Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Johnman signed a plea agreement admitting to: use of an interstate facility to entice a minor to engage in sexual conduct, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b); distribution of child pornography, section 2252(a)(2); and possession of child pornography, section 2252(a)(4). Each count and the corresponding maximum penalty appeared in an individual subparagraph and stated, “and a $5,000 special victims assessment.” A separate subparagraph aggregates all the maximum and mandatory minimum penalties in the three counts, including “an additional $15,000 special victims assessment.” Another provision stipulates that “[Johnman] agrees to pay the special victims and court assessments in the amount of $15,300 before the time of sentencing or at a time directed by this Court.” The court explained the $15,000 assessment at Johnman’s plea hearing. Johnman offered no objections.Johnman was sentenced to 368 months of incarceration, a lifetime of supervised release, $1,000 restitution, and $15,300 in special assessments. The plea agreement waived Johnson’s right to appeal or collaterally attack his convictions or sentence but permitted an appeal if “the defendant’s sentence on any count of conviction exceeds the statutory maximum for that count.” The Third Circuit affirmed. The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. 3014, applies to each conviction, not to the case as a whole. The text and context indicate that where a defendant is nonindigent, a separate $5,000 assessment applies to every qualifying count of conviction View "United States v. Johnman" on Justia Law

During the 2009-2010 term, James was a senator in the Virgin Islands Legislature. The Legislature maintained a fund for Legislature-related expenses. James used a large portion of the checks issued to him by the fund for personal expenses and his re-election campaign. James obtained these checks by presenting invoices purportedly associated with work on a historical project. In 2015, James was charged with two counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 and one count of federal program embezzlement, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(A). The Third Circuit affirmed his convictions, upholding a ruling that allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence of acts outside the limitations period, 18 U.S.C. 3282(a), and the substitution of an excused juror with an alternate after the jury had been polled. The court rejected a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on the prosecution calling two witnesses concerning an eviction dispute. The court had instructed the government not to discuss the eviction case in its opening; neither witness testified about the eviction case. The Third Circuit also upheld a ruling that permitted the use of a chart as a demonstrative aid to accompany the case agent’s testimony, with an instruction that the jury that it should consider the chart as a guide for testimony, not as substantive evidence. View "United States v. James" on Justia Law

In 2002, Holloway was convicted of a DUI at the highest blood alcohol content (BAC). The charge was dismissed upon his completion of an accelerated rehabilitation program. In 2005, Holloway was again arrested for DUI and registered a BAC of 0.192%. Holloway pled guilty to violating 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. 3802(c) for driving under the influence at the highest BAC (greater than 0.16%). He received a sentence of 60 months’ “Intermediate Punishment,” including 90-days’ imprisonment that allowed him work-release. In 2016, Holloway sought to purchase a firearm but was unable to do so because of his disqualifying DUI conviction, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Holloway sought a declaration that section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him. The district court granted Holloway summary judgment and entered a permanent injunction barring the government from enforcing section 922(g)(1) against him. The Third Circuit reversed. Pennsylvania’s DUI law, which makes a DUI at the highest BAC a first-degree misdemeanor that carries a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment, constitutes a serious crime that requires disarmament. The prohibition does not violate Holloway’s Second Amendment rights. View "Holloway v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Hodge was charged with three counts of using, carrying, or possessing a firearm during the commission of a violent crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) after he shot two armored-vehicle workers and stole $33,500. A jury convicted Hodge of two counts. In 2015, the District Court of the Virgin Islands sentenced Hodge to an aggregate 420 months imprisonment on the two counts—the then-mandatory minimum for first-time 924(c) offenders convicted of two counts involving discharging a firearm—plus another 310 months on other counts. The Third Circuit affirmed as to the federal counts but remanded the territorial charges with instructions to vacate two territorial counts and to conduct the “requisite resentencing.” Before resentencing took place, the First Step Act became law, amending section 924(c) so that first-time offenders convicted of two counts involving discharging a firearm and stemming from the same indictment now face a 240-month mandatory minimum. The district court declined to disturb Hodge’s federal sentence. The Third Circuit affirmed. The post–First Step Act modification of Hodge’s territorial sentence does not permit Hodge to invoke the reduced section 924(c) mandatory minimum. View "United States v. Hodge" on Justia Law

Tyson contacted a 17-year-old female on Facebook to engage her in prostitution. He traveled from Pennsylvania to New York City, picked up the victim and her friend, took them to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, then rented several rooms at a Motel 6. Phone records reveal that Harrisburg-area individuals contacted the victim to engage in commercial sexual activity. Law enforcement recovered the victim during a sting operation, interviewed her and reviewed her phone. They found a video of the victim performing oral sex on an adult male in a Motel 6 room. The man was identified as Tyson. Tyson was indicted for knowingly transporting a minor to engage in prostitution, 18 U.S.C. 2423(a) and producing child pornography, section 2251(a). Before trial, the court prohibited Tyson “from eliciting evidence to establish ‘mistake of age’” and from asserting “mistake of age” as an affirmative defense. The court found that such evidence’s “probative value is substantially outweighed by a risk that the evidence will result in unfair prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury.” Tyson entered a plea agreement, with a recommendation that his sentences be served concurrently for a total of 180 months’ imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed. The statutes’ text, context, and history make it clear that knowledge of age is not an element and mistake of age is not a defense. View "United States v. Tyson" on Justia Law

Bell and Robinson entered a Philadelphia store, wearing stockings over their faces. Bell grabbed an employee’s neck, pointed a weapon and threw the employee to the ground, then took cash from the register. The employee grabbed Bell. Bell hit the employee with the weapon, causing the weapon to break. The employee then realized the firearm was actually a plastic gun; he stood and attempted to stop the robbery. Bell and Robinson fled the store with $1,000.00 in cash. Bell dropped his hat, which was seized by the police for DNA testing. Approximately one year later, the police obtained a warrant for Bell’s DNA. Officers went to Bell’s residence to execute the warrant and found Bell hiding on the roof outside his bedroom window with a bag containing ammunition.Bell pled guilty as a felon in possession of ammunition, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and to Hobbs Act robbery, section 1951(a). The court imposed a two-level enhancement for physical restraint, U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) and a four-level enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon, section 2B3.1(b)(2)(D). The court calculated a sentencing range of 77-96 months and imposed a sentence of 86 months. The Third Circuit remanded for resentencing, affirming the application of the dangerous weapon enhancement but reversing the enhancement for physical restraint. While grabbing the victim and forcing him down satisfied the physical force requirement, the victim was not left with no alternative and the restraint was quite limited in time without sustained focus on the victim. Objects that appear to be dangerous weapons are considered dangerous weapons for purposes of section 2B3.1. View "United States v. Bell" on Justia Law

Eight-year-old Quinteros and his mother came to the U.S. from El Salvador in 2001. When he was 13, Quinteros joined the gang MS-13. In 2011, Quinteros was indicted for conspiracy to commit assault with a dangerous weapon, 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(6). The planned gang attack never occurred. Quinteros later pled guilty and was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment. In prison, Quinteros left MS-13 to follow Christianity. Other MS-13 members in prison told him that when he was deported “things are going to change. There’s no getting out over there.” Quinteros was charged as removable for having committed an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), (U), and (J). Quinteros checked the form box to contest his deportability but failed to follow up with additional documentation. Quinteros then sought withholding of removal. An asylum officer determined that Quinteros demonstrated a reasonable fear that he would be tortured in El Salvador. Before an IJ, Quinteros testified and presented studies and reports, that discussed the perception and treatment of individuals with tattoos in El Salvador. The Third Circuit vacated the BIA’s rejection of Quinteros’s claims. Quinteros’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(6) is not an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(F), (U), or (J); conviction under section 1959(a)(6) does not require an overt act and is not a categorical match for conspiracy under the Immigration Act. View "Quinteros v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

A Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office confidential informant made controlled purchases of PCP from Mitchell. Agents observed Mitchell traveling between the meeting and properties on Carlisle and Goodman Streets (owned by Mitchell’s wife’s LLC). Executing a warrant at Carlisle, agents arrested Mitchell and found keys to both properties and $2,947 in cash on Mitchell’s person. Inside the Carlisle property, agents recovered a loaded handgun, crack cocaine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. Inside the Goodman property, they found a loaded handgun, a photograph of and mail addressed to Mitchell, drug paraphernalia, and PCP. Later, agents searched a third property, also owned by Mitchell’s wife’s company, and found another gun, more drugs, and pictures of Mitchell. A witness testified that he purchased powder cocaine from Mitchell, weekly, in 2009-2011, including at Carlisle.The Third Circuit affirmed Mitchell’s convictions for 17 drug distribution and firearms offenses but vacated his 1,020-month sentence. The court rejected arguments that the district court failed to investigate possible juror bias; admitted statements in violation of the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause; and failed to instruct the jury that aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime requires that the accomplice have advance knowledge that the principal would possess a gun. Mitchell also argued that there was insufficient evidence that he aided and abetted possession of the Carlisle Street loaded firearm or constructively possessed the firearm. The court erred by relying on Mitchell’s bare arrest record to determine his sentence, without distinguishing between adjudications, adult convictions, and arrests. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

Ludwikowski went to the police station to report extortionate threats. He was there for about seven hours and was questioned extensively about why he was vulnerable to extortion. He was given water and offered pizza. He went to the restroom, unaccompanied, at least three times. He was interviewed for about four hours, in three phases, punctuated by breaks. He had his phone and used it to make a call. It came to light that Ludwikowski, a pharmacist, had been filling fraudulent oxycodone prescriptions. He was later tried for distribution of a controlled substance. He moved to suppress the statements he made at the police station, arguing that they were inadmissible because no one read him his Miranda rights. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Ludwikowski was not in custody, so no Miranda warnings were needed. Much of the interview was devoted to trying to identify the extorter and the motivation; the interview would have been shorter if Ludwikowski had been more responsive. His statements at the police station were not involuntary. A reasonable person would have understood he could leave; Ludwikowski’s calm demeanor and calculated answers belie his argument that he subjectively felt his freedom was constrained. There was no plain error in the admission of expert testimony on the practice of pharmacy. . View "United States v. Ludwikowski" on Justia Law

Sepling, represented by SC, pled guilty to importing GBL, a controlled substance analogue, 21 U.S.C. 952; Sepling’s sentence would be calculated without consideration of the Guidelines career offender section. Sepling was released on bond pending sentencing and became involved in a conspiracy to import methylone, another Schedule I controlled substance. He was charged under 21 U.S.C. 963. A search uncovered three kilograms of methylone. Subsequent investigation revealed that the conspiracy involved approximately 10 kilograms. A Public Defender (APD) represented Sepling on the new charges. The prosecution agreed to withdraw the new charge; in exchange, Sepling’s involvement in the conspiracy would be factored into his GBL sentence as relevant conduct. The APD ceased representing Sepling. Sepling’s unmodified Guideline range for the GBL was 27-33 months. The methylone relevant conduct dramatically increased his base offense level. The PSR analogized methylone to MDMA, commonly called “ecstasy,” and held him responsible for 10 kilograms, resulting in responsibility equivalent to that for conspiring to distribute five and a half tons of marijuana, for a sentencing range of 188-235 months. SC did not object to that calculation, nor did he file a sentencing memorandum. Rather than researching the pharmacological effect of methylone, SC relied upon Sepling to explain the effects of methylone. SC, the government, and the court all confessed that they did not possess any substantive knowledge of methylone The Third Circuit vacated the 102-month sentence. Sepling was prejudiced by his counsel’s ineffectiveness. View "United States v. Sepling" on Justia Law