Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the district court's dismissal of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that there was no error.Testing of a buccal swab of Defendant's cheek showed that Defendant was a genetic match for DNA found on evidence at the scene of a murder. Prior to his criminal trial, Defendant moved to suppress the DNA evidence, arguing that the forcible collection of the sample had violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the motion, and a jury convicted Defendant of murder, aggravated burglary, and possession of a weapon by a restricted person. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in affirming the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the buccal swab, nor did it err in rejecting Defendant's statutory arguments. View "State v. Evans" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court in this criminal case repudiated the sweeping language of its opinion in State v. James, 13 P.3d 576 (Utah 2000), and held that it can no longer be said that it makes no constitutional difference, as regards community caretaking concerns, whether a police officer opens a car door or asks a driver to do so.Defendant was charged with felony DUI and possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence discovered after an officer looked inside his pickup truck, which was parked in a store parking lot, opened the truck door, and saw evidence of drug paraphernalia between Defendant's feet. The district court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed on alternative grounds, holding that the officer was justified in opening the car door incident to a lawful traffic stop under the standard in James. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the identity of the door-opener may well affect the reasonableness of a given police encounter; and (2) the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress was proper under the authority of Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011). View "State v. Malloy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of dealing in material harmful to a minor, a third degree felony under Utah Code 76-10-1206, holding that Defendant's argument that the statute was unconstitutional as applied failed.As part of a sexually explicit online chat, Defendant sent photographs of women with nude breasts to someone who he thought was an underage girl. Defendant was convicted of dealing in material harmful to a minor, in violation of section 76-10-1206. On appeal, Defendant argued that because the photographs he sent did not depict sexual activity they could not qualify as obscenity, and therefore, the photographs were protected speech under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where nudity may be obscene to minors without depicting sexual conduct, Defendant's argument that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to his conduct failed. View "State v. Watts" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of distribution of or arranging to distribute a controlled substance, holding that the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's challenge brought under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) and that sufficient evidence supported the conviction.On appeal, Defendant argued that the State violated his right to equal protection when it used a peremptory strike to remove the only person of color from the jury pool. The trial court denied Defendant's Batson challenge, and the jury subsequently convicted him of drug-related counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's Batson challenge; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction. View "State v. Aziakanou" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of driving under the influence, holding that law enforcement officers' touch of Defendant's vehicle was supported by probable cause and provided an independent source of the evidence.Upon responding to a 911 call complaining of a person trying to enter a private residence, two police officers encountered a Ford Explorer that looked to be connected to the disturbance. One officer touched the hood to assess the temperature of the engine in order to determine how long the vehicle had been there. The other officer reached into the wheel well on two occasions, and both officers testified that the engine felt hot. Appellant argued that the officers' testimony about her engine's temperature should have been excluded at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even if the officers' contacts with the vehicle were searches, the automobile exception applied, and the final touch was supported by probable cause. View "State v. Speights" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Petitioner's post-conviction challenge to his convictions of child sex abuse and other offenses as time-barred under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), Utah Code 78B-9-101-503, holding that Petitioner's arguments on appeal were unavailing.Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to the PCRA the district court for post-conviction relief from his criminal conviction and sentence. The district court granted summary judgment for the State, concluding that the petition was time-barred under the PCRA. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the PCRA's time limitations should be tolled or, alternatively, he can invoke the court's constitutional writ power outside the PCRA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the PCRA time-barred Petitioner's petition; and (2) Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the application of the time-bar contained in the PCRA to Petitioner's petition violated his rights under the Utah Constitution. View "Patterson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals ruling that the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), Utah Code 78B-9-101-110, barred Appellant's claims because they "could have been" brought on appeal, holding that Appellant's claims failed because trial counsel was not ineffective.Appellant was convicted of sexually molesting his daughter. The convictions were affirmed on appeal. Appellant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal. The reviewing court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that the PCRA barred Appellant's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the PCRA barred Appellant's direct claims against his trial counsel; and (2) appellate counsel was not ineffective. View "McCloud v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of lewdness by a sex offender and vacated the conviction, holding that the court of appeals erred in upholding the district court's admission of other acts evidence.During trial, the State sought to introduce evidence of four prior occasions when Defendant had been accused of exposing and/or stimulating himself in public. The district court admitted the evidence over Defendant's objection, concluding that the doctrine of chances permitted the State to introduce the evidence. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) if the doctrine of chances is remain part of this jurisprudence, it needs to be more carefully explained and more precisely employed; and (2) the doctrine of chances was not correctly applied to admit the evidence in this case. View "State v. Richins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of distributing or arranging to distribute a controlled substance, holding that Defendant's trial counsel was not constitutionally deficient in not requesting a jury instruction pursuant to State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), about the potential unreliability of eyewitness identification.During trial, Defendant's counsel presented a theory of mistaken identification in his opening and closing arguments and cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses about weaknesses in their testimony. On appeal, Defendant argued that his trial counsel's failure to request a Long instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Long does not apply to "real-time identifications," such as the identification in this case. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' holding that Long did not apply but nevertheless affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred when it ruled that Long applies only to "memory-based" identifications; and (2) a reasonable, competent lawyer could have chosen not to request a Long instruction in this case. View "State v. Hunter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's conviction of accomplice to aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, under a theory of accomplice liability, holding that the trial court gave an erroneous mens rea instruction to which trial counsel should have objected and this failure to object prejudiced Defendant.At issue was a jury instruction detailing the mens rea required to convict under an accomplice-liability theory. On appeal, Defendant argued that the jury instruction was erroneous and that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to it. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding that the instructions adequately instructed the jury on accomplice liability for aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the jury instruction at issue was erroneous and that trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to object to it; and (2) trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Defendant. View "State v. Eyre" on Justia Law