Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Federal Protective Service, within DHS, hires Protective Service Officers for federal property and can secure contracts for private security. FPS contracted with a private security company, to provide security for the Philadelphia Social Security Administration (SSA) office. Smith and Bell were assigned to that office. In 2020, Washington was told that he could deliver certain paperwork to that office. He found the door locked. Bell explained that the office was open, with modified operations because of the coronavirus pandemic. Bell directed Washington to a drop box where he could deposit his paperwork. Washington insisted that he be allowed to visit the person with whom he spoke on the phone and forced his way into the building. Smith and Bell eventually subdued and handcuffed Washington.Washington was charged with two violations of 18 U.S.C. 111. The indictment alleges that Washington “forcibly assaulted, resisted, opposed, impeded, intimidated and interfered with an officer of the United States, as designated in [18 U.S.C. 1114], that is, [the victim], a Protective Services Officer,” while the victim was performing official duties. Weeks before trial, the government stated that Smith and Bell were contract officers but contended that they were designated under section 1114 because they were assisting the FPS in securing the SSA office. The Third Circuit reversed Washington's conviction. The indictment was flawed. It alleged that Washington assaulted federal officers when his victims could be protected only if designated as persons assisting federal officers or employees. The government’s evidence did not prove that modification. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

Titus’s solo medical practice, in its last 13 months, earned $1.1 million by distributing more than 20,000 prescriptions for Schedule II drugs. Titus often did only cursory physical examinations before prescribing opioids. He kept prescribing drugs despite signs that his patients were diverting or abusing them. At least two of Titus’s patients overdosed. Other doctors filed professional complaints. Titus closed his practice. Federal agents raided the homes of Titus and two of his employees and found thousands of patient files. Titus was indicted on 14 counts of unlawfully dispensing and distributing controlled substances (based on 14 prescriptions) and maintaining drug-involved premises, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 856(a)(1).The government's statistician, using the Prescription Monitoring Program, identified 1,142 patients for whom Titus had prescribed controlled drugs, drew a random sample of 300 patients, and extrapolated to conclude that Titus had provided 29,323 controlled substance prescriptions to 948 patients with at least one inconsistent drug test and 1,552 such prescriptions to 352 patients he had already discharged from his practice. The government’s medical expert reviewed 24 of those files and determined that Titus had written illegal prescriptions for 18 of the patients.The district court held Titus responsible for at least 30,000 kilos, citing “general trial evidence” and extrapolating from the 24-file sample. The Third Circuit affirmed Titus’s convictions but vacated his 240-month sentence. The government failed to prove that extrapolating from a small sample satisfied its burden to prove the drug quantity by a preponderance of the evidence. View "United States v. Titus" on Justia Law

Police stopped Henderson for a traffic violation, searched his vehicle, and found a loaded semiautomatic firearm with an obliterated serial number and 13 rounds of ammunition. Henderson pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He had a prior state robbery conviction under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 3701(a)(1)(ii).The court applied the U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(4) sentencing enhancement based on Henderson’s robbery conviction, reasoning that section 3701(a) is divisible and Henderson was convicted of violating subsection (ii), which qualified as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a). Subsection (ii) provides that a person is guilty of robbery if he “threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury,” which means a violation of the subsection necessarily “requires the purposeful use or threat of physical force against another.” With an enhancement for possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4)(B), and a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G. 3E1.1, his Guideline range was 57-71 months’ imprisonment.The Third Circuit affirmed Henderson’s 60-month sentence, applying the “modified categorical approach,” and concluding that subsection (ii) involves the requisite force and mens rea to qualify as a crime of violence under 4B1.2’s elements clause. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Porat, the Dean of the Fox School of Business at Temple University, was “almost obsessed with rankings.” To manipulate Fox’s U.S. New and World Report rankings, he submitted false information about students taking the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT), offers of admission, student debt, and average undergraduate GPA. Partly because of these deceptions, With Porat’s knowledge and involvement, Fox aggressively marketed its false high rankings. At trial, former students testified that they chose Fox because of its rankings or that they believed employers hire students from schools with the best “brand” and that Fox’s high rankings would help them “compete in the marketplace.” The government estimated that Fox gained nearly $40 million in tuition from the additional students who enrolled during 2014–2018. In 2018, Porat’s scheme was exposed. Fox administrators disclosed the false GMAT data to U.S. News, which announced Fox’s “misreported data.” As Fox’s rankings fell, its enrollment fell.The Third Circuit affirmed Porat’s convictions for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371, and wire fraud, section 1343. The government proved by sufficient evidence that he sought to deprive his victims of money, that he sought to personally obtain money, or that the party he deceived was the same party he defrauded of money (“convergence” View "United States v. Porat" on Justia Law

In 1985, Clark and Devose assaulted and kidnapped a postal worker at gunpoint, stripped him of his uniform, and restrained him in his truck. Disguised in the uniform, Devose gained entry to a banker’s home, where they held the banker’s 85-year-old mother-in-law and 19-year-old daughter at gunpoint and called the banker to demand ransom. Clark raped the girl. They saw police outside and fled. Devose pleaded guilty and agreed to testify against Clark.In 1990, Clark was convicted of two conspiracy offenses, attempted extortion, assault of a postal worker, kidnapping, theft of a postal vehicle, and using a firearm during a crime of violence--kidnapping (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). Clark was sentenced to life imprisonment plus five years for the firearm count, to be served consecutively, as section 924 required. The Sentencing Guidelines did not then apply. Clark filed an unsuccessful appeal and numerous unsuccessful collateral attacks. In 2019, the Supreme Court held that part of section 924(c)’s definition of “crime of violence” is unconstitutionally vague.In Clark’s successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion, the parties agreed that kidnapping does not qualify as a section 924(c) crime of violence. The district court vacated Clark’s 924 conviction but declined to conduct a full resentencing. The Third Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. As a matter of first impression, the court held that a certificate of appealability is required for a prisoner in federal custody to appeal a district court’s choice of remedy in a 28 U.S.C. 2255 proceeding. View "Clark v. United States" on Justia Law

Davis, a non-citizen, and Beckford, a U.S. citizen, met when they were children. In 1993, Davis was sentenced to life in prison for nonviolent drug convictions. When his sentence was reduced to 30 years in 2008, the two decided to marry. viewing marriage as an expression of their Christian faith. In 2012, Davis was moved to Moshannon Valley, a private prison that houses low-security alien inmates. The prison’s written policy for allowing marriage had certain behavioral requirements; the prison psychologist and other officials had to approve the request. Davis unsuccessfully challenged the denial of his marriage request through the prison’s administrative process. The Administrator of the Bureau of Prisons Privatization Management Branch informed Davis that marriage requests remained exclusively within the province of Moshannon officials. Davis learned that Moshannon had not approved a single request to marry during its contractual relationship. Davis’s sentence was later reduced to 27 years. He was deported after his release. Although their marriage would not have allowed Davis to challenge his deportation, Davis alleges that marriage to a U.S. citizen could provide a basis for other inmates to challenge their removals. Davis alleged that federal officials directed Moshannon officials to deny all inmate marriage requests to ensure that marriage to a citizen would not interfere with deportations. The district court dismissed claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1, under 42 U.S.C. 1985; and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Third Circuit vacated in part. Davis stated a RFRA claim. View "Davis v. Wigen" on Justia Law

Shaknitz pleaded guilty to three counts of distribution and attempted distribution of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a), and one count of possession of child pornography. Shaknitz was sentenced to a 170-month term of imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release. During sentencing, the district court orally imposed a condition on Shaknitz’s incarceration, limiting his contact with his five-year-old son to telephone only. In its written judgment, the court did not include its previously-announced condition but recommended that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) impose the telephone-only condition. The judgment did not state that the recommendation superseded the oral pronouncement.The Third Circuit vacated, noting its prior holding that a sentencing court lacks “inherent authority to impose a no-contact order during [a defendant’s] incarceration term.” It is unclear whether the written judgment was intended to replace the mandate with a recommendation; sentencing courts have the authority to recommend to the BOP that defendants’ contact with others be limited where necessary and appropriate. View "United States v. Shaknitz" on Justia Law

Kramer’s then-wife, Terry, found a document on her husband’s computer that led her to believe that Kramer had engaged in sexual conduct with a minor. Later, Terry found photographs on Kramer’s cellphone depicting the victim engaged in sexual acts. Terry met with police, described the sexually explicit photographs, and showed them the document; she emailed the photographs to the police. The victim reported that Kramer had sexually abused her for years and had used his cellphone to take pictures of her engaged in sexual conduct. Kramer admitted to having a sexual relationship with the victim and to taking the photographs. With a warrant, law enforcement searched Kramer’s cellphone and eventually found videos and photographs depicting sexual acts involving the victim.Kramer was charged with sexual exploitation of children, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). While in custody, he sent Terry a letter: “You crossed [the] line and it IS going to cost you,” repeatedly stating that he would have Terry arrested for her purported crimes. Kramer was then charged with attempted witness tampering, 18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(1). The Third Circuit affirmed Kramer’s convictions and 350-month sentence, upholding the denial of Kramer’s motion to suppress evidence. Terry conducted a private search of his cellphone and voluntarily provided the evidence to the government; the evidence was admissible without implicating the Fourth Amendment. The court properly denied Kramer’s motion to dismiss the attempted witness tampering charge. View "United States v. Kramer" on Justia Law

Following the armed robbery of a Winston-Salem, North Carolina convenience store, officers obtained a warrant for Stanford’s arrest and contacted Wilmington Detective Cannon for help apprehending Stanford, whom they believed had fled to Delaware. Cannon obtained a search warrant authorizing the use of a cell-site simulator to locate Stanford’s cell phone. Cannon alleged that Stanford was originally from Wilmington and had family members and associates who could assist him. Officers learned that Stanford was at a Wilmington Residence. While conducting surveillance, police approached a woman who exited the Residence and asked whether Stanford was there. She said Stanford and Gibson—Stanford’s brother, wanted on other charges—were inside. Officers knocked, announced, and entered the unlocked door. Stanford and Gibson were arrested. Cannon obtained a warrant to search the Residence for evidence of the North Carolina robbery. The Affidavit contained possible inaccuracies about the other suspects and Stanford's stay at the Residence. The subsequent search of the Residence yielded a loaded handgun beneath a cushion on the couch where Stanford was laying when he was arrested.Stanford was charged with illegal firearm possession 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress, based on the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, and his sentence. Delaware first- and second-degree robbery are U.S.S.G crimes of violence. View "United States v. Stanford" on Justia Law

Johnsonburg, Pennsylvania Officer Cuneo learned that the St. Marys Police Department had a search warrant to obtain a DNA sample from Perez. Cuneo knew Perez, a local with a history of illegal drug use. A log entry instructed officers who saw Perez to “hold” him and call St. Marys. Cuneo knew that Perez’s DNA had been found at the scene of a recent drug house burglary. Cuneo inferred—mistakenly—that a “body” warrant also had been issued. Later, sitting in his cruiser, Cuneo spotted Perez. The men stood on the sidewalk, having a “friendly conversation.” When Cuneo mentioned the DNA warrant and told Perez he needed to take him into custody. Perez said he was going home and sprinted away.Cuneo pursued Perez. Perez says he was tased from behind without warning. Cuneo says he warned Perez to stop before tasing him. Perez fell forward, breaking his nose. Cuneo radioed for backup and medical assistance. Perez recovered; a physical altercation ensued. Cuneo repeatedly tased and struck Perez with his baton, then shot Perez in the back.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Cuneo asserted qualified immunity in defense. The court denied Cuneo’s summary judgment motion as to his use of his firearm and the unlawful seizure claim. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Cuneo did not seize Perez during their initial encounter. The court remanded so Perez’s excessive force claim for Cuneo’s use of his firearm can proceed. View "Perez v. Borough of Johnsonburg" on Justia Law