Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of one count each of aggravated murder and child kidnapping, each a first degree felony. Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent sentences of life imprisonment without parole for the convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, holding (1) Utah’s noncapital aggravated murder sentencing statute is not constitutionally deficient; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion with respect to various evidentiary rulings Defendant challenged on appeal, including the court’s admission into evidence of two photographs, although in reaching that decision the Court abandoned its prior test that determined the threshold for the admission of potentially gruesome photographs; (3) the district court did not err in declining to merge Defendant’s child kidnapping conviction with his aggravated murder conviction; and (4) even assuming Defendant’s trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance, counsel’s performance did not prejudice Defendant. The sentencing court, however, incorrectly stated that the presumptive sentence for Defendant’s aggravated murder conviction was life in prison without parole. Remanded for the limited purpose of permitting the district court to clarify what impact is misapprehension of the law had on its sentencing decision. View "State v. Met" on Justia Law

Based on information received by a confidential informant (CI), police officers pulled over a vehicle in which Defendant was a passenger. Drugs were discovered during a search of the vehicle. Defendant was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance. Defendant filed a motion to compel the State to reveal the CI’s identity. The State claimed a privilege under Utah R. Evid. 505 and opposed the motion to compel. The district court elected to conduct an in camera interview to determine whether the CI possessed knowledge relevant to Defendant’s guilt or innocence, but the CI refused to appear. The district court concluded that Rule 505 did not require it to dismiss the charges against Defendant. Thereafter, Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court applied the incorrect legal standard when it ruled that Rule 505 did not require dismissal of the charges against Defendant. Remanded. View "State v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

Suspecting that his ex-girlfriend was planning to steal a motor home, Defendant snatched his ex-girlfriend’s purse to deliver the evidence to the police. Defendant’s conduct led to a fight between him and his ex-girlfriend. The State charged Defendant with aggravated robbery, among other crimes. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err when it declined to reduce Defendant’s conviction from aggravated robbery to robbery; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not granting a continuance to permit Defendant to subpoena additional defense witnesses. View "State v. Mackin" on Justia Law

Layton City charged Defendant with driving under the influence, driving on a denied license, and leaving the scene of a property-damage accident. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered after police officers investigating a hit-and-run accident entered a private residence with neither permission nor a warrant. The district court granted the motion, concluding that, even though the officers were in the process of obtaining a search warrant at the time they entered the house, the inevitable-discovery exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply in this case. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the City established the applicability of the inevitable-discovery exception to the warrantless search. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the district court’s order granting Defendant’s suppression motion, holding that the district court correctly determined that the City’s evidence was too speculative to establish inevitable discovery, and therefore, the City failed to meet its burden of establishing the inevitable-discovery exception. View "Brierley v. Layton City" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of aggravated murder, possession of a dangerous weapon by restricted person, and obstruction of justice. Brandon Wright, one of the State’s witnesses at trial, testified that Petitioner admitted to the aggravated murder when they were both serving prison time. While Petitioner’s appeal was pending, Wright confessed to an unrelated twenty-year-old murder. Based on Wright’s confession, Petitioner petitioned for extraordinary relief, asserting that unless the Court exercises its authority to issue an extraordinary writ, he will be unable to seek a new trial based on this newly discovered evidence until after he has exhausted his direct appeal. The Supreme Court declined to exercise its discretion to grant Petitioner’s petition for extraordinary relief because Petitioner failed to carry his burden of showing that the newly discovered impeachment evidence in this case justifies the Court issuing an extraordinary writ. View "Logue v. Court of Appeals" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with burglary, theft, and criminal mischief. In the course of one day, Defendant entered her initial appearance in district court, was appointed counsel, waived her right to a preliminary hearing, pled guilty, waived the minimum two-day waiting period for sentencing, and received judgment and sentence. Defendant filed a notice of appeal without filing a motion to withdraw her plea, challenging her plea as unknowingly and involuntary. Although the plea withdrawal statute cuts of a defendant’s right to a direct appeal once sentencing is announced, Defendant argued that the plea withdrawal statute merely allows a defendant to pursue either a direct appeal or postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in accordance with caselaw, the plea withdrawal statute bars direct appeals once sentencing takes place, thus requiring defendants to pursue post-conviction relief; and (2) because Defendant had not pursued a Post-Conviction Remedies Act proceeding, her claims were not ripe for review. View "State v. Gailey" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder. The jury imposed a sentence of life without parole. On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case for the trial court to conduct a rule 23B hearing addressing Defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court stayed the remainder of Defendant’s appeal pending the outcome of those proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain DNA and mtDNA evidence; (2) Defendant’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance; and (3) even if the remainder of Defendant’s claims established errors, any such errors would not have resulted in a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome. View "State v. Griffin" on Justia Law

In 2002, Appellant was convicted of murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on appeal. Appellant later filed a petition under Part 3 of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act seeking testing on previously untested items from the murder scene and arguing that the DNA testing would prove his factual innocence. The State subsequently filed a response asking the district court to dismiss Appellant’s petition. Before Appellant had an opportunity to oppose the State’s filing, the district court dismissed Appellant’s petition on the grounds that Appellant failed to establish a non-tactical reason for declining DNA testing at trial. Thereafter, the district court denied Appellant’s motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in refusing to allow Defendant an opportunity to file a response to the State’s opposition to his petition under Utah R. Civ. P. 65C. Remanded. View "Gordon v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial held in 1999, Appellant was convicted of murder and tampering with evidence. The convictions were affirmed on appeal and upheld on multiple postconviction challenges in both state and federal court. Appellant here filed a petition for postconviction DNA testing, claiming that DNA testing will show his factual innocence. The district court denied Appellant’s petition, concluding that the DNA testing did not have the potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that would establish Appellant’s factual innocence under Utah Code 78B-9-301(2)(f). The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court’s analysis of the operative terms of the statute was only partially in accordance with the law. Remanded. View "Meinhard v. State" on Justia Law

Monsour Al Shammari, a citizen of Saudia Arabia, was arrested and charged with rape. The Royal Consulate of Saudia Arabia provided the cash funds to post bail. Al Shammari subsequently attempted to cross the border into Mexico but was detained by the United States Customs and Border Patrol. Thereafter, Al Shammari failed to appear for a scheduled hearing, and the district court ordered the cash bail forfeited. Al Shammari moved to set aside the order of forfeiture, contending that the forfeiture was procedurally deficient because the Consulate was not given notice. The district court ordered the bail forfeited, concluding that the Consulate was not a “surety” for purposes of Chapters 20 and 20b of Title 77 of the Utah Code. The Supreme Court denied the Consulate’s petition for extraordinary relief, concluding that the Consulate was not a surety that was constitutionally or statutorily entitled to notice. View "Royal Consulate v. Hon. Pullen" on Justia Law