Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Four defendants, who have multiple ties to organized crime, were convicted for their roles in the unlawful takeover and looting of FirstPlus Financial, a publicly traded mortgage loan company. Their scheme began with the defendants’ and their co-conspirators’ extortion of FirstPlus’s board of directors and its chairman, using lies and threats to gain control of the company. Once they forced the old leadership out, the defendants drained the company of its value by causing it to enter into expensive consulting and legal-services agreements with themselves, causing it to acquire (at vastly inflated prices) shell companies they personally owned, and using bogus trusts to funnel FirstPlus’s assets into their own accounts. They ultimately bankrupted FirstPlus, leaving its shareholders with worthless stock.Each defendant was convicted of more than 20 counts of criminal behavior and given a substantial prison sentence. In a consolidated appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the investigation, the charges and evidence against them, the pretrial process, the government’s compliance with its disclosure obligations, the trial, the forfeiture proceedings, and their sentences. The government conceded that the district court’s assessment of one defendant’s forfeiture obligations was improper under a Supreme Court decision handed down during the pendency of this appeal and remanded that assessment. View "United States v. Scarfo" on Justia Law

Rodriguez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 100 grams of heroin and possession with intent to distribute an unspecified amount of heroin and more than 50 grams of methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 262 months’ imprisonment, based on a 262–327-month Sentencing Guidelines range that reflects sentence enhancements for being the organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants and for maintaining premises for distributing drugs.The Third Circuit affirmed. The district court found that Rodriguez “set the prices,” “issue[d] edicts,” “dictated to whom and for how much the drugs were to be sold,” and provided drugs to his co-conspirators for distribution and did not clearly err by applying the “leader” sentence enhancement. The court also upheld the application of the “premises” enhancement. Rodriguez directed the activities at the premises in question and those premises were one of the “places where essential parts of drug operation[s] were conducted.” The ownership of premises was not dispositive. View "United States v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

For several years, Adair sold prescription opioid pills in Pittsburgh. She pleaded guilty to a 10-count indictment. At sentencing, the court increased her offense level by four points for being an organizer or leader of extensive criminal activity, U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(a). Although Adair timely pleaded guilty, the government did not move for a one-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, section 3E1.1(b). The district court calculated Adair’s Sentencing Guidelines range as 188-235 months and granted a downward variance so that Adair received a 168-month prison term for the longest of her concurrent sentences.The Third Circuit affirmed, upholding the imposition of a four-point increase for the organizer-leader enhancement and rejecting an argument that the court should have compelled the government to move for a one-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. View "United States v. Adair" on Justia Law

In 2015, Mitchell was convicted of drug-and gun-related offenses, including two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, and aiding and abetting such possession, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1). After the enactment of the 2018 First Step Act, the Third Circuit vacated Mitchell’s 1,020-month sentence, finding that the sentencing court violated his due process rights.The Third Circuit held that the provisions of the First Step Act do apply to Mitchell’s resentencing. The Act is ambiguous; it applies, prospectively, to all offenses committed after the Act’s enactment but, retroactively, “to any offense that was committed before the date of enactment of this Act, if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of [that] date.” The court chose to interpret it broadly to allow the Act’s provisions to apply to a defendant whose pre-Act-unconstitutional sentence was vacated after the Act’s enactment. Because Mitchell’s sentence was fully vacated, he was an unsentenced defendant after the enactment of the Act and entitled to benefit from it. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

El-Battouty was a leader of a large-scale online child pornography ring for almost two years. Using an alias, El-Battouty posted several thousand times on the internet chat platform, Discord's servers, which were organized into text channels that functioned as chatrooms. They operated as hierarchical distribution networks for sexually explicit images and videos of minors. Users shared methods to coerce children into producing pornography. El-Battouty used a fictional online persona to deceive minors into believing they were playing a “game” of progressively lewder sex acts with a fellow minor, surreptitiously recorded and then distributed this content to other users on the Discord servers. An undercover FBI agent monitored and preserved content. A search of El-Battouty’s residence pursuant to a warrant recovered digital devices containing thousands of archived sexually explicit images and videos of minors. The devices and El-Battouty’s own statements established his access and use of the servers.Convicted of engaging in a child exploitation enterprise, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(g), he was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment, a life term of supervised release, and restitution. The Third Circuit affirmed. The central issue was whether El-Battouty acted alone or conspired with other users on the Discord servers. The statute presents common words and phrases, which the district court explained to the jury in a straightforward way. View "United States v. El-Battouty" on Justia Law

Marsalis is a nursing-school dropout but on dating websites, he was “Dr. Jeff,” a high-flying physician at the University of Pennsylvania and also a NASA astronaut. When an unsuspecting woman fell for Marsalis’s ruse, he drugged her drink, then offered to let her recover at his apartment. As the woman blacked out, he sexually assaulted her. In total, 10 women accused Marsalis of rape, each telling a version of that same story. A jury acquitted him of rape, convicting him only of two sexual assaults. The judge found that he was a sexually violent predator and sentenced him to the maximum: up to 21 years in prison. On state habeas review, Marsalis argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an alibi defense and investigate a victim’s medical condition. The court dismissed his petition, and the Superior Court affirmed.Marsalis filed this federal habeas petition, arguing that trial counsel should have objected to a doctor’s expert testimony. The district court rejected the ineffective-counsel claim because Marsalis had not raised it during state habeas. The Third Circuit affirmed. Marsalis’s federal habeas challenge was untimely and a jury would have convicted him even if his lawyer had been adequate. View "Marsalis v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Inmate Rivera was temporarily transferred in order to represent himself in a trial challenging his conditions of confinement. He was assigned to the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU) from which inmates may access a “mini law library.” Rivera’s trial was scheduled to begin on a Monday. On Friday, his request for continuing access to the library throughout his trial was approved. The library, however, did not contain any physical books, only two computers. Both were inoperable. Rivera had no way to access the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rules of Evidence, and the court rules. Rivera’s request to borrow paper copies from the main law library was summarily denied. The judge refused to admit his evidence on hearsay grounds. The jury entered a defense verdict. According to Rivera, access to the Rules would likely have changed the outcome of his trial.The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Rivera’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit on qualified immunity grounds. At the time of the alleged violation, Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedents had not clearly established a prisoner’s right to access the material after he filed a complaint. “Going forward, however, there should be no doubt that such a right exists. The ability of a prisoner to access basic legal materials in a law library … does not stop once a prisoner has taken the first step towards the courthouse’s door.” View "Rivera v. Monko" on Justia Law

Georgetown Law invited Yung to interview an alumnus. Yung thought his interviewer was rude. Georgetown rejected Yung's application. Yung launched a cyber-campaign, creating fake obituaries for the interviewer’s wife and son, social-media profiles and blogs in the interviewer's name, containing KKK content and bragging about child rape. A Google search of the interviewer’s name revealed thousands of similar posts. In reports to the Better Business Bureau, Yung accused the interviewer of sexually assaulting a female associate and berating prospective employees. Impersonating the interviewer’s wife, he published an online ad seeking a sex slave. The interviewer’s family got hundreds of phone calls from men seeking sex. Strange men went to the interviewer’s home. The interviewer hired cyber-investigators, who, working with the FBI, traced the harassment to Yung.Yung, charged with cyberstalking, 18 U.S.C. 2261A(2)(B) & 2261(b) unsuccessfully challenged the law as overbroad under the First Amendment. Yung was sentenced to prison, probation, and to pay restitution for the interviewer’s investigative costs ($70,000) and Georgetown’s security measures ($130,000). The Third Circuit affirmed the conviction. A narrow reading of the statute’s intent element is possible so it is not overbroad--limiting intent to harass to “criminal harassment, which is unprotected because it constitutes true threats or speech that is integral to proscribable criminal conduct.” The court vacated in part. Yung could not waive his claim that the restitution order exceeds the statute and Georgetown suffered no damage to any property right. View "United States v. Yung" on Justia Law

Federal prosecutors indicted Cannon and moved for his detention, 18 U.S.C. 3142. Because of the drug and firearms charges against Cannon, section 3142(e)’s presumption of detention pending trial applied. Because Cannon had complied with the conditions of his state court bond during his release, a magistrate granted Cannon’s request for pretrial release with conditions. Condition 1, required under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3142(b), was that Cannon “must not violate federal, state, or local law while on release.”Cannon is a paraplegic and suffers from serious and painful medical conditions. Cannon's doctor had issued him a certification under Pennsylvania’s Medical Marijuana Act to obtain medical marijuana from an approved dispensary. The magistrate rejected Cannon's request for medical marijuana use, stating: "It’s still federally illegal, card or not.” Cannon replied that he “[did]n’t need it” before agreeing to abide by the conditions. A month later, Cannon unsuccessfully asked the court to modify the conditions and again requested an exemption. The Probation Office informed the court that on several occasions, Cannon had either tested positive for marijuana or admitted using marijuana.The court entered an order revoking Cannon’s bond. The Third Circuit affirmed; the use and possession of marijuana—even where sanctioned by a state— remains a violation of federal law. View "United States v. Cannon" on Justia Law

The Bank Secrecy Act requires U.S. citizens to report interests in foreign accounts with a value exceeding $10,000, 31 U.S.C. 5314. Collins, a dual citizen of the U.S. and Canada, has lived in the U.S. since 1994 and has bank accounts in the U.S., Canada, France, and Switzerland. In 2007, the balance of his Swiss account exceeded $800,000. Collins did not report any of those accounts until he voluntarily amended his tax returns in 2010. The IRS accepted Collins into its Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program (OVDP). His amended returns for 2002-2009 yielded modest refunds stemming from large capital losses in 2002. Collins then withdrew from the OVDP, prompting an audit. Because Collins invested in foreign mutual funds, his Swiss holdings were subject to an additional tax on passive foreign investment companies, 26 U.S.C. 1291, which he failed to compute in his amended returns. The IRS audit determined that Collins owed an additional $71,324 plus penalties. In 2015 the IRS determined that since he withdrew from the OVDP, Collins was liable for civil penalties for “willful failure” to report foreign accounts. The IRS assessed a civil penalty of $308,064.The district court and Third Circuit affirmed, citing a “decades‐long course of conduct, omission, and scienter” by Collins in failing to disclose his foreign accounts. The disparity between Collins’s putative income tax liability and his penalty is stark but is consistent with the statute. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law