Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2016, John O. Kalu, an inmate at FCI Allenwood, alleged that he was sexually assaulted on three separate occasions by Lieutenant K. Middernatch. Kalu reported the first two incidents to Warden Spaulding, who responded that he would investigate but took no further action. Following his report, Kalu was placed in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) and later returned to the general population, where he was assaulted a third time. Kalu also claimed that he was subjected to inhumane conditions of confinement, including being forced to sleep on a cold metal bunk in freezing temperatures without adequate clothing.Kalu filed a pro se complaint in the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Warden Spaulding and Lt. Middernatch, seeking damages under Bivens for violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed Kalu’s claims against Warden Spaulding for lack of personal involvement but allowed the sexual assault claim against Lt. Middernatch to proceed. Kalu later amended his complaint, but the District Court ultimately dismissed all claims, determining that they presented new Bivens contexts and that special factors counseled against extending Bivens remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The court held that Kalu’s Eighth Amendment sexual assault and conditions-of-confinement claims presented new Bivens contexts. It found that special factors, including the availability of alternative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons’ Administrative Remedy Program, Congress’s omission of a standalone damages remedy in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), and separation of powers principles, counseled against extending Bivens liability. The court also agreed that Kalu’s complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim against Warden Spaulding for deliberate indifference or failure to protect. View "Kalu v. Spaulding" on Justia Law

Tony Fisher, a federal inmate, filed a lawsuit against several prison officials, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to the risk of sexual assault by another inmate, resulting in his rape. Fisher entered federal prison in 2013 and was transferred to Fort Dix, where he reported past sexual assault and harassment by other inmates. Despite these reports, prison staff did not classify him as at high risk for sexual assault. Shortly after, Fisher was raped by another inmate. Fisher claimed that a prison official, Captain Fitzgerald, discouraged him from reporting the assaults and seeking legal help, warning him of potential retaliation.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed Fisher’s complaint, ruling it was time-barred under New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Fisher appealed, arguing that the statute of limitations should be tolled due to the prison official’s threats and his mental health issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The court held that no Bivens cause of action exists for failure to protect an inmate from another inmate’s violence, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Egbert v. Boule. The court also ruled that even if such a claim were cognizable, Fisher’s complaint was untimely. The court found that Fisher did not qualify for equitable tolling because he was transferred away from the influence of the threatening official shortly after the assaults and did not exercise due diligence in pursuing his claims. Additionally, the court held that New Jersey’s revival statute for sexual assault claims did not apply to Bivens actions. View "Fisher v. Hollingsworth" on Justia Law

In 2015, Eddie Williams was prosecuted in Pennsylvania for crimes related to a drug dispute that resulted in one death and one serious injury. Williams, along with Rick Cannon and Akeita Harden, was implicated in the incident. Cannon pleaded guilty to twenty charges, including homicide and conspiracy, some of which named Williams as a coconspirator. During Williams's trial, his attorney misrepresented Cannon's plea, leading the judge to read Cannon's entire Criminal Information to the jury, which included references to Williams as a coconspirator.Williams was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to life imprisonment plus additional years. He filed a Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney's actions. The PCRA court denied relief, finding no Confrontation Clause violation and concluding that the attorney's strategy was reasonable. The Superior Court affirmed, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied further appeal.Williams then filed a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which granted relief, finding that the reading of Cannon's Criminal Information violated the Confrontation Clause and that Williams's counsel was ineffective for not objecting. The Commonwealth appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that the reading of Cannon's Criminal Information, which included references to Williams, was testimonial and violated the Confrontation Clause. The court also found that Williams's counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the reading, which prejudiced Williams's defense. The court concluded that these errors had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict, warranting habeas relief. View "Williams v. Greene" on Justia Law

Jamal Morton was convicted in 2012 in the Virgin Islands Superior Court of second-degree murder and various firearm offenses, receiving a fifty-year sentence. After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, Morton filed a territorial habeas petition in 2014, raising twenty claims, including violations of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Despite his numerous attempts to move the case forward, including motions for default judgment, discovery requests, and status conference requests, the Superior Court took no substantive action for nearly six years.Frustrated by the inaction, Morton filed a federal habeas petition in the U.S. District Court of the Virgin Islands in April 2020, raising the same claims. The District Court dismissed his petition without prejudice, citing his failure to exhaust territorial court remedies. The court reasoned that Morton had not taken sufficient steps, such as seeking a writ of mandamus from the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, to address the delay in the territorial court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and found that the nearly six-year delay in the territorial court, coupled with the lack of progress and Morton’s reasonable efforts to advance his case, constituted inordinate delay. The Third Circuit held that the District Court erred by not requiring the Government to justify the delay before dismissing Morton’s petition. The court vacated the District Court’s dismissal and remanded the case, instructing the lower court to allow the Government to provide any justifications for the delay and proceed accordingly. View "Morton v. Director Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections" on Justia Law

In 2008, Diontai Moore was investigated for drug crimes, leading to his arrest and a guilty plea for distributing cocaine base. He was sentenced to 72 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. In 2013, while on supervised release, Moore was found with a handgun and subsequently pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, resulting in a 60-month prison sentence and another three years of supervised release. In 2021, during his supervised release, Moore used a firearm to confront intruders at his fiancée’s home, leading to his arrest and charges for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania sentenced Moore to 84 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release after he pleaded guilty to the firearm possession charge. Moore reserved the right to appeal the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to him.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and held that Moore, as a convict on supervised release, does not have a Second Amendment right to possess a firearm. The court found that historical analogues, such as 18th-century forfeiture laws, supported the disarmament of convicts during their sentences. The court concluded that these historical practices justified the application of § 922(g)(1) to Moore. Consequently, the court affirmed Moore’s conviction, rejecting his as-applied and facial challenges to the statute. View "United States v. Moore" on Justia Law

Joseph Marcy was convicted by a Pennsylvania jury of raping his five-year-old daughter, D.M., based on her testimony and corroborating evidence from caseworkers and a physician. Years later, D.M. recanted parts of her testimony during a state postconviction relief hearing, leading Marcy to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that due process required his release due to the recantation.After his conviction, Marcy filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. He then appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which affirmed his conviction. Marcy did not appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. He subsequently filed two premature state petitions for postconviction relief, which were dismissed. A later petition included a note from a third party suggesting D.M. had not told the truth at trial. The Court of Common Pleas found D.M.’s recantation credible and granted Marcy a new trial, but the Superior Court vacated that decision, citing procedural waiver. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to review the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed Marcy’s habeas petition. The court held that Marcy’s claim was barred by Teague v. Lane, which prevents the application of new constitutional rules to cases on collateral review unless they are substantive or watershed rules of criminal procedure. The court found that Marcy’s proposed rule—that a conviction based on recanted testimony violates due process regardless of the government’s knowledge of the falsity—was a new procedural rule and not dictated by precedent. Consequently, the court affirmed the District Court’s order dismissing Marcy’s petition. View "Marcy v. Superintendent Phoenix SCI" on Justia Law

Steven Baker was charged with bank robbery and using a firearm during the robbery. The government offered him a plea deal to plead guilty to these charges and admit to two other bank robberies without being charged for them. Baker’s counsel incorrectly advised him that he faced 15-17 years if he accepted the plea and 21 years for the firearm charges if he went to trial. In reality, he faced a 57-year mandatory minimum for the firearm charges due to the statute’s “stacking” provision. Misled by this advice, Baker rejected the plea, went to trial, and was convicted on all counts, receiving a 57-year sentence for the firearm charges plus 87 months for the bank robberies.Baker appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence. He then filed a Section 2255 motion, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel due to the miscalculation of his sentence exposure. The District Court for the District of New Jersey denied relief, finding that Baker could not show prejudice from his counsel’s error.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Baker’s counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable due to the significant miscalculation of his sentence exposure. The court also determined that Baker demonstrated prejudice because there was a reasonable probability he would have accepted the plea offer if he had been correctly advised. The court noted the substantial disparity between the plea offer (15-17 years) and the actual sentence (57 years plus 87 months) and credited Baker’s testimony that he would have accepted the plea but for his counsel’s error. The court reversed the District Court’s decision and remanded with instructions to order the government to reoffer the original plea agreement to Baker. View "Baker v. United States" on Justia Law

Hugo Abraham Aguilar, a native and citizen of Honduras, entered the United States without inspection in 2001 and has three U.S. citizen children. In January 2014, he was arrested in New Jersey for allegedly sexually assaulting his stepdaughter and remained in pretrial detention for 1,332 days due to his inability to afford bail. In May 2017, Aguilar pled guilty to a reduced charge of third-degree endangering the welfare of a child and was sentenced to 1,332 days in prison, with credit for time served. Shortly after his sentencing, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Aguilar statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal, citing his inability to demonstrate "good moral character" due to his confinement for more than 180 days as a result of his conviction. The IJ also denied his request for a continuance to challenge his conviction in state court. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Aguilar's appeal, agreeing with the IJ's findings and concluding that the IJ acted within his discretion in denying the continuance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that pre-conviction detention credited toward a defendant's sentence is considered confinement "as a result of conviction" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Consequently, Aguilar's 1,332 days of pre-conviction detention, credited as time served, precluded him from establishing the required good moral character for cancellation of removal. The court also denied as moot Aguilar's challenge to the BIA's decision dismissing his appeal from the IJ's denial of a continuance, as his state post-conviction relief efforts had concluded unsuccessfully. The Third Circuit denied Aguilar's petition for review. View "Aguilar v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

The case involves the United States government's appeal against the District Court's dismissal of one of two counts in an indictment against Reginald Hopkins. Hopkins was initially arrested on state firearms charges, and while awaiting his state preliminary hearing, a federal grand jury indicted him on charges of distributing cocaine base and being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition. The state charges were subsequently withdrawn. Hopkins moved to dismiss the federal indictment, invoking a so-called "ruse exception" to the Speedy Trial Act (STA), arguing that his rights under the Act had been violated because he had been federally indicted over four months after his arrest by state authorities and because he had not been brought to trial within 70 days of that state arrest.The District Court held two evidentiary hearings and eventually dismissed one count of the indictment, the felon-in-possession charge, based on the ruse exception. The government appealed this decision, arguing that the STA contains no such ruse exception.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with the government, concluding that a ruse exception premised on a state arrest is inconsistent with the text of the STA and that there are sound policy reasons for declining to adopt a ruse exception. The Court reversed the order of the District Court and reinstated the dismissed count of the indictment. View "United States v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

The case involves Robert Haggerty, a first-time offender who was indicted on three counts of receiving a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, as well as one count of possessing such depictions. Haggerty admitted to communicating with undercover detectives posing as underage girls using online messaging platforms. A search of Haggerty's house and truck yielded two tablets containing a total of 97 still images and 9 videos of child sexual abuse material.The District Court applied multiple Guideline enhancements at sentencing, including a five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7), which provides for a graduated enhancement scheme based on the number of "images" involved in a child-exploitation offense. Haggerty objected to the application of a five-level, number-of-images enhancement, arguing that the Guideline is unambiguous and does not include videos. The District Court overruled Haggerty’s objection and applied the five-level enhancement, calculating a total offense level of 32, which yielded an advisory Guideline range of 121 to 151 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that "image," in the moving picture or video context, unambiguously means "frame." Deference to the Commentary’s 75-images rule is therefore unwarranted. Instead, the number of frames comprising a moving picture or video will determine the specific sentencing enhancement that a District Judge must apply. The court vacated the District Court’s sentencing order and remanded for resentencing in a manner consistent with its holding. View "United States v. Haggerty" on Justia Law