The next day, Simmons’ mother was at the home of a friend. Simmons arrived wearing a mask and fired a gunshot through the front door into an occupied room. A home security camera captured video and audio, including Simmons stating, “Next time I’m going to kill everybody.” Simmons’ mother told his probation officer that Simmons did not live with her, despite him having listed her address as his own with Pennsylvania’s sex offender registry.The U.S. Probation Office alleged four violations of his supervised release: the two violent incidents, failure to update his address with the sex offender registry, and possession of a firearm. The district court found Simmons violated the terms of his release and sentenced him to 21 months’ imprisonment followed by a reimposed life term of supervised release. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting Simmons’s arguments that the court violated 18 U.S.C. 3583(h) by not subtracting the 21 months from his life term of supervised release and that the imposition of a life term of supervised release was substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Simmons" on Justia Law

In 2008, Jenkins pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(e). He was sentenced to the 15-year mandatory minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because he had three prior convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.” including two prior drug convictions and a conviction for aggravated assault under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 2702(a)(3). Section 2702(a)(3) applies to one who “attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury” to certain persons “in the performance of duty.”In 2015, the Supreme Court, in “Johnson," held that ACCA’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. As a result, Jenkins’s Section 2702(a)(3) conviction for a non-enumerated offense would qualify as a predicate violent felony only if it satisfied the elements clause. Jenkins moved to correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, arguing that because Section 2702(a)(3) can be violated without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, it is not a “violent felony” under ACCA’s elements clause. The Third Circuit agreed and granted relief. A violation of Section 2702(a)(3) can be committed by a failure to act. The court acknowledged the “bizarre result” required by the categorical approach in analyzing Pennsylvania’s aggravated assault laws. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

In 2010, Harris pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(e), which typically carries a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. Harris’ PSR concluded that Harris qualified for a sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because his criminal record included three predicate offenses: one serious drug conviction and at least two violent felony convictions. Based on this determination, the district court imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years.In 2016, Harris moved to correct his sentence (28 U.S.C. 2255) following the Supreme Court’s Johnson decision, claiming the statutes underlying his prior convictions criminalize reckless conduct. In 2021, the Supreme Court (Borden) held crimes that could be committed with a mens rea of recklessness do not qualify as violent felonies under ACCA’s element of force clause. Borden eliminated some of Harris’ prior convictions as predicate offenses.Before the Borden decision, the Third Circuit (Mayo) held a Pennsylvania conviction for first-degree aggravated assault does not require physical force as understood within the context of ACCA. Based on Mayo, the Third Circuit vacated Harris’ sentence; his aggravated assault conviction is stricken as a predicate, and he no longer has the three violent felony convictions necessary to justify the enhancement. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Upshur and Thompson operated a trust; people wired fees to Upshur and allowed the defendants to file tax forms representing that the Trust had withheld income tax on their behalf, hopefully yielding sizable refunds. The defendants themselves also participated. Though this scheme was largely unsuccessful, the IRS issued one $1.5 million refund but, realizing, its mistake, froze the payment. In another scheme, they made large fraudulent tax overpayments, hoping to generate refunds. This scheme apparently did not generate any payments from the IRS, but the two schemes, together, resulted in over $325 million in fraudulent tax claims.Upshur was convicted of conspiracy to defraud the United States and eight counts of aiding and assisting in the preparation of false tax returns, 18 U.S.C. 371, 26 U.S.C. 7206(2). The court recognized there was no actual loss to the U.S. Treasury, and calculated Upshur’s base offense level under U.S.S.G. 2T1.4 using the intended-loss figure of $325 million, for a Guidelines range of 324-348 months. The Third Circuit affirmed his 84-month sentence. The court acknowledged its 2022 “Banks” holding that for theft offenses, absent Guideline text extending “loss” to intended loss, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1’s loss table reached only actual loss. However. the texts of sections 2T1.1 and 2T1.4, applicable to tax fraud, indicated that 2T4.1’s loss table covers the loss the perpetrator intended. View "United States v. Upshur" on Justia Law

Nucera was charged with committing a hate crime, depriving another of his civil rights, and making false statements to the FBI, arising from actions he took as a police officer arresting Stroye. His jury engaged in heated deliberations with racial tensions playing a major role. Credibility determinations were crucial, and jurors were deeply divided over whom and what to believe.The Third Circuit rejected Nucera’s claims of jury misconduct. Nucera offers only post-verdict affidavits from jurors who say they experienced racial vitriol, intimidation, and other misconduct that occurred during the jury deliberations. When parties challenge a verdict, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) bars a court from considering a juror’s statement or affidavit unless it satisfies either an exception in the Rule or a constitutional exception created by the Supreme Court (Peña-Rodriguez, 2017), for evidence of racial bias. The latter exception is narrow and specific: it requires a clear statement that a juror voted for a conviction based on racial animus toward, or stereotypes about, the defendant. None of Nucera’s evidence satisfies the Rule 606(b) exceptions nor does it fit the Peña-Rodriguez exception. The court also affirmed a ruling that limited Nucera’s use of the victim’s out-of-court statement and the court’s jury instructions about unanimity. The court vacated Nucera’s sentence; the district court erred in applying the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Nucera" on Justia Law

Corsica, Pennsylvania, with 357 residents and two businesses, is governed by a seven-person Council that meets once a month. In 2009, the Council hired Laird as secretary/treasurer—the Borough’s only paid staff position— at $12.50 per hour. Laird was the point person for Borough audits; only Laird and the Council President were authorized to sign Borough checks. Though two signatures were required, the President “common[ly]” provided Laird with signed blank checks. Between 2009-2017, Laird wrote unauthorized checks from the Borough’s bank account to herself and her husband. She paid her personal expenses by electronically transferring Borough funds and used the Borough’s credit card to purchase personal items. Laird embezzled $345,600.79. The Borough had to double property taxes to recoup some of its losses.Laird pleaded guilty to 26 counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, without a plea agreement. The PSR recommended a two-level increase under U.S.S.G 3B1.3 for Laird’s abuse of a position of trust and a 12-level increase under section 2B1.1(b)(1)(G) for loss between $250,000-$550,000. After decreasing three levels for Laird’s acceptance of responsibility, the PSR calculated a Guidelines sentencing range of 27-33 months’ imprisonment. The district court concluded that Laird’s legitimate salary did not reduce the total loss below $250,000 and applied the abuse-of-trust enhancement. The Third Circuit affirmed Laird’s 21-month sentence and a $266,050.79 restitution order. View "United States v. Laird" on Justia Law

Diaz was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin and cocaine and was sentenced to 33 months’ incarceration followed by 36 months’ supervised release. During that period of supervised release, Scranton Police Officers responded to a report of a physical, domestic incident involving Diaz’s then-girlfriend, Fernandez. Other violations of supervised release included possessing and using marijuana. During a probable cause and detention hearing, Magistrate Saporito heard testimony from Fernandez that she was not scared of Diaz. Saporito imposed a no-contact condition. Fernandez's testimony in the detention hearing was proven false. Diaz had called Fernandez and persuaded her to recant her statements to the police. Saporito ordered Diaz to be detained until his final revocation hearing.At the final supervised release violation hearing, Judge Mannion sentenced Diaz to the statutory maximum of 24 months’ incarceration followed by another two years’ supervised release. Mannion reimposed the no-contact order to apply during Diaz’s incarceration and his new term of supervised release. The Third Circuit vacated in part. The district court lacked either statutory or inherent authority to impose the custodial no-contact order. The court upheld the condition of Diaz’s second period of supervised release as narrowly tailored and sufficiently connected to the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. View "United States v. Santos Diaz" on Justia Law

The Department of Transportation (DOT) provides funds for state transportation projects. States that receive federal transportation funds must set participation goals for disadvantaged business enterprises (DBEs)--for-profit small businesses “at least 51 percent owned by one or more individuals who are both socially and economically disadvantaged” and “[w]hose management and daily business operations are controlled by one or more of the socially and economically disadvantaged individuals who own it.” States certify businesses as DBEs.The defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349, and wire fraud, section 1343, arising out of DOT-financed contracts for work in Philadelphia that included DBE requirements. The Defendants' bids committed to working on the projects with Markias, a company that had prequalified as a DBE. During the performance of their contracts, the Defendants submitted false documentation regarding Markias’ role; PennDOT awarded the Defendants DBE credits and paid them based on their asserted compliance with the DBE requirements. Markias did not do any work on the projects or supply any of the materials. The Defendants arranged for the actual suppliers to send their invoices to Markias, which then issued its own invoices, adding a 2.25% fee.The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions but vacated the forfeiture order and loss calculation. The court acknowledged the complex nature of this fraud in this and commended the attempt to determine the amount of loss for sentencing purposes, and the amount to be forfeited. View "United States v. Kousisis" on Justia Law

Coleman was convicted for supervising a conspiracy to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to life imprisonment before the Supreme Court’s 2000 “Apprendi” decision. The court did not specify which provision of section 841(b) grounded his conviction and sentence. After unsuccessfully seeking habeas relief and a sentence reduction under Sentencing Guidelines amendments, Coleman sought a reduced sentence under the 2018 First Step Act, claiming he had been sentenced for a “dual-object conspiracy involving both crack and powder cocaine.” The district court denied Coleman’s motion, finding that he was not convicted of an offense involving crack cocaine.The Third Circuit vacated. The conspiracy trafficked in crack; the court discussed Coleman’s responsibility for crack-related activities at sentencing; and the parties sparred on direct appeal over the amount of crack attributable to Coleman. If, on remand, the court reaffirms what may have been its implicit factual determination, it should acknowledge those crack references and explain why Coleman was not convicted of a crack offense. The Guidelines required the court to determine whether the drugs involved in the conspiracy were powder cocaine, crack, or both, and the amount of each, “regardless of whether the judge believed that [Coleman’s] crack-related conduct was part of the ‘offense of conviction,’” which could explain how Coleman could be found responsible for crack cocaine yet not be convicted of a crack offense. View "United States v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Doyduk came to the U.S. from Turkey on a visa that expired in 2010. Still in the country a year later, he participated in a night of heavy drinking with his then-girlfriend Filipova (also in the country without authorization). Filipova was stabbed in the stomach, suffering a serious injury. Doyduk’s boss, Coskun, called 911. Doyduk was charged with aggravated assault, possessing an instrument of crime, possessing a prohibited offensive weapon, simple assault, and recklessly endangering another person. All the charges were withdrawn after Filipova and Coskun refused to testify. The charging documents were discarded under a Pennsylvania law that requires expungement after 18 months pass without action.In 2011 removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) for having overstayed his visa, Doyduk sought an adjustment of status based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. At a 2017 hearing, the officer who arrested Doyduk testified about the stabbing. The IJ also considered the Philadelphia police report and heard testimony from Doyduk, his citizen-wife, and others attesting to Doyduk’s character. The IJ denied relief, finding that the evidence strongly suggested that Doyduk committed the crime. The BIA affirmed. The Third Circuit denied a petition for review. The Immigration and Nationality Act allows IJs to consider facts underlying expunged charges. View "Doyduk v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law