Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a defendant who was charged and convicted of felony lewd and lascivious conduct after an incident involving an eighteen-year-old victim who was staying overnight at a friend’s house, where the defendant was also present. During the night, the defendant engaged in sexual contact with the sleeping victim, including touching her breast and genitals, and masturbating over her. The victim disclosed the incident days later, and the defendant subsequently admitted his actions. The jury found the defendant guilty of the felony offense and not guilty of the lesser-included misdemeanor. The court sentenced him to two-to-four years, with all but ninety days suspended, and imposed probation.After sentencing, the defendant appealed, raising a constitutional challenge to the proportionality of his sentence and arguing it was disproportionate to his conduct, which he characterized as “misdemeanor-level.” The Vermont Supreme Court, in an earlier direct appeal, reviewed the proportionality argument for plain error due to lack of preservation and did not find plain error. Following that decision, the defendant filed a motion for sentence reconsideration under Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 in the Superior Court, Windham Unit, Criminal Division, arguing his sentence violated the Vermont Constitution and seeking a reduction based on mitigating factors.The Superior Court denied the motion, concluding it lacked authority under Rule 35(a) to address constitutional challenges to the underlying conviction and that the arguments presented had already been considered at sentencing. On further appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Rule 35(a) cannot be used to collaterally attack a conviction or to challenge the constitutionality of the statute of conviction, and that the defendant’s sentence was within the statutory limits. The Court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying sentence reduction under Rule 35(b). View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault, one without consent and one involving a victim under sixteen years of age. While awaiting sentencing, he was released under restrictive curfew conditions, which were occasionally relaxed. The parties agreed to a plea deal specifying a split-to-serve sentence, with the minimum incarceration period to be contested at sentencing. The defendant could argue for three years and the State for seven years.The Vermont Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Criminal Division, held a change-of-plea hearing, accepted the guilty pleas, and scheduled a sentencing hearing. At sentencing, both sides presented arguments and victim-impact statements were given. The defendant objected to certain statements, arguing they were speculative or outside the record. The court overruled these objections but clarified that it would not consider allegations beyond the documented offenses. The defendant requested jail credit for time spent under curfew, which the court denied, citing lack of authority. The court ultimately imposed a sentence aligned with the plea agreement: ten years to life (suspended with seven years to serve) for the first count and ten-to-twenty years (suspended except for seven years to serve) for the second, to run concurrently.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court erred in handling the plea agreement, considering victim-impact statements, and refusing credit for restrictive curfew time. The Supreme Court held that the trial court had not accepted the plea agreement at the change-of-plea hearing but deferred its decision and properly followed Rule 11. It found no error in the handling of victim-impact statements, as the court did not rely on improper information. Finally, it affirmed the denial of credit for curfew time, consistent with precedent. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence. View "State v. Hirzel" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was charged with lewd or lascivious conduct with a child under Vermont law. The charges stemmed from allegations by the defendant’s step-daughter, J.B., who reported that between 2018 and 2019, when she was between nine and ten years old, the defendant repeatedly touched her buttocks under her clothing, both in the family car and while sitting together at home. Evidence at trial included J.B.’s testimony detailing the frequency and nature of the acts, the defendant’s own admissions during a police interview (including his acknowledgment that the conduct was “wrong”), and testimony about the defendant’s behavior toward his biological children, which did not include similar conduct after they were very young.After a jury found the defendant guilty in the Vermont Superior Court, Lamoille Unit, Criminal Division, the defendant moved for acquittal, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove that his acts were lewd or that he had the requisite intent for conviction. The trial court denied this motion both after the State’s case and post-conviction. The defendant also requested that the jury be instructed on a lesser-included offense—specifically, “open and gross lewdness” under a different statute—but the trial court denied this request, holding that the lesser charge was not a lesser-included offense of the crime charged.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the defendant acted with the intent to gratify sexual desires, and that his conduct was lewd. The Court also held that “open and gross lewdness” is not a lesser-included offense of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child, as the elements of the two crimes are not identical. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "State v. Lovejoy" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted in 1990 of burglary and three counts of sexual assault after forcibly entering a victim’s apartment, threatening her and her infant son with a weapon, and committing multiple assaults. At sentencing, defense counsel reviewed the presentence investigation report with the petitioner, filed written objections, and argued for a sentence with a suspended portion to permit inpatient treatment. The court ultimately imposed a forty-five-to-eighty-five-year sentence, emphasizing punishment and public safety.The petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. He subsequently filed multiple petitions for post-conviction relief (PCR), including a sixth petition that alleged ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence. The Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil Division, dismissed the sixth petition as an abuse of the writ, a decision later affirmed by the Vermont Supreme Court. The instant petition, his seventh, again alleged ineffective assistance at sentencing. At the merits hearing, the petitioner presented expert and psychotherapist testimony to support his claim. The court denied the petition on the merits and, alternatively, found it barred by claim preclusion.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the civil doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply to PCR proceedings, but that the error in applying it here did not require reversal because the petitioner failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court found the petitioner did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel’s performance was deficient or that any alleged deficiency prejudiced the outcome. The exclusion of a 2024 report on historical abuse at a school the petitioner attended was also found not to be an abuse of discretion or prejudicial. The Court affirmed the denial of the PCR petition. View "In re Bruyette" on Justia Law

The defendant was involved in a single-car accident and was subsequently arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. After being transported to the police station, the arresting officer read him Vermont’s implied consent form, informing him of his statutory right to consult with an attorney before deciding whether to submit to an evidentiary breath test. The defendant privately consulted with an on-call attorney, who, after receiving incorrect information from the officer that the defendant had a prior DUI conviction, advised him to take the test. In reality, the defendant did not have a prior DUI conviction, though he had previously pleaded guilty to negligent operation. Relying on the attorney’s advice, the defendant submitted to the breath test.At the Chittenden Unit of the Superior Court, Criminal Division, the defendant moved to suppress the breath test results, arguing that he did not knowingly or voluntarily consent to the test, was coerced by inaccurate information, and was denied his statutory right to meaningfully consult with counsel. The trial court denied the motion, relying on the Vermont Supreme Court’s prior decision in State v. Fredette, and found that the defendant had received a meaningful opportunity to consult with an attorney, as required by statute, even though the attorney’s advice was based on incorrect information. The court also held that there was no legal authority for the defendant’s argument that unintentional misinformation constituted coercion.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo and affirmed. It held that Vermont law only guarantees a meaningful opportunity to consult with counsel before deciding on a breath test, not an accurate or flawless consultation. The statutory right does not require the attorney to have correct information about the defendant’s criminal history, nor does it obligate police to provide such information. The Court declined to overrule Fredette, rejected the defendant’s arguments regarding coercion and knowing consent, and affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress. View "State v. Eaton" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual assault against his niece, N.H., based on events that occurred between 2005 and 2011, when N.H. was a child. The charges alleged both oral and penetrative sexual contact. The main evidence at trial included N.H.’s testimony describing multiple assaults, with a focus on specific incidents that occurred in the defendant’s barn, particularly an incident when N.H. was in the sixth grade. N.H. also testified that the assaults stopped when she was around eleven or twelve years old.After the jury convicted the defendant on both counts in the Superior Court, Addison Unit, Criminal Division, the defendant appealed. He argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove that N.H. was under thirteen at the time of the barn assault (Count Two), that the trial court’s jury instruction on reasonable doubt violated his constitutional rights, and that the admission of prior-bad-act evidence was an abuse of discretion. The trial court had previously denied his motion for acquittal on Count Two, finding there was enough evidence for the jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that N.H. was under thirteen at the relevant time, affirming the denial of acquittal. However, the Court determined that the trial court’s instruction defining “beyond a reasonable doubt” as “great certainty” impermissibly lowered the government’s burden of proof, violating the defendant’s federal due process rights. This was deemed plain error, requiring reversal of the convictions and a remand for a new trial. The Court did not address the evidentiary issue regarding prior bad acts. The main holding is that defining “beyond a reasonable doubt” as “great certainty” constitutes plain error warranting reversal and a new trial. View "State v. Kolts" on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant who was charged in December 2017 with one count of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child, based on allegations that she had inappropriately touched a six-year-old girl, A.G., who was the daughter of her then-boyfriend. Before trial, the court allowed both the admission of the child’s statements from a 2017 police interview and permitted A.G. to testify. In 2019, the State requested that A.G. testify outside the defendant’s presence via video, citing potential trauma. After a hearing in 2020, the trial court granted this request, finding that testifying in front of the defendant would traumatize and impair A.G.’s ability to testify. In 2023, as A.G. had aged, the defense sought a new hearing on this issue. At the new hearing, a school counselor testified about A.G.’s general emotional state and possible trauma but did not specifically link trauma to testifying in the defendant’s presence.The Superior Court, Orleans Unit, Criminal Division, relying on the counselor’s testimony, again permitted A.G. to testify outside the defendant’s presence. A jury trial followed in October 2023, during which A.G. testified by video and the jury found the defendant guilty. The court denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial, concluding that although the prosecutor improperly commented on the defendant’s post-arrest silence, this was harmless error.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the requirements of Vermont Rule of Evidence 807 and the Confrontation Clause were met. The Court held that the trial court’s finding—that requiring A.G. to testify in the defendant’s presence would cause trauma substantially impairing her ability to testify—was clearly erroneous because the evidence did not specifically support such trauma would result from the defendant’s presence. As a result, the Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the defendant’s right to confrontation was violated. View "State v. Sylvester" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with lewd or lascivious conduct with a child, a felony under Vermont law. At arraignment, the State sought to have the defendant held without bail pending trial, arguing that the charged offense involved an act of violence, which would permit pretrial detention under Vermont’s constitutional and statutory exceptions to the general right to bail. The parties agreed that the offense was a felony and that the evidence of guilt was great, but the defendant contended that lewd or lascivious conduct with a child did not qualify as a crime involving an act of violence for purposes of denying bail.The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Criminal Division, denied the State’s motion to hold the defendant without bail. The court concluded that, despite a statutory provision designating lewd or lascivious conduct with a child as a violent act for bail purposes, the offense did not have an essential element involving an act of violence as required by the Vermont Constitution. The court relied on prior single-justice decisions, including State v. Madigan, which interpreted “violence” narrowly to require physical force or contact, and declined to give effect to the legislative designation in 13 V.S.A. § 2602(f).On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the definition of “violence” in the context of bail eligibility. The Court held that lewd or lascivious conduct with a child is a felony with an element involving an act of violence, as the offense inherently involves an abusive or unjust use of power over a child, even if physical contact is not required. The Court overruled the contrary reasoning in State v. Madigan, reaffirmed a broader definition of violence, and concluded that the statutory designation in § 2602(f) was consistent with constitutional requirements. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings on the State’s request to hold the defendant without bail. View "State v. Shores" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was charged with several offenses, including aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, grand larceny, unlawful mischief, carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon while committing a felony, and assault and robbery, following an incident in which he ran at a teenager who was leaving a friend’s house, causing the teenager to abandon his belongings out of fear. The defendant then destroyed some of the teenager’s property and took the rest. The complainant testified that the defendant appeared to be holding a knife, which contributed to his fear and decision to flee.The Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Criminal Division, presided over the trial. After the State presented its evidence, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on all but the unlawful-mischief charge, arguing insufficient evidence, particularly regarding the presence of a knife and intent to place the complainant in fear. The court granted acquittal on the grand-larceny charge due to insufficient evidence of value but denied acquittal on the remaining charges. The jury acquitted the defendant of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and carrying a dangerous or deadly weapon while committing a felony but convicted him of unlawful mischief, larceny from the person, and assault and robbery. The defendant’s post-trial motion to vacate the assault and robbery conviction, based on alleged inconsistency with the acquittals, was denied.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. The Court held that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty of assault and robbery, even without proof that he possessed a knife. The Court also held that the jury instructions did not require proof of a knife and that the verdicts were not inconsistent. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. View "State v. Diaz" on Justia Law

A police officer observed a vehicle late at night on a rural road in Vermont, where the passenger-side wheels of the vehicle left the paved portion of the road twice in quick succession. The road had only a center line and no edge markings. The officer, who had extensive training and experience in detecting impaired driving, interpreted the vehicle’s movements as erratic and indicative of possible impairment. The officer stopped the vehicle, and the driver was subsequently arrested for suspicion of driving under the influence (DUI) and driving with a suspended license. The officer’s observations were recorded on the cruiser’s camera.The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. The Vermont Superior Court, Addison Unit, Criminal Division, held a hearing and denied the motion to suppress, finding the officer’s testimony credible and concluding that the observed driving behavior—specifically, the vehicle’s wheels leaving the paved road twice—constituted erratic driving and provided reasonable suspicion of impairment. The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to the DUI charge and appealed the denial of her suppression motion to the Vermont Supreme Court. The charge for driving with a suspended license was dismissed with prejudice.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and considered de novo whether those facts met the legal standard for reasonable suspicion. The Court held that the officer had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the defendant based on the totality of the circumstances, specifically the erratic driving observed. The Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress, concluding that the stop was justified under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution. View "State v. Norton" on Justia Law