Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In December 2014, defendant Jeremy Gates was charged with felony extortion, domestic assault, and unlawful mischief in the amount of $250 or less following an incident involving his mother. Defendant appealed a 2016 superior court ruling revoking his right to bail under 13 V.S.A. 7575 after repeated violations of conditions of release (VCRs). Defendant argued that the trial court ruled on inadequate grounds, without making the necessary findings, and based on probable cause affidavits, rather than on an independent determination by a preponderance of direct evidence required for bail revocation. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court could not conclude that the trial court’s findings were sufficient to support its conclusion that defendant had violated section 7575(1) so as to revoke his conditions of release. The Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Gates" on Justia Law

Defendant Tisa Farrow was arraigned on charges of driving under the influence (DUI). Before trial, defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude from evidence the arresting officer’s testimony about his observations and opinion regarding defendant’s performance of the “Modified Rhomberg Test” (MRT), as well as the videotape of the event. Defendant had previously declined to perform field sobriety tests. Thereafter, at the officer’s request, defendant began the exercise in question, which involved closing her eyes, leaning her head back, and counting thirty seconds. She stopped five to eight seconds later, indicating that she did not want to do the exercise. Defendant’s written motion stated that the MRT evidence was irrelevant because the exercise was never completed and was thus unreliable, and that even if the evidence was marginally relevant, any probative value it had was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The issue this case presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review centered on the admissibility of evidence of defendant’s decision not to complete a field sobriety exercise as requested by a police officer in the context of an answer to a question the Court left open in a prior decision: Under the Vermont Constitution, is a defendant’s refusal or failure to perform voluntary field sobriety exercises admissible if the defendant was not advised at the time of the refusal that evidence of a refusal to perform the exercises may be admissible in court? The Court concluded that the refusal evidence was admissible without regard to whether police advised the individual that a refusal to perform the exercises could be admitted as evidence in court. Because the Court rejected defendant’s argument to the contrary on this point, as well as her arguments that on the record in this case the evidence in question was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, the Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Farrow" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by jury of sexual assault. On appeal of that conviction, he argued: (1) the seating of two biased jurors deprived him of his right to an impartial jury; (2) the trial court committed prejudicial error by prohibiting him from using a prior conviction to impeach a witness; and (3) the prosecutor’s comments during closing argument violated his right to a fair trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Atherton a/k/a Melton" on Justia Law

Defendant was a citizen of the Dominican Republic who lived and worked legally in Massachusetts as a permanent resident of the United States. In June 2013, he pleaded guilty to one charge of felony domestic assault stemming from a May 2013 incident in which he attempted to strangle his girlfriend at her home in Rutland. Defendant signed a written plea agreement prior to a change-of-plea hearing. Shortly after defendant was released on probation, the federal government issued a detainer to place him into deportation proceedings upon completion of his sentence. Then, in late October 2013, Rutland police responded to two calls in which defendant’s girlfriend alleged that defendant battered or otherwise assaulted her. As a result of the latter two incidents, in August 2014 defendant pleaded guilty both to a charge of violation of probation and to a second, misdemeanor charge of domestic assault. Again, defendant signed a written plea agreement prior to the change-of-plea hearing. The language of this agreement concerning the possible collateral consequences of a conviction on his immigration status was identical to that of the prior written agreement. In January 2015, defendant filed a motion to withdraw both of his guilty pleas on the basis that the court had not properly advised him that deportation was a risk of pleading guilty. The court denied this motion, finding that there was no substantive difference between what the court advised defendant and specifically telling him that he could be “deported.” Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas in his two domestic assault cases. Defendant argued that the court erred by not using the term “deportation” or “clearly equivalent language” to advise him that deportation was a possible consequence of pleading guilty. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Mendez" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Rosenfield appealed the denial of his motion, which requested that the trial court “correct the record” by amending his third driving-under-the-influence (DUI) conviction to appear as a DUI-1. Defendant filed the motion with the ultimate goal of reducing his conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor to reduce its collateral consequences. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Rosenfield" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence and a special condition of probation imposed following a guilty plea for sexual assault of a minor. He argued that probation condition 43, which gave his probation officer unbridled authority over where defendant lived and worked, was overbroad. Furthermore, defendant argued the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding he would be in breach of his plea agreement if he elected to argue for a lighter prison sentence. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed defendant’s sentence apart from probation condition 43, which the Court held was imposed in plain error. The judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the trial court to justify, make more specific, or strike. View "Vermont v. Careau" on Justia Law

Defendant Thomas Bryan appeals appealed the denial of his motion to withdraw counsel and order finding him in violation of his probation. The critical question in this case was whether sexually touching a minor violated a probation condition prohibiting violent or threatening behavior. After review, the Supreme Court held that defendant’s act constituted violent behavior, and affirmed the trial court’s rulings. View "Vermont v. Bryan" on Justia Law

Defendant Shamel Alexander appealed his conviction for trafficking heroin. He argued the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful seizure that was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Based on its review of the facts entered into evidence at trial, the Supreme Court agreed with defendant and reversed. View "Vermont v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Defendant Ivan Alcide was charged with possession of heroin and cocaine and sought to suppress all evidence of drugs seized from his vehicle after a police dog indicated the presence of drugs. The trial court found that the contraband was obtained through the illegal expansion of the scope of a vehicle violation stop into a criminal drug investigation, suppressed the evidence, and dismissed the charges. The State appealed the trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion to suppress and dismiss. On appeal, the State argued that a minimal delay following the completion of a traffic stop for a dog sniff was reasonable under federal and state law and, in the alternative, that the trial court committed plain error in excluding evidence based upon an illegal detention when the evidence was unrelated to the detention itself. Defendant moved to dismiss the State's appeal on grounds the State untimely filed its notice of appeal. After review, the Supreme Court rejected defendant’s argument and affirmed the trial court’s decision to dismiss the case against defendant. View "Vermont v. Alcide" on Justia Law

The issue this motion presented for the Supreme Court's consideration was whether it should have adopted the “prison mailbox rule” and hold that a notice of appeal was deemed filed for purposes of Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 when an unrepresented incarcerated inmate delivered it to the prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk. The Supreme Court previously dismissed petitioner’s appeal in this case on the ground that he did not timely file his notice of appeal, and petitioner filed a motion to reconsider. "As many courts across the country have held in applying the prison mailbox rule under their own procedural rules, 'it would be unfair to hold . . . defendant accountable for the vagaries . . . of the prison mail system.' The Court adopted the prison mailbox rule and vacated the prior dismissal. View "In re Joseph Bruyette" on Justia Law