Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this appeal from the denial of a post-conviction determination of factual innocence pursuant to the Post-Conviction Remedies Act the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court, holding that further proceedings were required in accordance with the legal standards set forth in this opinion.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child for allegedly abusing her son, Kevin. Approximately one decade later Defendant recanted his statements. Based on the recantation, Defendant filed his petition for a post-conviction determination of factual innocence. The district court denied the petition after holding an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) Kevin's recantation, if believable, was sufficient to prove Defendant's factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence; (2) the district court erred in denying the petition without weighing all of the relevant evidence, assessing credibility, or making an ultimate finding on the recantation's veracity; and (3) to the extent the district court made an implicit credibility determination, it was based on a clearly erroneous factual finding that certain facts were disputed. View "Ashby v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of aggravated arson, holding that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that Defendant's counsel did not render ineffective assistance.On appeal, Defendant argued that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move for a directed verdict and by failing to object to the testimony of an expert who opined that the structure Defendant had set fire to was habitable. A divided court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) reasonable counsel could have decided to forgot a motion for directed verdict; and (2) the court of appeals correctly concluded that Defendant was not deprived of the Sixth Amendment guarantees. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in this interlocutory appeal of the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress calls made by Defendant on the Salt Lake County Jail's telephones and recorded by the jail, holding that Defendant impliedly consented to the conditions the jail had placed on the use of its phones.Defendant was charged with kidnapping and assaulting his wife and made hundreds of calls to his wife from the jail. The State moved to admit recording of several of those phone calls and filed new charges based on the recordings. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the recordings in both cases. The Supreme Court denied the motions, concluding that Defendant impliedly consented to the interception of the phone calls and that the calls were exempt under the law enforcement exception to Utah's Interception of Communications Act, Utah Code 77-23a-1 to -16. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant impliedly consented to the jail's recording of his phone calls, and therefore, the interception of Defendant's calls was authorized under the Interception Act's consent exception. View "State v. Wood" on Justia Law

In this ongoing sexual abuse of a child case the Supreme Court denied Defendant's motion filed under rule 4-202.04 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration seeking access to F.L.'s therapy records that the trial court sealed after its in camera review, holding that the balance of interests weighed in favor of keeping F.L.'s therapy records sealed during appellate review.Defendant was charged with four counts of sexual abuse of a child, F.L. In preparing his defense, Defendant requested that the trial court order in camera review of the records of multiple entities that had provided mental health services to F.L. and that the record contained references "to this incidents alleged to have occurred" in his case. The court authorized in camera review of the records, provided Defendant with relevant portions of the records, and then sealed them. After Defendant was convicted on one count, he appealed. The court of appeals unsealed the therapy records, and Defendant used them to prepare his appellate brief. F.L. requested that the court of appeals re-seal her records, which the court did. The Supreme Court denied Defendant's request to access the records, holding that the interests favoring the records' closure outweighed those favoring Defendant's access. View "State v. Chadwick" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for sexually assaulting six women, holding that the doctrine of chances precedent should be abandoned in favor of a plain-test reading of rules 402, 403 and 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.On appeal, Defendant argued that under rules 404(b) and 403 and the doctrine of chances, the district court erred in allowing the admission of other acts evidence to show that he sexually assaulted a particular victim. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding (1) in an analysis of whether the district court erred in admitting the other-acts evidence under the rules of evidence, without reference to the doctrine of chances, there was no error in the district court's other-acts evidence determination; (2) most of Defendant's hearsay claims were properly admitted consistent with exemptions to the hearsay rule, and any errors in admitting statements that should have been excluded as hearsay were harmless; and (3) Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were unavailing. View "State v. Green" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Defendant's motion for remand under rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure after a jury convicted him of aggravated robbery, holding that the court of appeals did not err.On appeal of his conviction, Defendant alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective by not supporting his mistaken identity defense with evidence that Defendant had prominent tattoos on his hands that were not visible in surveillance images of the robber. Defendant moved under rule 23B to supplement the record with facts concerning his trial counsel's alleged ineffective assistance. The court of appeals denied Defendant's rule 23B motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's rule 23B motion did not allege that the arresting officers would provide favorable testimony; and (2) therefore, Defendant failed to offer nonspeculative facts that, if true, would have established that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to question the officers about Defendant's tattoos or comment on that evidence in closing argument. View "State v. Samora" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals concluding that Defendant, Gregory Miller, could be guilty of stalking Kendra, holding that the court of appeals did not err in interpreting the stalking statute and that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.A jury found Defendant guilty of stalking Kendra based on emails that Defendant sent to an attorney who represented Kendra and Kendra's then-employer. The trial court judge arrested the judgment, concluding that no reasonable jury could have convicted Defendant of stalking based on the emails. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) correctly interpreted the stalking statute; and (2) did not err in holding that there was sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find Defendant knew or should have known his conduct would cause a person in Kendra's circumstances emotional distress. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals vacating Defendant's convictions based on ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that errors in the proceedings below did not prejudice Defendant.In vacating Defendant's convictions the court of appeals concluded that trial counsel had been ineffective by failing to object to introduction and use of evidence about Defendant's silence while being arrested and by not objecting to the manslaughter jury instruction. The court ultimately concluded that Defendant was prejudiced by these instances of deficient performance. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the convictions vacated by the court of appeals, holding (1) trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to object to a certain jury instruction; and (2) assuming counsel was also deficient for not objecting to the State's use of Defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence against Defendant, Defendant failed to establish that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different without these errors. View "State v. Bonds" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting the State's motion for pretrial detention after charging Defendant with four first-degree felonies connected to an alleged sexual assault, holding that the district court did not err when it denied Defendant bail.In its pretrial motion filed pursuant to Utah Code 77-20-1 the State argued that there was substantial evidence to support the charges against Defendant and clear and convincing evidence that Defendant was a substantial danger to the public and likely to flee if released on bail. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the district court's determinations. View "State v. Randolph" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals construing F.L.'s motion to intervene in David Chadwick's appeal from his sexual abuse of a child conviction as a motion to file an amicus brief under Utah R. App. P. 25 and allowing her thirty days to file the amicus brief, holding that F.L. should be allowed to proceed as a limited purpose party to assert her privacy interests.F.L. was the alleged victim of the sex crimes charged against Chadwick. During proceedings below, the court granted Chadwick's request to conduct an in camera review of F.L.'s therapy and counseling records. The court then sealed the records, and Chadwick was convicted. On appeal, the court of appeals first unsealed F.L.'s records and allowed Chadwick to make use of those records and then granted F.L.'s request to reseal her records and strike all references to the records in Chadwick's supply brief. When Chadwick argued on appeal that the sealing order violated his rights F.L. moved to intervene as a limited-purpose party to assert her privacy interests. The court of appeals construed the motion as a request for leave to file an amicus brief and granted it. The Supreme Court granted extraordinary relief, holding that the court of appeals made a mistake of law in not allowing F.L. to intervene as a limited-purpose party. View "F.L. v. Court of Appeals" on Justia Law