Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of lewdness involving a child and sexual exploitation of a minor by distribution of child pornography for dropping his pants in front of two young girls, exposing a toddler-sized diaper he was wearing, and in distributing a flyer containing images of children and adolescents wearing diapers. On appeal, Appellant argued, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding that, while Appellant’s conduct was deplorable and socially inappropriate, it did not fall to the level of criminal lewdness or sexual exploitation under the criminal definition of those terms as clarified in this opinion. View "State v. Bagnes" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual battery, a misdemeanor. Before trial, the district court ruled that evidence of other sexual misconduct allegations against Defendant was inadmissible. However, during redirect examination of an investigating detective, the prosecutor elicited testimony about other allegations of sexual misconduct against Defendant, which was classified as Utah R. Civ. P. 404(b) evidence. A panel majority of the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial after refusing to apply the presumption of regularity in favor of the State, holding that the district court plainly erred and counsel rendered ineffective assistance in allowing the Rule 404(b) evidence. The Supreme Court reversed without addressing the State’s argument that a gap in the record of a criminal trial should always be interpreted in favor of the State, holding that Defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective in referencing and admitting the Rule 404(b) evidence, and the district court did not commit plain error in allowing the evidence to be presented. Remanded. View "State v. Bedell" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and removed from a home he owned with his wife. Soon afterwards, Defendant's wife obtained a restraining order that prohibited Defendant from going to the family home for 150 days. About three weeks after the restraining order expired, Defendant entered the home and brandished a rifle. Defendant was subsequently charged with aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and commission of domestic violence in the presence of a child. A magistrate found Defendant could not be bound over on the aggravated burglary charge because there was insufficient evidence that Defendant had relinquished his possessory interest in the family home to render his entry unlawful under Utah's burglary statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an estranged spouse may implicitly relinquish his or her possessory rights to the marital home by voluntarily establishing a separate residence; but (2) in this case, the State did not produce sufficient evidence of voluntary relinquishment. Remanded. View "State v. Machan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor sexual battery. The court of appeals reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the district court plainly erred and Defendant's trial counsel was ineffective in allowing the investigative detective's testimony on redirect examination about other allegations of sexual misconduct against him. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that trial counsel was not ineffective in referencing and admitting the Utah R. Evid. 404(b) evidence, and the district court did not commit plain error in allowing the evidence to be presented. In so holding, the Court did not address the State's argument that a gap in the record of a criminal trial should always be interpreted in favor of the State. View "State v. Bedell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual assault and one count of robbery for the 1996 attack and sexual assault of a twenty-three-year-old woman. On appeal, Appellant contended that the statute of limitations had run before the State commenced its prosecution of Appellant and, alternatively, that his right to a speedy trial was violated. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions, holding that the State commenced Appellant's prosecution within the applicable statute of limitations and that Appellant's right to a speedy trial was not violated, where, while this case involved an extraordinary delay, the delay was not the fault of the State and Appellant was not prejudiced. View "State v. Young" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child and one count of dealing in material harmful to a minor. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the prosecutor prejudiced the jury by making several improper comments during closing arguments. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's convictions and remanded for a new trial on all counts, holding (1) Defendant failed to preserve his arguments based on prosecutorial misconduct for appeal; but (2) nevertheless, defense counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's conduct at trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. View "State v. Larrabee" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder and two counts of attempted murder. Defendant was sentenced to life without parole for each aggravated murder conviction and three years to life for each attempted murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although the district court erred when it limited and excluded the testimony of the defense's expert witnesses, these errors were harmless; (2) the combined result of these errors did not undermine the Court's confidence in the verdict; and (3) Utah Code 76-3-207.7, which provides the sentencing scheme for first degree felony aggravated murder, is constitutional on its face and was constitutionally applied to Defendant. View "State v. Perea" on Justia Law

In 1993, Jed Gressman was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to a term of five years to life. In 1996, Gressman moved to dismiss the charges against him based on newly-discovered evidence. The district court vacated Gressman's conviction based on the newly-discovered evidence. In 2009, Gressman filed suit under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) seeking to obtain his factual innocence and obtain financial assistance. Gressman died during pendency of the suit, so counsel moved to substitute Gressman's widow. The district court substituted Gressman's widow, granted Gressman's widow's motion for summary judgment, and awarded Gressman's widow PCRA assistance payments, including prejudgment interest. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed for further proceedings, holding (1) Gressman's PCRA claims survived his death, and thus, the district court properly substituted Gressman's widow as the plaintiff in this suit; (2) the district court erred when it found that the vacatur of Gressman's conviction conclusively established his factual innocence as defined by the PCRA; and (3) the district court erred in awarding prejudgment interest. View "Gressman v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance in a drug free zone and was sentenced to a term of incarceration for five years to life. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained through a search of his vehicle. Specifically, Defendant argued that the search was unlawful because, among other reasons, the officers did not have reasonable suspicion that there were drugs in his vehicle when they stopped him for a traffic infraction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred when it denied Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, as the officers, who had possessed reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in or about to be engaged in criminal activity, improperly extended the original purpose of the stop, which was to investigate a minor traffic infraction, and instead undertook a prolonged investigation into Defendant's possible drug activity. Remanded. View "State v. Gurule" on Justia Law

Defendant confessed to shooting a female victim during a custodial interrogation by detectives. Defendant moved to suppress the confession on the grounds that it was coerced. The district court granted the motion based on the detectives' invocation of Defendant's children as a method to get a confession. After clarifying that a confession is involuntary if the will of the accused has been overcome, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances of this case, Defendant's free will was not overcome, and therefore, the district court erred in concluding that the references in the interrogations to Defendant's children were coercive police tactics that rendered Defendant's confession involuntary. Remanded. View "State v. Arriaga-Luna" on Justia Law