Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Under the terms of a plea agreement Defendant agreed to plead guilty to a second-degree felony. Defendant and his wife appeared in court for their joint preliminary hearing, but a preliminary hearing never occurred. Eventually, Defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree felony possession or use of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone. After Defendant was sentenced he appealed, arguing that because he was never bound over following either a preliminary hearing or an express waiver of the right to a preliminary hearing, the district court never obtained subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The court of appeals agreed with Defendant, determining that the guilty plea was void. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it is error for a district court to accept a guilty plea without holding a preliminary hearing or obtaining an express waiver from the defendant of the right to a preliminary hearing, but (2) such an error does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

In 2002, Appellant, a Mexican native and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, pleaded guilty to felony theft. Eight years later, deportation proceedings were initiated against Appellant, in part due to Appellant’s 2002 felony theft conviction. Appellant filed a petition asking the district court to vacate his 2002 plea under the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) or, alternatively, through a writ of coram nobis. In his petition, Appellant claimed that his counsel was ineffective during the plea process by failing to disclose the possible immigration consequences related to his plea. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition and writ of coram nobis, concluding (1) Appellant’s petition was time barred by the PCRA, and (2) Appellant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel, as Appellant knew or should have known that there were potential immigration consequences related to his plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to preserve his argument that his attorney affirmatively misrepresented the immigration consequences of his plea; and (2) the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s petition for a writ of coram nobis, as Appellant had a remedy available to him through the PCRA. View "Oseguera v. State" on Justia Law

After law enforcement officers discovered child pornography on Defendant’s computer, they applied for and obtained a federal search warrant to search the computer. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to five counts of voyeurism. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the warrant was not sufficiently particular and lack probable cause and because his statements to the officers violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the warrant was sufficiently particular and supported by probable cause; and (2) Defendant was not in custody at the time he made the statements to the law enforcement officers so the officers’ failure to read him his Miranda rights did not violate the Fifth Amendment. View "State v. Fuller" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his counsel provided ineffective assistance at trial. The postconviction court granted summary judgment in favor of the State. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in his postconviction proceedings and then filed a Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to set aside the postconviction court’s final judgment. The postconviction court denied the motion. The Supreme Court consolidated the appeals and affirmed the postconviction court’s grant of summary judgment and denial of Rule 60(b) relief, holding (1) Petitioner failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact for each of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims; and (2) the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). View "Honie v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. Defendant later moved to withdraw his guilty plea based upon ineffective assistance of counsel and a violation of Utah R. Crim. P. 11, arguing that his plea was not knowing or voluntary because neither his defense counsel nor the trial court informed him that his guilty plea carried with it the requirement that Defendant register on the state’s sex offender registry. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to withdraw, concluding that neither defense counsel nor the district court had an obligation to inform him of the registration requirement because the registration requirement was a collateral consequence of the guilty plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the requirement to register as a sex offender is properly classified as a collateral consequence of a defendant’s guilty plea, and therefore, neither defense counsel nor the trial court in this case was constitutionally obligated to inform Defendant of the registration requirement before his guilty plea was accepted as knowing and voluntary. View "State v. Trotter" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Frank and Joan Steed, husband and wife, were each convicted of three counts of failure to file a proper tax return and one count of engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity. The failure-to-file statute requires proof that a defendant failed to file with one of three specific intents. The Steeds moved to arrest the judgment largely on the same grounds upon which they relied in a previously denied motion to dismiss. Specifically, the Steeds contended that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence of two of the three specific intent alternatives. Ultimately, the trial court submitted only the two contested intent alternatives to the jury and excluded the remaining intent alternative. The Supreme Court reversed the Steeds’ convictions, holding (1) the State presented insufficient evidence of the two contested intent alternatives; (2) because the court excluded the single supported intent alternative and submitted the two unsupported intent alternatives to the jury, there was insufficient evidence to support the verdicts; and (3) because the pattern counts were contingent on the failure-to-file convictions, the pattern counts, along with the failure-to-file convictions, must be reversed. View "State v. Steed" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of murder and child abuse for the death of her two-year-old son, Alex. Appellant appealed her convictions on several grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a preponderance of the evidence is required to admit evidence of prior bad acts, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of prior child abuse under Utah R. Evid. 404(b); (2) Appellant’s defense counsel was not ineffective for, among other things, deciding not to introduce expert testimony regarding Battered Woman’s Syndrome because the trial strategy he selected was objectively reasonable; and (3) there was no cumulative error. View "State v. Lucero" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated murder, desecration of a body, kidnapping, and aggravated kidnapping. Defendant was sentenced to life without parole for his murder conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that it was error for his case to be tried in Cache County with Box Elder County jurors. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction of and sentence for aggravated murder and desecration of a body but reversed and vacated his kidnapping and aggravated kidnapping convictions, holding (1) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in deciding to hold the trial in Cache County with a jury consisting of residents of neighboring Box Elder County; and (2) because Defendant’s kidnapping and aggravating kidnapping convictions merged, the kidnapping conviction should have been vacated, and Defendant’s aggravated kidnapping conviction should have merged with his aggravated murder conviction. View "State v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to criminally negligent automobile homicide and driving under the influence of alcohol, reserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained through a blood draw. Defendant’s blood was drawn after the police were issued eWarrants through the Utah Criminal Justice Information System. On appeal, Defendant argued that because the affidavits submitted by the police in order to obtain the warrants were not supported by an oath or affirmation, as required by both the Utah and United State constitutions, the warrants were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, holding that the affidavits comported with the historical understanding of what constitutes a constitutionally valid “affirmation,” and therefore, the affidavits were constitutionally sufficient to support the issuance of the warrants in this case. View "State v. Gutierrez-Perez" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with various crimes, including aggravated burglary and aggravated assault. After the jury was empaneled and sworn and on the second day of trial, the trial judge announced that she was recusing herself and declaring a mistrial. The case was subsequently reassigned for retrial under a new judge. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him on the grounds of double jeopardy. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the mistrial did not act as an acquittal because the mistrial was legally necessary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the burden to create a record for and sufficiently justify the mistrial fell on the trial court and the State, and, in this case, the legal necessity for a mistrial was not established on the record; and (2) Utah’s constitutional protections against double jeopardy precluded a second trial under such circumstances. View "State v. Manatau" on Justia Law