Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The State charged Defendant with official misconduct under Utah Code 76-8-201 and with witness tampering under Utah Code 76-8-508(1). At a preliminary hearing, the magistrate judge refused to bind Defendant over for trial, concluding that the State had not met its burden of presenting sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that Defendant had committed witness tampering or official misconduct. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the magistrate and court of appeals erred in weighing the evidence in search of the most reasonable inference; and (2) the State presented evidence supporting a reasonable belief that each offense in question was committed by Defendant. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Petitioner’s son assaulted Petitioner’s co-worker. Petitioner was convicted of aggravated assault because phone records showed that calls were made Petitioner’s phone and his son’s phone just before and after the assault. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting preliminary hearing testimony about the phone records from a detective who had dried before trial and that his lawyer’s objection on this point violated his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) any error in admitting the detective’s testimony was not invited because there was no clear affirmative statement by counsel inviting the court to err; and (2) even if the trial court erred in admitting the detective’s testimony, Petitioner was not prejudiced by the admission of the testimony. View "State v. McNeil" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of child kidnapping and sentenced to a term of ten years to life. During trial, Defendant moved to put on an expert in eyewitness testimony. The motion was denied because Defendant failed to establish that such testimony was reliable, but the jury was instructed on the issues surrounding eyewitness testimony. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that this case called for the retroactive application of the Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Clopten. In Clopten, the Court held that where eyewitness are identifying a stranger, expert eyewitness testimony meets the requirements of Utah R. Evid. 702 if certain established factors affecting accuracy are present. Prior to Clopten, there was a presumption against the admission of eyewitness expert testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Clopten applies retroactively to Defendant’s case; but (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion under the Clopten standard in denying Defendant’s motion to admit eyewitness expert testimony. View "State v. Guard" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with vaginally raping and orally and anally sodomizing his seven-year-old daughter. The State sought to introduce evidence pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 404(c) that Defendant had previously vaginally raped and orally and anally sodomized two other daughters. The district court ordered that the evidence not be admitted, concluding that the evidence demonstrated a propensity to commit the crime charged but did not pass muster under Utah R. Evid. 403 because it presented a danger of unfair prejudice that substantially outweighed its probative value. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard and abused its discretion in how it assessed the similarities between the evidence of prior abuse and the current alleged abuse, as well as the potential prejudice from the evidence of prior abuse; and (2) the evidence of Defendant’s past child molestation conviction was admissible under Rule 403. View "State v. Cuttler" on Justia Law

Defendant was parked on the side of a highway with his hazard lights flashing when two sheriff’s deputies stopped to check on his welfare. The officers subsequently discovered marijuana in Defendant’s vehicle. The State charged Defendant with possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from his vehicle. The district court denied the motion to suppress, ruling that the stop was justified by the community caretaking doctrine. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the charges. Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the deputies seized Defendant when they pulled behind his parked vehicle with blue and red lights flashing; but (2) the community caretaking doctrine justified the stop under the facts of this case, and therefore, the seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and cruelty to an animal. Petitioner was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for the aggravated kidnapping conviction. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence of LWOP for his aggravated kidnapping conviction because the court failed to properly consider whether the interests of justice warranted a lesser sentence as allowed for in Utah’s aggravated kidnapping statute. The court of appeals upheld Petitioner’s LWOP sentence. The Supreme Court vacated Petitioner’s sentence of LWOP, holding that the district court erred when it considered only those aggravating and mitigating circumstances recognized by the Sentencing Commission instead of broadly considering the interests of justice required by the aggravated kidnapping statute. Remanded. View "State v. Lebeau" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of five securities law violations and one count of maintaining a pattern of unlawful activity related to an investment scheme. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s five securities law convictions, concluding that Defendant’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to a jury instruction stating that a “note is presumed to be a security” because that instruction impermissibly relieved the prosecution of its burden to prove each element of the securities crimes with which Defendant was charged. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated Defendant’s five securities law convictions, holding that the instruction at issue was an accurate statement of law and not a burden-shifting evidentiary presumption. View "State v. Kelson" on Justia Law

Defendant pled no contest to patronizing a prostitute in Layton City after negotiating a plea in abeyance agreement. The agreement contained the condition that Defendant would commit “no violations of law.” Defendant was subsequently charged in Sunset City with sexual solicitation. The action was dismissed after Defendant entered into a diversion agreement with Sunset City. Thereafter, the Second District Court held a hearing to determine whether Defendant violated the plea in abeyance agreement condition requiring that he commit no further violations of law. The district court concluded that the “no violations of law” condition in the plea abeyance agreement required a conviction, and entering into the diversion agreement did not constitute a conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the prosecution may show that the defendant failed to comply with the condition through evidence of misconduct other than a conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prosecution need not provide proof of a conviction to establish that a defendant failed to comply with a plea in abeyance condition prohibiting further violations of law; and (2) the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant failed to comply with a condition in a plea in abeyance agreement. View "Layton City v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

In 2009, Petitioner entered a plea in abeyance to a charge of lewdness that ultimately culminated in a conviction. In 2010, Petitioner was convicted of a second act of lewdness. In 2011 and 2012, Petitioner was subject to further lewdness charges. Petitioner was charged with felonies in light of his prior convictions. At this point, Petitioner sought to challenge his 2010 conviction, alleging that he had been deprived of his right to appeal the 2010 decision under the standards set forth in Utah R. App. P. 4(f) and Manning v. State. The justice court denied Petitioner’s motion. On de novo appeal to the district court, the court determined that Petitioner had waived the right to assert the denial of his right to appeal under Manning by waiting too long to assert that claim. Petitioner sought extraordinary relief challenging the dismissal of his appeal. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) Rule 4(f) governed Petitioner’s motion to reinstate his appeal from justice court to district court in a manner foreclosing the district court’s waiver analysis; (2) the district court retained jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s motion; and (3) the Post-Conviction Remedies Act’s exclusive remedy provision was inapplicable. View "Ralphs v. District Court" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to one count of attempted aggravated sexual abuse of a child. The district court neither conducted a preliminary hearing nor obtained a waiver of Defendant’s right to a preliminary hearing. After Defendant was sentenced he appealed, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter his guilty plea because he was neither afforded the right to a preliminary hearing nor did he expressly waive his right to a preliminary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, as set forth in State v. Smith, which the Court also issued today, a district court’s failure to conduct a preliminary hearing, obtain a waiver of the right to a preliminary hearing, or issue a bindover order is a nonjurisdictional defect. View "State v. Young" on Justia Law