Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

The State charged defendant Jeffrey Reed with three offenses: (1) a violation of 13 V.S.A. 1754(a) by knowingly giving false information to a law enforcement officer with the purpose of deflecting an investigation from himself; (2) a violation of 10 V.S.A. 4747 by taking big game by the aid of a salt lick; and (3) a violation of 10 V.S.A. 4781 by possessing big game taken by an illegal device, in this case a salt lick. A jury convicted defendant of knowingly giving false information to a law enforcement officer, and defendant appealed, arguing the evidence presented against him was insufficient to support the verdict. In summary, the statements at issue here were essentially: I don’t know what happened to the antler and I do know what happened to the antler; it fell off when I laid a knife on it. In addressing the argument here, making inconsistent statements is not an element of the crime. The Supreme Court noted the question properly considered was whether, if the jury found each of the statements to be false, could it also find that each statement was made for the purpose of deflecting an investigation. Neither of the statements was sufficient to meet the purpose element. On this basis, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Vermont v. Reed" on Justia Law

Defendant Patricia Kane appealed the trial court’s conclusion that she violated a special probation condition requiring electronic monitoring, specifically a global position system (GPS) monitor. On appeal, she claimed: (1) the condition was an improper delegation of authority; (2) failed to notify her of the conduct constituting a violation; and (3) violated her constitutional right to travel and her right to be free of unreasonable searches. Defendant also claimed that, after the probation revocation hearing, the court improperly imposed defendant’s original conditions, including the electronic monitoring condition. Finding nothing improper nor a violation of her constitutional rights, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Kane" on Justia Law

Can a prison superintendent order a second administrative hearing when a hearing panel finds a prisoner not guilty of violating a prison rule at an initial hearing because of a clerical mistake in the prison’s evidence? Petitioner, an inmate in Vermont State prison charged with fighting, appealed summary judgment decision validating a superintendent’s authority to order a second hearing under these factual circumstances. The hearing officer found petitioner not guilty of the charged violation. The disciplinary committee unanimously agreed with the hearing officer. The superintendent then ordered a new hearing on the charge against petitioner. As he did in his motion for summary judgment, petitioner argues on appeal that the principle of collateral estoppel operates to bar a second hearing on the charge that was tried in his initial hearing. While the Supreme Court was unwilling to rule broadly on the superintendent’s power to order a new hearing, the Court held that the new hearing ordered here was appropriate when it was clear that the original decision was based on a mistake in the recording of the date of the incident underlying the disciplinary action. View "McLaughlin v. Pallito" on Justia Law

Defendant Ronald Carter was convicted of domestic assault as a lesser included offense of first degree aggravated domestic assault. He appealed, arguing that domestic assault was not a lesser included offense of aggravated domestic assault when defendant is charged with inflicting serious bodily injury by strangulation. The Supreme Court disagreed that the inclusion of the lesser included offense was improper and affirmed. View "Vermont v. Carter" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Sullivan was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI) with death resulting, and leaving the scene of a fatal accident. On appeal, he challenged the trial court’s jury instructions, admission of expert testimony, and denial of his motion for access to necessary services as a needy person pursuant to 13 V.S.A. section 5231(a)(2). After review, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s convictions. However, based on its conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion by not continuing the sentencing hearing to allow defendant to present testimony of his expert witness, the Supreme Court remanded the matter for resentencing. View "Vermont v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

Defendant Richard Ladue appealed his conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), arguing that: (1) the State’s principal witness testified on a matter that violated the trial court’s pretrial ruling granting defendant’s motion in limine; (2) the court erred in overruling defendant’s objection to the prosecutor eliciting testimony from the State’s principal witness that defendant never reported to police that he was not driving his vehicle on the night in question; (3) the prosecutor made several impermissible statements during his opening statement and closing argument regarding defendant’s failure to inform police that he was not the driver; and (4) in attempting to define the term “reasonable doubt,” the court diminished the constitutional burden of proof imposed on the State, thereby committing structural error that requires reversal of defendant’s conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Ladue" on Justia Law

The question central to this appeal was whether a petitioner could raise a challenge to a Department of Corrections’ (DOC) disciplinary conviction that was not presented in the underlying DOC proceedings. Petitioner appealed the trial court’s dismissal of his Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 appeal of a DOC disciplinary determination. Because petitioner did not preserve before the DOC the issue he raised for the first time before the trial court, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pratt v. Pallito" on Justia Law

In late 2016, Vermont State Police received a call from defendant William Bailey in which defendant told the police that he had accidentally shot his friend Daniel Hein and that Hein was likely dead. When the police arrived at the scene, they found Hein’s dead body in the back seat of defendant’s car; he had been shot in the head. Defendant was charged with manslaughter, and the court set bail at $50,000. Defendant later filed a motion to review bail, and the court held two bail review hearings. The court lowered bail to $25,000, but determined, after hearing testimony from both defendant’s father and defendant’s girlfriend, there was no responsible adult to whom defendant could be released. In cases of bailable offenses, there is a presumption that the defendant may be released before trial either on his or her own recognizance or on an unsecured appearance bond. However, the presumption is rebutted if the court determines that such conditions are insufficient to assure the defendant’s appearance at future court proceedings. Defendant appealed the trial court’s order to set bail at $25,000 and its determination that neither his father nor his girlfriend were responsible adults to whom he can be released. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the trial court’s requirement that he post a secured appearance bond in the amount of $25,000 with a ten percent deposit to be paid to the court. Defendant was being held for lack of bail, and he argued that the amount set by the trial court was excessive. Although a court must consider a defendant’s financial resources in determining conditions of release, the Supreme Court concluded that neither the U.S. nor Vermont Constitution nor the applicable Vermont statutes required trial courts to find that a defendant has a present ability to raise bail in the amount set by the court. "Although courts must consider a defendant’s financial resources when they set bail, courts may set bail at a level that a particular defendant cannot secure. In setting bail, courts must always be guided by the goal of securing a defendant’s appearance at trial, and should not set bail at an unattainable level for the purpose of detaining a defendant rather than assuring the defendant’s appearance." View "Vermont v. Pratt" on Justia Law

The patient in this case, G.G., appealed a trial court’s denial of requests by him and his counsel to let him represent himself in his mental-health proceedings and from the court’s subsequent orders of continued treatment and involuntary medication. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precluded G.G. from proceeding without representation in his involuntary medication and involuntary commitment hearings, given the State’s exceedingly strong interest in an accurate determination on the merits of those hearings. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of G.G.’s motion to waive counsel and his attorney’s motion to withdraw. Additionally, the Court affirmed the decisions on the merits of G.G.’s continued treatment and involuntary medication orders. View "In re G.G." on Justia Law