Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 2022, Stewart, serving a life sentence for drug trafficking, racketeering, and attempted money laundering, moved for compassionate release, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). He cited his record of rehabilitation, the risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, and his status as a survivor of attempted prison rape as extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction.The district court found that there were no “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances and declined to analyze whether Stewart’s release would be consistent with the section 3553(a) sentencing factors. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Section 3582 does not define “extraordinary and compelling,” so courts may consult the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements—which are non-binding in the context of prisoner-initiated motions—“to form a working definition” of the phrase. The Third Circuit has held that neither the length of a lawfully imposed sentence nor any nonretroactive change to mandatory minimum sentences establishes “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances warranting release but may be relevant “at the next step of the analysis,” when the court weighs the section 3553(a) factors. View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Under Kaboni’s leadership, the KSO gang sold drugs. While Kaboni was incarcerated, Kidada coordinated KSO activities. Northington was a KSO drug dealer and enforcer, causing one murder and committing another. Merritt sold drugs for the gang, often with his cousin, KSO member Lewis. In 2004, Kaboni told Kidada of his concern that KSO member Coleman was cooperating with the police. Kidada told Lewis that Kaboni had ordered him to “firebomb the Colemans’ house.” Lewis enlisted Merritt; the cousins filled gas cans and headed to Merritt’s house to get a gun. At 4:08 a.m., a Philadelphia officer stopped them for speeding but allowed them to leave. The two then parked near the Coleman house, carried the cans to the house, kicked in the door, and fired shots. Merritt ran inside and threw a lit gas can, causing a “big explosion.” He then exited the house, throwing another can. Lewis left a message on Kidada’s phone: “It was done.” .Six people, ages 15 months to 53 years, were killed. Coleman entered witness protection. Court-authorized recording devices near Kaboni’s cell and in the visitation room intercepted Kaboni’s conversations with his friends and other inmates and recorded Kaboni making vulgar statements about the deaths and threatening to kill others.Kidada, Northington, and Merritt were convicted of combinations of RICO conspiracy, murder in aid of racketeering (and conspiracy), retaliating against a witness, and using fire in the commission of a felony. The Third Circuit, after affirming Kiboni’s convictions and death sentence, affirmed their convictions and life sentences. The court upheld a refusal to grant Kidada a new trial based on a conflict allegedly held by one of her attorneys, the admission of Kaboni’s statements, evidentiary rulings, the rejection of a “Batson” challenge, jury instructions, and the denial of motions to sever. View "United States v. Savage" on Justia Law

In 2018, Kousisis and Alpha Painting were convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349, and three counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The charges arose from false documents filed concerning “disadvantaged business enterprise” status in transportation construction projects for which the U.S. Department of Transportation provided funds through the Federal Highway Administration to the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation. The district court imposed a 20-point sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1), which corresponds to a loss of $9.50 million-$25 million, noting that the actual loss to the government was not measurable at the time of sentencing and concluding that Alpha’s “ill-gotten profits” represented an appropriate measure of loss.The Third Circuit affirmed the convictions. The defendants secured PennDOT’s money using false pretenses and the value PennDOT received from the partial performance of those painting and repair services is no defense to criminal prosecution for fraud. The court vacated the calculation of the amount of loss for sentencing purposes, noting the extreme complexity of the case. The victim’s loss must have been an objective of the fraudulent scheme; it is insufficient if that loss is merely an incidental byproduct of the scheme. The court separately vacated a forfeiture order of the entire profit amount on the contracts. View "United States v. Alpha Painting & Construction Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Packer was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine, and a substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) and 846. He was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment followed by five years’ supervised release. After Packer’s release from prison, the court modified the conditions of Packer’s supervised release on three occasions in response to Packer's admissions that he continued to abuse methamphetamine. In 2022, Packer’s former girlfriend, Jones, forwarded to a probation officer threatening voicemail messages that Packer had sent to her. The probation office petitioned for revocation of Packer’s supervised release, citing the “crime of terroristic threats,” a first-degree misdemeanor punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment under Pennsylvania law. Packer attempted to justify his behavior and testified that Jones had no reason to believe that he would hurt her.Following the presentation of evidence, the court found that Packer had violated his supervised release and that the U.S.S.G. term was 21-27 months’ imprisonment. Before inviting Packer to speak, the court stated its intention to impose a 24-month sentence. The judge then invited Packer to speak. The Third Circuit affirmed the revocation and sentence, rejecting an argument that the court denied Packer his right of allocution by announcing the sentence it intended to impose before allowing him an opportunity to speak. Neither Packer nor his counsel raised an objection at the sentencing hearing. View "United States v. Packer" on Justia Law

In 1992, Pesikan a six-year-old citizen of Bosnia, along with his mother, fled Bosnia. In 1998, they entered the U.S. as refugees and gained lawful permanent resident status. In 2017, Pesikan caused a car accident. A responding officer found a half-consumed bottle of whiskey on Pesikan’s driver’s seat and marijuana in the door pocket. A blood test of Pesikan revealed the presence of cocaine, marijuana, alprazolam, and a ,054 blood alcohol content. Pesikan was convicted in Pennsylvania of DUI six counts; the court merged the DUI counts into Count 2–for driving while under the influence of marijuana.Pesikan was charged with removability as an alien convicted of violating a law relating to a controlled substance, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), which asks whether a noncitizen has been convicted of a violation of any law relating to a federally controlled substance. Pesikan argued that, applying the categorical approach to comparing state and federal crimes, Pennsylvania’s DUI statute is broader than the federal law because it allows for convictions based on the use of substances that are not federally controlled. The IJ held that the Pennsylvania statute is divisible, applied the modified categorical approach, and denied a motion to terminate. The BIA dismissed Pesikan’s appeal. The Third Circuit granted a petition for review. Because the identity of the specific controlled substance is not an element of the Pennsylvania DUI statute, that statute is indivisible and cannot serve as the basis for Pesikan’s removal. View "Pesikan v. Attorney General United States" on Justia Law

Durham, a prisoner with lumbar stenosis, received epidural steroid injections for pain and was prescribed a walking cane. In 2020, Durham was sent to a quarantine unit without his cane. For 10 days, Durham repeatedly, unsuccessfully requested his cane because he was in severe pain. His requests to see a doctor and to use a shower chair were ignored. Durham fell in the shower. Durham filed suit, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act (RA).The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that Durham’s claims for money damages against the defendants in their capacity as state officials barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity; Durham failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim, having failed to plausibly allege that the prison officials were “subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm”; and Durham failed to state ADA and RA claims, having failed to show that he is a qualifying individual with a disability. The Third Circuit vacated. Durham is a “qualified individual” and the provision of showers in prison is an activity that must be made accessible to people with disabilities. Durham sufficiently pleaded that the defendants had knowledge that his federally protected ADA right was substantially likely to be violated. A state program that accepts federal funds waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity to RA claims. Durham adequately alleged deliberate indifference. View "Durham v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Three men joined in a shootout, but only Rogers was convicted of murdering a bystander caught in their crossfire. At his trial, Rogers’s attorney did not object while the trial judge admonished a trial witness (Singleton) about perjury after that witness gave testimony favorable to Rogers. The attorney offered no arguments when Singleton changed his testimony and did not cross-examine Singleton about the change. The Third Circuit reversed the denial of habeas relief. Counsel’s failure to object to the trial judge’s admonishment, conduct he “did not think” was problematic, fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under “Strickland” as did counsel’s later failure to cross-examine Singleton regarding his changed testimony. Counsel characterized Singleton as “a liar, trying to help his buddy out,” whose testimony would not be “determinative of the outcome of this case,” but Singleton was the only witness to ever claim Rogers shot first—the ultimate issue in the case. Had Rogers’s counsel objected to the trial judge’s admonishment of Singleton and cross-examined Singleton about his changed testimony, “a reasonable probability” exists that “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Without Singleton’s testimony against Rogers, the prosecution’s remaining evidence was negligible. View "Rogers v. Superintendent Greene SCI" on Justia Law

Philadelphia Police obtained a search warrant for the house where Dennis resided, suspecting that it was being used for drug activity. Dennis was not home. Six officers performing surveillance were in plain clothes “to maintain an advantage.” They spotted Dennis driving near his house and decided to stop his car. The ensuing events were captured by a nearby surveillance camera. The plainclothes officers in unmarked police cars surrounded Dennis’s vehicle at an intersection. For 48 seconds, Dennis attempted to free his car, bumping into the police vehicles. When Dennis’s car appeared to have stopped, Officer Nicoletti shot Dennis, who was unarmed, three times through the driver’s window. Dennis died at the scene.In the ensuing lawsuit (42 U.S.C. 1983), the court found open questions of fact concerning excessive force claims against Philadelphia and Nicoletti, regarding whether Dennis posed a threat to the officers or public safety. The court denied Nicoletti qualified immunity, reasoning that his conduct: “sho[oting] at an unarmed driver attempting to escape at slow speed who had hit a car,” and/or “using deadly force against an individual driving a car” when “the driver did not pose a threat to the safety of the officer or others,” violated clearly established law. The Third Circuit affirmed, declining to consider Nicoletti’s factual arguments and rejecting any arguments that could be construed as a legal challenge to the holding that his conduct violated clearly established law. View "Rush v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Mercado filed weekly fraudulent Pandemic Unemployment Assistance claims, collecting a total of $37,555 in benefits. He pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. His plea agreement endorsed the possibility of a downward adjustment (U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(a)) if Mercado could “adequately demonstrate recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility.” At the plea hearing, Mercado apologized. The court continued his bail pending sentencing, including several conditions, requiring that Mercado refrain from using narcotic drugs or other controlled substances, submit to substance abuse testing, complete substance abuse evaluation and treatment if deemed appropriate, and get medical and psychiatric treatment as directed by pretrial services.On the day he pleaded guilty, Mercado tested positive for cocaine. Probation referred him for intensive outpatient treatment, but he never reported. Mercado subsequently admitted to using cocaine again, and two months later, refused to take a drug test. When he finally submitted to testing, he again tested positive. His PSR calculated a Guideline range of 10-16 months’ imprisonment. A two-point downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility would have produced a Guideline range of 6-12 months but the PSR recommended against it. At sentencing, Mercado again expressed remorse. The court declined the two-point adjustment, citing his ongoing drug use, and imposed a 10-month sentence. The Third Circuit affirmed. U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(a) does not preclude consideration of post-plea conduct “unrelated” to the pled-out offense. The commentary to this provision lists “appropriate considerations,” several of which expressly reference post-plea conduct. View "United States v. Mercado" on Justia Law

Officers swarmed a New Jersey hotel room to execute an arrest warrant for Montalvo-Flores in connection with his suspected involvement in a robbery. They found car keys during a search incident to arrest. Although Montalvo-Flores exclaimed that those were his car keys, he did not have a valid driver’s license. Upon locating the car in the parking lot, officers discovered that its registered owner was the Enterprise. Officers called Enterprise’s regional risk manager to obtain permission to search the car, stating that Montalvo-Flores was operating the vehicle while involved in criminal activity. The manager, noting Montalvo-Flores was not listed on the rental agreement (his girlfriend, Pisciotta, was) gave officers consent to search the vehicle. In that search, officers found 304 grams of cocaine inside the trunk.Montalvo-Flores, charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), moved to suppress, arguing that he, with his girlfriend’s permission, lawfully possessed and controlled the car. The district court denied Montalvo-Flores’s motion, holding that he lacked standing because he failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. The Third Circuit reversed. Montalvo-Flores had dominion and control of the car with his girlfriend’s permission and had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. View "United States v. Montalvo-Flores" on Justia Law