Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Kisela, a Tucson police officer, shot Hughes less than a minute after arriving, with other officers, at the scene where a woman had been reported to 911 as hacking a tree with a knife and acting erratically. When Kisela fired, Hughes was holding a large kitchen knife, had taken steps toward nearby woman (her roommate), and had refused to drop the knife after at least two commands to do so. Hughes matched the description given by the 911 caller. Her injuries were not life-threatening. All of the officers later said that they subjectively believed Hughes was a threat to her roommate. Hughes had a history of mental illness. Her roommate said that she did not feel endangered. Hughes sued Kisela, alleging excessive force, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the officer, reversing the Ninth Circuit. Even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, which “is not at all evident,” Kisela was entitled to qualified immunity. Although the officers were in no apparent danger, Kisela believed Hughes was a threat to her roommate. Kisela had mere seconds to assess the potential danger and was separated from the women by a chain-link fence. This is "far from an obvious case" in which any competent officer would have known that shooting Hughes would violate the Fourth Amendment; the most analogous Ninth Circuit precedent favors Kisela. A reasonable officer is not required to foresee judicial decisions that do not yet exist in instances where the requirements of the Fourth Amendment are far from obvious. View "Kisela v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Ayestas was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in a Texas state court. He secured new counsel; his conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. A third legal team sought, unsuccessfully, state habeas relief, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel but not counsel’s failure to investigate petitioner’s mental health and substance abuse. His fourth legal team raised that failure in a federal habeas petition. The court found the claim procedurally defaulted because it had never been raised in state court. The case was remanded for reconsideration in light of Martinez, in which the Supreme Court held that a prisoner seeking federal habeas relief could overcome the procedural default of a trial-level ineffective-assistance claim by showing that the claim is substantial and that state habeas counsel was ineffective in failing to raise it, and Trevino's extension of that holding to Texas prisoners. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion for funding to develop his claim (18 U.S.C. 3599(f)). A unanimous Supreme Court vacated, first holding that the denial was a judicial decision, requiring the application of a legal standard and subject to appellate review, rather than an administrative decision. The Fifth Circuit did not apply the correct legal standard in requiring that applicants show a “substantial need” for the services. Section 3599 authorizes funding for the “reasonably necessary” services of experts, investigators, and the like; it requires the court to determine, in its discretion, whether a reasonable attorney would regard the services as sufficiently important. The court also required “a viable constitutional claim that is not procedurally barred,” which is too restrictive after Trevino. An argument that funding is never “reasonably necessary” where a habeas petitioner seeks to present a procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance claim that depends on facts outside the state-court record may be considered on remand. View "Ayestas v. Davis" on Justia Law

Ayestas was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in a Texas state court. He secured new counsel; his conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. A third legal team sought, unsuccessfully, state habeas relief, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel but not counsel’s failure to investigate petitioner’s mental health and substance abuse. His fourth legal team raised that failure in a federal habeas petition. The court found the claim procedurally defaulted because it had never been raised in state court. The case was remanded for reconsideration in light of Martinez, in which the Supreme Court held that a prisoner seeking federal habeas relief could overcome the procedural default of a trial-level ineffective-assistance claim by showing that the claim is substantial and that state habeas counsel was ineffective in failing to raise it, and Trevino's extension of that holding to Texas prisoners. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion for funding to develop his claim (18 U.S.C. 3599(f)). A unanimous Supreme Court vacated, first holding that the denial was a judicial decision, requiring the application of a legal standard and subject to appellate review, rather than an administrative decision. The Fifth Circuit did not apply the correct legal standard in requiring that applicants show a “substantial need” for the services. Section 3599 authorizes funding for the “reasonably necessary” services of experts, investigators, and the like; it requires the court to determine, in its discretion, whether a reasonable attorney would regard the services as sufficiently important. The court also required “a viable constitutional claim that is not procedurally barred,” which is too restrictive after Trevino. An argument that funding is never “reasonably necessary” where a habeas petitioner seeks to present a procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance claim that depends on facts outside the state-court record may be considered on remand. View "Ayestas v. Davis" on Justia Law

In 2004-2009, the IRS investigated Marinello’s tax activities. In 2012, Marinello was indicted for violating 26 U.S.C. 7212(a) (the Omnibus Clause), which forbids “corruptly or by force or threats of force . . . obstruct[ing] or imped[ing], or endeavor[ing] to obstruct or impede, the due administration” of the Internal Revenue Code. The judge instructed the jury that it must find that Marinello “corruptly” engaged in at least one specified activity, but was not told that it needed to find that Marinello knew he was under investigation and intended corruptly to interfere with that investigation. The Second Circuit affirmed his conviction. The Supreme Court reversed. To convict a defendant under the Omnibus Clause, the government must prove the defendant was aware of a pending tax-related proceeding, such as a particular investigation or audit, or could reasonably foresee that such a proceeding would commence. The verbs “obstruct” and “impede” require an object. The object in 7212(a) is the “due administration of [the Tax Code],” referring to discrete targeted administrative acts rather than every conceivable task involved in the Tax Code’s administration. In context, the Omnibus Clause serves as a “catchall” for the obstructive conduct the subsection sets forth, not for every violation that interferes with routine administrative procedures. A broader reading could result in a lack of fair warning. Just because a taxpayer knows that the IRS will review her tax return annually does not transform every Tax Code violation into an obstruction charge. View "Marinello v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2004-2009, the IRS investigated Marinello’s tax activities. In 2012, Marinello was indicted for violating 26 U.S.C. 7212(a) (the Omnibus Clause), which forbids “corruptly or by force or threats of force . . . obstruct[ing] or imped[ing], or endeavor[ing] to obstruct or impede, the due administration” of the Internal Revenue Code. The judge instructed the jury that it must find that Marinello “corruptly” engaged in at least one specified activity, but was not told that it needed to find that Marinello knew he was under investigation and intended corruptly to interfere with that investigation. The Second Circuit affirmed his conviction. The Supreme Court reversed. To convict a defendant under the Omnibus Clause, the government must prove the defendant was aware of a pending tax-related proceeding, such as a particular investigation or audit, or could reasonably foresee that such a proceeding would commence. The verbs “obstruct” and “impede” require an object. The object in 7212(a) is the “due administration of [the Tax Code],” referring to discrete targeted administrative acts rather than every conceivable task involved in the Tax Code’s administration. In context, the Omnibus Clause serves as a “catchall” for the obstructive conduct the subsection sets forth, not for every violation that interferes with routine administrative procedures. A broader reading could result in a lack of fair warning. Just because a taxpayer knows that the IRS will review her tax return annually does not transform every Tax Code violation into an obstruction charge. View "Marinello v. United States" on Justia Law

A federal grand jury indicted Class for possessing firearms in his locked jeep, which was parked on the grounds of the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D. C.; 40 U.S.C. 5104(e)(1) provides that “An individual . . . may not carry . . . on the Grounds or in any of the Capitol Buildings a firearm.” After the court rejected his Second Amendment and Due Process claims, Class pleaded guilty. His plea agreement said nothing about the right to challenge on direct appeal the constitutionality of the statute. The Court of Appeals held that Class, by pleading guilty, had waived his constitutional claims. The Supreme Court reversed. A guilty plea, alone, does not bar a federal criminal defendant from challenging the constitutionality of his statute of conviction on direct appeal. Where the claim implicates “the very power of the State” to prosecute the defendant, a guilty plea cannot by itself bar it. Class's claims do not contradict the terms of the indictment or the plea agreement and can be resolved based on the record. Class challenged the government’s power to criminalize his (admitted) conduct and to constitutionally prosecute. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2), which governs “conditional” guilty pleas, does not say whether it sets forth the exclusive procedure for a defendant to preserve a constitutional claim following a guilty plea and does not apply to this situation. View "Class v. United States" on Justia Law

District of Columbia police officers responded to a complaint about loud music and illegal activities in a vacant house and found the house in disarray. They smelled marijuana and saw liquor. They found a makeshift strip club in the living room, and a naked woman and several men in a bedroom. The partygoers gave inconsistent stories. Two identified “Peaches” as the tenant and said that she had given permission for the party. When the officers spoke by phone to Peaches, she was agitated and evasive, eventually admitting that she did not have permission to use the house. The owner confirmed that he had not given anyone permission to be there. The officers arrested the partygoers for unlawful entry. Several partygoers sued for false arrest. The Supreme Court held that the officers had probable cause to arrest the partygoers. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the officers made an “entirely reasonable inference” that the partygoers knew they did not have permission to be in the house, The condition of the house and the conduct of the partygoers allowed the officers to make common-sense conclusions about human behavior and infer that the partygoers, who scattered and hid, knew the party was not authorized. The partygoers’ implausible answers gave the officers reason to infer that they were lying. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. 1983 even if they lacked actual probable cause because a reasonable officer could have interpreted the law as permitting the arrests. View "District of Columbia v. Wesby" on Justia Law

Tharpe moved to reopen his federal habeas corpus proceedings regarding his claim that the Georgia jury that convicted him of murder included a white juror, Gattie, who was biased against Tharpe because he is black. The district court denied the motion as procedurally defaulted in state court. The Eleventh Circuit denied a certificate of appealability application based on its conclusion, rooted in the state court’s fact-finding, that Tharpe had not established prejudice. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. While the state court’s prejudice determination is binding on federal courts absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Tharpe produced a sworn affidavit, signed by Gattie, indicating Gattie’s view that “there are two types of black people: 1. Black folks and 2. Niggers”; that Tharpe, “who wasn’t in the ‘good’ black folks category in my book, should get the electric chair for what he did”; that “[s]ome of the jurors voted for death because they felt Tharpe should be an example to other blacks who kill blacks, but that wasn’t my reason”; and that, “[a]fter studying the Bible, I have wondered if black people even have souls.” Gattie’s "remarkable" affidavit presents a strong factual basis for the argument that Tharpe’s race affected Gattie’s vote for a death verdict. "At the very least, jurists of reason could debate whether Tharpe has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the state court’s factual determination was wrong.” View "Tharpe v. Sellers" on Justia Law

More than 30 years ago, Madison shot a police officer in the head at close range. An Alabama jury found Madison guilty of capital murder. In 2016, he sought suspension of his death sentence, arguing that, due to recent strokes, he has become incompetent. The court heard testimony from psychologists who had examined Madison. The court’s appointed psychologist reported that, although Madison may have “suffered a significant decline post-stroke, . . . [he] understands the exact posture of his case,” and appears to have a “rational understanding ” of his death sentence. A psychologist hired by Madison’s counsel reported that Madison “able to understand the nature of the pending proceeding and … what he was tried for” and that . . . [Alabama is] seeking retribution” for that crime, but Madison cannot recall “the sequence of events from the offense to his arrest to the trial” and believes that he “never went around killing.” The trial court denied Madison’s petition. Madison sought federal habeas relief. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the denial of that petition. The Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the denial, citing its “Panetti” and “Ford” holdings. Neither decision “clearly established” that a prisoner is incompetent to be executed because of a failure to remember his commission of the crime, as distinct from a failure to rationally comprehend the concepts of crime and punishment as applied to him. The state court did not unreasonably apply those decisions in holding that Madison is competent to be executed because he recognizes that he will be put to death as punishment for the murder he was found to have committed. Nor was the state court’s decision founded on an unreasonable assessment of the evidence. View "Dunn v. Madison" on Justia Law

Cuero, on parole, driving under the influence of methamphetamine and without a license, while carrying a gun, drove his car into and seriously injured a pedestrian. A California court permitted the state to amend a criminal complaint to which the Cuero had pleaded guilty, acknowledging that permitting the amendment would lead to a higher sentence. The amendment added another “strike” to Cuero’s criminal history. The court reasoned that the case was distinguishable from “a situation where the [State] might, after a guilty plea, seek to amend” by adding “new charges” or facts that fundamentally alter the substance of the complaint.Cuero was allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, then pleaded guilty to the amended complaint and was sentenced to a term with a minimum of 25 years. The Ninth Circuit held that the California court had made a mistake of federal law, reasoning that Cuero was entitled to specific performance of the 14-year, 4-month sentence that he would have received had the complaint not been amended. The Supreme Court reversed, citing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), stating that none of its prior decisions clearly require the state court to impose the lower sentence that the parties originally expected. Even if the state violated the Constitution when it moved to amend the complaint there is no Supreme Court precedent that “clearly established” specific performance as a remedy. Circuit precedent does not constitute “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” View "Kernan v. Cuero" on Justia Law