Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

James’s 10-year-old nephew found a loaded handgun in a drawer. The gun fired accidentally, wounding the boy’s six-year-old sister. She recovered. James pleaded guilty under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), to possession of a firearm by one convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of incarceration. The PSR recommended 84-105 months' imprisonment, with two criminal history points for a 2011 conviction for “loitering and prowling at night time,” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 5506, a third-degree misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year of incarceration. James had been sentenced to 60 days’ probation. Probation violations resulted in a nine-month sentence of incarceration. James argued that the sentence for “[l]oitering” and for all offenses “similar to” it should be excluded from his criminal-history score under U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(c)(2), which would result in a guidelines range of 70-87 months.The Third Circuit affirmed a 105-month sentence. Although section 5506 and its application to James are similar to the offenses that comprise loitering simpliciter, excluded by U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(c)(2), the court noted section 5506’s one-year maximum term of imprisonment. Section 5506’s mens rea requirement categorically distinguishes it from the “[l]oitering” offense listed in section 4A1.2(c)(2). Pennsylvania courts have construed section 5506, which refers to acting “maliciously” to contain a mens rea element akin to the Model Penal Code’s term “purposely.” View "United States v. James" on Justia Law

Diaz was charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute drugs. His five co-defendants pled guilty. Albert-Heise, assigned to represent Diaz, accepted a new position. Dissatisfied with his newly-appointed attorney, O’Brien, Diaz requested new counsel, stating that O’Brien pressured him to plead guilty, did not accept Diaz’s advice on pretrial motions, and failed to share discovery. The district court then appointed Kalinowski. Diaz subsequently complained about Kalinowski’s failure to communicate with him. Kalinowski never complied with a court order to respond to Diaz. Diaz again requested new counsel. The court did not inquire further or schedule any hearing and granted a continuance without commenting on Diaz’s request for new counsel. Diaz and Kalinowski appeared together for a pretrial conference; neither raised any issue related to the representation. Twice more, Diaz wrote to the court complaining of Kalinowski. The case proceeded to trial with Kalinowski representing Diaz.The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction, despite expressing concern that the district court “may not have been as attentive to Diaz’s complaints regarding his counsel as it should have been,” and that certain testimony by a government witness violated Rule 701 (lay opinion testimony). The improper testimony did not prejudice Diaz so as to affect his substantial rights. The court did not clearly err when it attributed more than 20 grams of heroin to Diaz at sentencing. View "United States v. Diaz" on Justia Law

Customs and Border Protection K-9 Officer Lopez was working at the airport in St. Thomas and took his certified canine, Bo, into a cargo plane to inspect incoming mail. Bo alerted to a package, indicating the presence of drugs. The package purportedly had been sent by Price, whose address was in South Carolina, and had been mailed to Meade in St. Thomas. Kouns removed it from the plane, opened the box and brought out a piece of clothing that smelled strongly of marijuana, although no drugs were found. When Kouns returned the item to the box, a magazine and round of ammunition fell to the floor. The officers discovered the unassembled parts of a gun. Days later, a postal inspector contacted Customs regarding another package, bearing the same names and addresses. Lopez and Kouns responded. Because of the addresses and the package's weight, Kouns suspected it might contain another gun. An x-ray revealed items an apparent gun and ammunition. Kouns opened the package and discovered a gun and ammunition. Homeland Security arranged a controlled delivery of the packages. Authorities apprehended Baxter as the sender of the packages; he was charged with two counts of illegal transport of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(5). The District Court of the Virgin Islands granted his motion to suppress. The Third Circuit vacated, holding that Customs permissibly conducted the searches pursuant to the border search exception to the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Baxter" on Justia Law

Hoffert, incarcerated since 2003, made requests for documents from various governmental entities after he began serving his sentence. Dissatisfied with the responses, Hoffert filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of that complaint. Hoffert then filed an administrative tort claim with the Torts Branch of the Department of Justice’s Civil Division, seeking $7,396,800,000 for his allegedly unlawful incarceration, which he claimed was “beyond the lawful Decrees of the Laws of Commerce and without use of a compact/contract/agreement between the Claimant and the U.S. Inc.’s subcorporation, PENNSYLVANIA.” The claim was rejected. Hoffert wrote a threatening letter to the director of the Torts Branch, then filed a “Claim of Commercial Lien Affidavit [and] Notice of Non-Judicial Proceeding” in the Office of the Recorder of Deeds, Erie County, Pennsylvania, naming five federal officials as lien debtors. Hoffert asked the U.S. Marshals Service to “begin collection/liquidation of all their movable assets” Hoffert was convicted five counts of filing or attempting to file a false lien or encumbrance against the real or personal property of an officer or employee of the federal government, 18 U.S.C. 1521 and was sentenced to 48 months to be served consecutive to his current sentence. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges that section 1521 is unconstitutionally vague and an overbroad restriction of protected speech and to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Hoffert" on Justia Law

Ragbir, a green card holder from Trinidad and Tobago, was convicted of mortgage fraud in 2000. On his attorney’s advice, Ragbir agreed that the actual loss was $350,000-$500,000, believing that his convictions alone made him deportable. The Third Circuit affirmed Ragbir’s convictions and sentence. Ragbir never sought post-conviction relief. DHS commenced removal proceedings. Ragbir then learned that his stipulation to a loss of more than $10,000 made him deportable. Ragbir’s immigration counsel represented that an attorney would be hired to attempt to vacate the underlying convictions. Ragbir still did not pursue a collateral attack. The IJ ordered him removed; the BIA and Second Circuit upheld the decision. In the meantime, Ragbir married an American citizen and obtained an immigrant visa. The BIA denied a motion to reopen. DHS eventually elected not to renew its discretionary stay of removal. Ragbir then challenged his detention, asserting that his conviction should be overturned because jury instructions given at his trial were erroneous in light of later Supreme Court rulings and asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition. Ragbir had the ability to bring all his claims at least six years before his 2012 petition for coram nobis. He provides no sound reason for his delay. View "Ragbir v. United States" on Justia Law

Johnson and Wright were charged with murder. Before trial, Wright confessed to his involvement in the crime and identified Johnson as the shooter. The prosecution introduced Wright’s confession at trial, substituting Johnson’s name with “the other guy” in an attempt to avoid a Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause violation. Johnson’s identity as the “other guy” was explicitly revealed at the trial's beginning and end. The court instructed the jury to ignore Wright’s confession when considering Johnson’s culpability, but a question from the jury indicated that they were having great difficulty doing so. Johnson was convicted of first-degree murder. The Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled that there was no violation of the Supreme Court’s “Bruton” holding; the substitution of “other guy,” plus the jury instructions were adequate to protect Johnson’s rights under Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent.A federal district court concluded that a Bruton violation had occurred but was harmless. The Third Circuit reversed. In these circumstances. courts cannot rely on a juror’s ability to put such inculpatory statements out of their minds; the statement’s admission violates the non-confessing co-defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause and requires a new trial if he has been prejudiced by such damaging evidence. The court noted that the jury, faced with a lack of overwhelming inculpatory evidence against Johnson, and significant credibility issues with the prosecution’s key witnesses, struggled for six days to reach a verdict. View "Johnson v. Superintendent Fayette SCI" on Justia Law

Officers executed a search warrant at Rawls’ residence, yielding an iPhone 6 and a Mac Pro Computer with attached external hard drives, all protected with encryption software. With a warrant, forensic analysts discovered the password to decrypt the Mac Pro but could not determine the passwords for the external hard drives. The Mac Pro revealed an image of a pubescent girl in a sexually provocative position, logs showing that it had visited likely child exploitation websites and that Rawls had downloaded thousands of files known to be child pornography. Those files were stored on the external hard drives. Rawls’ sister stated that Rawls had shown her child pornography on the external hard drives. A Magistrate ordered Rawls to unencrypt the devices. Rawls cited the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court denied Rawls’ motion, reasoning the act of decrypting the devices would not be testimonial. Rawls decrypted the iPhone, which contained 20 photographs that focused on the genitals of Rawls’ six-year-old niece. Rawls stated that he could not remember the passwords for the hard drives. The Third Circuit affirmed a civil contempt finding.Rawls, incarcerated since September 2015, moved for release, arguing that 28 U.S.C. 1826(a) limits the maximum confinement for civil contempt to 18 months. The Third Circuit ordered his release, rejecting the government’s argument that Rawls was not a “witness” participating in any “proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury.” The proceedings to enforce the search warrant fall within the statute’s broad description of any “proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury," the Decryption Order is “an order of the court to testify or provide other information,” and section 1826(a) applies to the detention of any material witness, even if that person is also a suspect in connection with other offenses. View "United States v. Apple Mac Pro Computer" on Justia Law

Hendrickson was a pretrial detainee in the custody of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections. During a routine pat-down, a guard found a cell phone in Hendrickson’s pocket. When the phone was activated, it displayed an AT&T logo and asked for a password. The phone was missing its SIM card, a removable chip that allows the phone to connect to a cellular network. Without the SIM card, the phone was unable to receive calls and could make calls only to 911. Hendrickson stated that he had been using the phone to play music. Because the phone was password-protected, the government did not search it for text messages, emails, or other data. Hendrickson was convicted of possession of prison contraband, 18 U.S.C. 1791(a)(2). The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that no reasonable juror could find that the phone was a “prohibited object” or that Hendrickson was “an inmate of a prison” Hendrickson possessed a “phone” within the meaning of section 1791(d)(1)(F); an electronics technician confirmed that the device was “definitely” a phone. The U.S.Marshalls contract with the Virgin Islands to house prisoners at Hendrickson’s facility, so Hendrickson was an inmate of a facility where persons were held “in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the Attorney General.” View "United States v. Hendrickson" on Justia Law

Fishoff began trading securities in the 1990s. By 2009, he had earned enough money to establish his own firm, with one full-time employee and several independent contractors. Fishoff had no formal training in securities markets, regulations, or compliance. Nor did he hold any professional license. He operated without expert advice. Fishoff engaged in short-selling stock in anticipation of the issuer making a secondary offering. Secondary offerings are confidential but a company, through its underwriter, may contact potential buyers to assess interest. When a salesperson provides confidential information, such as the issuer's name, the recipient is barred by SEC Rule 10b-5-2, from trading the issuer’s securities or disclosing the information before the offering is publicly announced. Fishoff’s associates opened accounts at investment banking firms in order to receive solicitations to invest in secondary offerings. They agreed to keep the information confidential but shared it with Fishoff, who would short-sell the company’s shares.Fishoff pled guilty to securities fraud (15 U.S.C. 78j(b), 78ff; 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (Rule 10b-5); 18 U.S.C. 2), stipulating that he and his associates made $1.5 to $3.5 million by short-selling Synergy stock based on confidential information. Fishoff unsuccessfully claimed that he had no knowledge of Rule 10b5-2 and was entitled to the affirmative defense against imprisonment under Securities Exchange Act Section 32, as a person who violated a Rule having “no knowledge of such rule or regulation”. The Third Circuit affirmed his 30-month sentence. Fishoff adequately presented his defense. The court’s ruling was sufficient; the government never agreed that the non-imprisonment defense applied. Fishoff did not establish a lack of knowledge. His attempts to conceal his scheme suggests that he was aware that it was wrong. View "United States v. Fishoff" on Justia Law

Rosa, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was admitted to the U.S. as a legal permanent resident in 1992, as a child. In 2004, he pled guilty to possession and sale of a controlled substance (cocaine) within 1,000 feet of school property under the New Jersey School Zone Statute. Eleven years later, Rosa was charged as removable for the conviction of a controlled substances offense and of an “aggravated felony” for a “drug trafficking crime.” Rosa denied removability for the aggravated felony, which would have precluded him from being eligible for cancellation of removal.The IJ applied the “categorical approach” and compared the New Jersey School Zone Statute with the federal statute for distribution “in or near schools and colleges” and concluded that the state statute swept more broadly than its federal counterpart in both proscribed conduct and its definition of “school property,” so that Rosa’s state conviction was not an “aggravated felony” under federal law. The IJ granted cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals held that Rosa’s state conviction could be compared to the federal statute generally prohibiting the distribution of a controlled substance as a lesser included offense of the Federal School Zone Statute and ordered Rosa removed. The Third Circuit remanded. The categorical approach, which compares the elements of prior convictions with the elements of crimes under federal law, does not permit comparison with any federal crime but only with the “most similar” one. View "Rosa v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law