Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

James Alexander pled guilty to burglary with intent to commit sexual battery. Prior to sentencing, Alexander filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing (1) the district court failed to apprise him of the elements of sexual battery as required by Utah R. Crim. P. 11, and (2) his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made. The court denied Alexander's motion and sentenced him accordingly. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) the district court did not comply with Rule 11 at the plea hearing because it did not inform Alexander of the elements of sexual battery, and (2) the violation of Rule 11 rendered the plea unknowing and involuntary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although the court of appeals erred in limiting its review to whether the district court had complied with Rule 11 during the plea hearing, the record demonstrated that Alexander's plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made; (2) the court of appeals did not err in declining to require a showing of prejudice; and (3) because this case involved a different issue than the one addressed in the Court's holding in Hurst v. Cook, the two cases did not conflict.

Troy Kell was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Kell subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which the district court dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed. Kell thereafter filed a Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion, asking the district court to relieve him from its earlier dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief. The district court denied the motion, holding that because Kell's postconviction petition had been dismissed, appealed, and affirmed on appeal, the underlying denial of his petition for postconviction relief was no longer "pending" and thus the court could not consider the merits of the 60(b) motion. The Supreme Court affirmed on alternate grounds, holding (1) Rule 60(b) does not have a "pending" requirement and is not necessarily inappropriate in all cases in which the Court has already ruled, but it may not be used as a way to circumvent the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA); and (2) in this case, Kell's claims were barred by the PCRA and therefore could not be brought under Rule 60(b).

Lemuel Prion pled guilty and mentally ill to three felony charges pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 77-16-104(3). Under the provisions of the statute, Prion was first sentenced to three terms of varying length, all to be served concurrently. As part of his first sentence, Prion was committed to the hospital for evaluation. After his stay there, Prion was released. Based upon the recommendations of the hospital staff and administration, the district court resentenced Prion to serve his three terms consecutively, nearly doubling his prison time. Prion filed a motion to correct his sentence, claiming that his second sentence was statutorily barred and violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the federal constitution. The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that, although the sentencing statute at issue expressly allows for a recall and resentencing at any time during an eighteen-month review period, Prion's resentencing exceeded the bounds of the double jeopardy clause in light of the nature and timeframe of this proceeding.

Patient received medical treatment from Nurse at Medical Clinic. Nurse prescribed Patient at least six medications. With all of these drugs in his system, Patient shot and killed his wife. Patient subsequently pled guilty to aggravated murder. Patient's children (Plaintiffs) filed suit through their conservator against Nurse, her consulting physician, and Medical Clinic (collectively Defendants), alleging negligence in the prescription of the medications that caused Patient's violent outburst and his wife's death. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that Nurse owed no duty of care to Plaintiffs because no patient-health care provider relationship existed at the time of the underlying events between Plaintiffs and Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that healthcare providers owe nonpatients a duty to exercise reasonable care in the affirmative act of prescribing medications that pose a risk of injury to third parties.

While driving, Jed Price struck another vehicle, killing a passenger in that vehicle. After he consented to accompany an officer to a police station, a magistrate issued a warrant to seize Price's blood for testing to determine his blood-alcohol levels. The blood was tested for the presence of, among other things, THC, and the test results came back positive for the presence of THC. Price was subsequently charged with causing death while driving with a measurable controlled substance and failing to yield the right of way. The district court denied Price's motion to suppress the evidence. Price appealed, arguing that testing for THC was outside the scope of the warrant because the magistrate's probable cause determination was based only on the suspicion that Price had been driving under the influence of alcohol. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) after his blood was lawfully obtained, Price did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in any contraband in his blood; (2) the test for THC did not infringe on any legitimate privacy interests; and (3) the testing was therefore constitutional.

Von Lester Taylor pled guilty to two capital homicide charges and was sentenced to death. A Utah R. App. P. 23B hearing was later held before the district court, after which the court rejected all of Taylor's claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed. Taylor's counsel thereafter filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed. Taylor then filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief. The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss the petition, holding that all of Taylor's claims were procedurally barred under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) because they were raised, or could have been, but were not, raised in a prior proceeding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Taylor failed to establish that his claims could not have been raised in a prior proceeding and failed to meet any statutory or common law exceptions to the procedural bar.

Lonnie Arave approached an eleven-year-old boy and offered to pay him if he would agree to let Arave perform oral sex on him. At trial, Arave moved to dismiss a charge of attempted sodomy on a child, asserting that his conduct amounted only to the offense of solicitation and could not sustain a conviction of attempt. The district court denied the motion, and Arave was convicted on the attempt charge. A divided court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals insofar as it upheld Arave's conviction for attempt, holding (1) solicitation of a potential victim falls within the ambit of the solicitation statute; and (2) the act of solicitation alone is not enough to constitute a substantial step, and thereby an attempt, to commit a crime. Remanded.

Terry Johnson was convicted of murdering his child's babysitter. The court of appeals affirmed. Johnson subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, challenging, among other things, his counsel's effectiveness and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. The district court denied the petition without reaching the merits of Johnson's claims, finding each claim was either previously adjudicated, frivolous, or barred under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Johnson's petition contained claims that had been previously adjudicated, that the district court had no jurisdiction to decide, and that could have been, but were not, raised on direct appeal, the district court correctly dismissed Johnson's petition.

Defendant Money & More Inc. (M&M) allegedly maintained and operated a Ponzi scheme. Pursuant to a petition filed by the State, the district court issued a temporary restraining order freezing Defendants' assets and later entered a preliminary injunction. Several hundred individuals and dozens of corporations that made fraudulent investments formed Money & More Investors LLC (MMI) and assigned to it their rights, interests, and claims against Defendants, who included the individuals comprising M&M. After reaching a settlement agreement with Defendants, MMI filed a motion to intervene in the State's preservation action. The district court granted MMI both intervention as of right under Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a) and, in the alternative, permissive intervention under Utah R. Civ. P. 24(b). The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of intervention as of right, holding that MMI met all the elements of rule 24(a) where (1) MMI's motion to intervene was timely; (2) MMI had a direct interest relating to the property; (3) MMI sufficiently established that the original parties to the suit would inadequately represent MMI's interests; and (4) MMI would be bound by the judgment.

Three cases, including State v. Davis, State v. Jeffs, 2011 UT 56, and State v. Parduhn, 2011 UT 55, were consolidated in this opinion. All three cases came to the Supreme Court on interlocutory appeal and involved nearly identical facts and issues. Each Defendant was charged with crimes in Salt Lake County. Although each Defendant qualified for representation by a public defender, each Defendant retained a private attorney. Subsequently, each Defendant filed a motion requesting funding for expert witnesses and other defense resources, which the district court denied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the holding in State v. Burns, which states that the Utah Indigent Defense Act requires local governments to provide indigent defendants with funding for necessary defense resources even when the defendant is represented by private counsel, remains good law after amendments to the Act; and (2) because the Act requires a defendant to demonstrate a compelling reason to receive funding for defense resources only when a local government has contracted to provide such resources to all indigent defendants, and the County in this case had not so contracted, the district court erred in requiring Defendants to demonstrate a compelling reason for the requested funding.