Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Lucas Dwight appealed the trial court’s restitution order requiring him to pay dental expenses resulting from defendant’s conviction for simple assault. Defendant raised two issues on appeal: (1) whether the court erred in awarding restitution for expenses that complainant’s father paid on complainant’s behalf; and (2) whether the ordered repayment schedule, which considered defendant’s earning capacity, was impermissibly punitive. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Dwight" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, the State of Vermont appealed the trial court’s interlocutory orders granting defendants’ motions in limine seeking to suppress evidence of their refusal to submit to blood tests to determine if they were operating a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs (DUI). The trial court granted the motions in limine based on its conclusion that in Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, to refuse to submit to a warrantless blood test. In the trial court’s view, that constitutional right superseded Vermont’s implied consent law and precluded the State from introducing evidence of defendants’ refusal at their criminal DUI trial. The State challenged the trial court’s interpretation of Birchfield, arguing the federal Supreme Court indicated evidence of a refusal to take a warrantless blood test in the context of a DUI arrest and prosecution could be admitted at trial as evidence of guilt. Defendants responded that the constitutional issue had been effectively mooted by a post-Birchfield amendment to Vermont’s implied consent law and that, in any event, the trial court correctly construed Birchfield and other related federal law to prohibit the admission of evidence of a refusal to consent to a warrantless blood test. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the amendment to the implied consent law did not moot the constitutional issue, and that the trial court erred in determining, following the Birchfield decision, the Fourth Amendment prohibited admitting in a criminal DUI proceeding evidence of a defendant’s refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test requested pursuant to Vermont’s implied consent law. Accordingly, the Vermont Court reversed the trial court’s decisions granting defendants’ motions in limine and remanded the cases for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Rajda" on Justia Law

Petitioner Mark Clark appealed pro se the dismissal of his complaint regarding his eligibility for prison work camp. Petitioner is an inmate under the custody and control of the DOC. He pled guilty to driving under the influence, fourth offense, in July 2016 pursuant to a plea agreement. The plea agreement included a “recommendation to work camp.” The DOC subsequently deemed petitioner ineligible for work camp because petitioner had an earlier conviction that involved a violent assault against a law enforcement officer. Petitioner grieved this decision within the DOC, and his grievances were denied. The trial court concluded that it lacked authority to review this Department of Corrections (DOC) programming decision. Vermont case law "makes clear that it is for the DOC to assess petitioner’s eligibility for work camp." The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and thus affirmed its decision. View "Clark v. Menard" on Justia Law

Defendant Liana Roy was convicted of custodial interference for taking her four-year-old daughter, who was then in Department for Children and Families (DCF) custody, on a two-day trip out of the state without DCF’s permission. After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal, concluding that, in the absence of a court order specifying defendant’s parent-child contact, defendant was not criminally liable. The central question presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review in this case was whether a parent may be convicted of custodial interference under 13 V.S.A. 2451 for interfering with the custody of the DCF in the absence of a court order specifying the schedule and limitations of the parent’s visitation. The Court held section 2451 did not require such an order and that the evidence of defendant’s knowing and egregious actions in derogation of DCF’s custodial rights supported her conviction. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "Vermont v. Roy" on Justia Law

Defendant Emily St. Peter appealed her conviction on five counts of cruelty to animals, arguing the trial court erred in declining to suppress evidence about five horses she voluntarily surrendered during a cruelty investigation. In particular, defendant contended that because the humane officer failed to have the horses timely examined and assessed by a licensed veterinarian within seventy-two hours of her voluntary surrender of them, as required by 13 V.S.A. 354(b)(1), the court should have excluded any evidence acquired by a humane officer, veterinarian, or other witness following that surrender. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded, based on reasoning in Vermont v. Sheperd, 170 A.3d 616 (2017), the trial court properly declined to grant defendant’s suppression motion, and accordingly affirmed. View "Vermont v. St. Peter" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were inmates in the custody of the Vermont Department of Corrections who claimed a statute and certain administrative policies enacted after their incarceration operated together to retroactively increase the length of their sentences, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an ex post facto violation and therefore affirmed the trial court’s award of summary judgment to the Department in each case. View "Wool v. Pallito / Carter v. Menard" on Justia Law

Defendant Aaron Cady appeals the trial court’s decision, rejecting his coram nobis petition challenging the validity of the plea colloquy preceding his conviction for driving under the influence, second offense (DUI-2). The trial court found the plea was made knowingly and voluntarily, and entered a guilty judgment. Defendant did not appeal the DUI-2 conviction. After complying with all sentencing terms, the trial court discharged defendant from probation. In January 2017, defendant was charged with DUI-3. In June 2017, defendant filed a petition for coram nobis in the DUI-2 docket, alleging that the trial court failed to ensure that a factual basis existed for the plea under Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) in that case. Defendant asserted that he would suffer collateral consequences because the DUI-2 conviction would be used to enhance the penalty for the pending DUI-3 charge. The trial court denied defendant’s petition for coram nobis, concluding that although coram nobis was available because defendant had no other remedy available to challenge the DUI-2 conviction, his plea colloquy nevertheless satisfied Rule 11(f). In so finding, the trial court concluded that the change-of-plea court sufficiently inquired into the facts as they related to each element of the offense. The issue this case raised for the Vermont Supreme Court was whether a defendant who was not currently suffering a collateral consequence of an enhanced sentence, but faced the threat of an enhanced sentence due to a prior conviction, could preemptively challenge the plea colloquy preceding the prior conviction using coram nobis. The Supreme Court concluded that because individuals, like defendant, can raise the adequacy of a plea colloquy in a prior conviction through post-conviction relief (PCR) proceedings once sentenced, coram nobis relief was not available, "Coram nobis relief is only available as a last resort and cannot supplant other forms of relief such as direct appeal, post-judgment motions, or PCR petitions under 13 V.S.A. 7131." View "Vermont v. Cady" on Justia Law

Petitioner Cynthia Pinheiro appealed a superior court judgment denying her post-conviction relief (PCR). In her PCR action, petitioner sought to set aside her conviction for aggravated domestic assault on the basis that the plea colloquy was defective under Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure 11(c) and (f) because the trial court failed to identify the mental element of the crime (that she acted willfully or recklessly) and to elicit a factual basis supporting that element. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the plea colloquy was not substantially compliant with the requirements of Rule 11(c) and accordingly reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Cynthia Pinheiro" on Justia Law

In late October 2015, two women in Burlington found flyers advertising the Ku Klux Klan at their homes. One of the women was Mexican American; the other, African American. One woman found the flyer folded up and inserted into the mailbox by her front door, while the other woman found the flyer tucked into her front door. Neither woman saw this flyer at neighboring homes. The only other reported sighting was at a local copy store, where an employee reported finding the flyer in one of the store’s copy machines. Police viewed surveillance camera footage from the store and were able to identify defendant, William Schenk. The investigating detective contacted defendant, who admitted to distributing the flyers and explained that he was a “Kleagle,” or recruiter for the Ku Klux Klan. Defendant told the detective that he had distributed a total of thirty to forty flyers in neighborhoods that defendant described as “more white.” Defendant was charged with two counts of disorderly conduct in connection with the distribution of the recruitment flyers in the City of Burlington. For each count, the State charged that the penalty should have been enhanced under 13 V.S.A. 1455 because the crime was hate-motivated. Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the two disorderly conduct charges and the associated sentence enhancement. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the State failed to establish a prima facie case because defendant’s conduct conveyed neither the physical nor imminent threat of harm that is construed as the definition of “threatening behavior.” Accordingly, the Court did not reach defendant’s challenge to the application of the hate-motivated crime sentence enhancement. The Court reversed and granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. View "Vermont v. Schenk" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether an individual convicted of a sex offense could be compelled to register as a sex offender if the putative victim was an adult undercover police officer posing as a minor child. Defendant Benjamin Charette appealed the trial court’s decision requiring him to register as a sex offender, arguing the plain language of the sex offender registration statute required that the underlying crime be committed against an actual minor victim. Considering the structure and purpose of the statute, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded 13 V.S.A. 5401(10)(B) encompassed attempted crimes against a putative victim who the defendant perceives to be a minor. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Charette" on Justia Law