Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Tiffanie Felix appealed her conviction for the sale or delivery of 200 milligrams or more of heroin following a jury trial. She argued that the trial court erred in refusing to allow her to impeach the credibility of the State’s key witness in various ways, depriving defendant of a fair trial. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed and remanded this case for a new trial. View "Vermont v. Felix" on Justia Law

Defendant Owen Cornell was convicted by jury of lewd and lascivious conduct with a twelve-year-old child. Defendant argued on appeal: (1) that the boilerplate "sex offender conditions" imposed by the trial court were not sufficiently individualized to comply with statutory sentencing requirements; (2) that the vague and ambiguous wording of some of the conditions violated defendant’s due process rights and impermissibly delegated the court’s authority to his probation officer; (3) and that several of the conditions were unduly restrictive and invasive in violation of defendant’s substantive due process rights. Defendant raised these issues in response to a limited remand from the Supreme Court, but the trial court did not address them because its authority on remand, as requested by the parties, was limited to clarifying the conditions it had already imposed. In accordance with the Supreme Court’s September 2013 entry order extending the trial court’s authority on remand to resolve defendant’s challenges, the case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings on defendant’s motion to reconsider the probation conditions. View "Vermont v. Cornell" on Justia Law

Defendant Patrick Bostwick was convicted of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child and sentenced to three to fifteen years, all suspended but six months. Defendant's probation order contained "special sex offender conditions": "You will not live in an apartment complex that allows children, in neighborhoods with large numbers of children, or in neighborhoods near parks, schools, playgrounds, etc, unless directed otherwise by your Supervising Officer"; and "You shall reside where your Supervising Officer directs. You shall not change your residence without the prior written permission of your Supervising Officer." While defendant was still incarcerated, the State filed a probation violation complaint, claiming that defendant had violated the condition stating: "You shall reside where your Supervising Officer directs." The State claimed that defendant had violated this condition because he did not submit a residence for his probation officer's approval prior to his release and therefore he would be homeless upon his release. The court dismissed the complaint for "impossibility of performance." Defendant was subsequently released and, with approval from his probation officer, resided at a few temporary addresses in succession. In its analysis, the court found that defendant did not look for housing for approximately one month, and that defendant "certainly should have known that abandoning his efforts to find housing for several days . . . was not in compliance with his obligations under the terms of his probation." Defendant argued that the requirements that he make housing search calls every day and find housing by a certain date were not part of his court-ordered probation conditions. Therefore, defendant claimed that his probation officer lacked authority to impose those requirements on him and that defendant had no notice of the consequences of failing to fulfill those requirements. Defendant further argued that he had no meaningful opportunity to find housing, that it was in fact impossible for him to find housing, and that his failure to find housing was not willful. Because the Supreme Court agreed with defendant that he did not violate any of his court-ordered conditions of release, it did not reach the remainder of his other arguments made on appeal. The Court held that defendant's conduct was not inconsistent with the plain language of his probation conditions, and reversed. View "Vermont v. Bostwick" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a restitution order requiring him to pay $2,427.36 for damage to a car. On appeal, he argued: (1) the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the victim’s loss was uninsured; (2) the court failed to make a specific finding that the damage was uninsured; (3) the court erred in admitting and using a repair estimate because it was hearsay; and (4) the court erred in calculating the amount of restitution by using the cost of repair rather than the difference in fair market value before and after the accident. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the restitution order. View "Vermont v. Morse" on Justia Law

The State of New Hampshire attempted to extradite Vermont resident and petitioner William LaPlante for failing to appear at a 2009 hearing allegedly related to a criminal conviction in New Hampshire in 1998. Following a Governor’s warrant from Vermont, petitioner requested a writ of habeas corpus from the Vermont superior court in Rutland, which was granted on grounds that the warrant lacked information required by statute. Vermont appealed this grant of habeas corpus relief, contesting the court’s holding and its findings regarding the contents of the Governor’s warrant. Finding no reversible error, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re LaPlante" on Justia Law

Petitioner Roy Girouard appealed the superior court’s denial of a motion to reopen his Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75 post-conviction relief petition and to order the Department of Corrections (DOC) to release him on furlough. Petitioner argued that the superior court’s 2009 order directing DOC to evaluate petitioner for furlough was the law of the case and the superior court had “inherent authority” to enforce it. Petitioner alleged that DOC’s actions constituted a “bad faith evasion” of the court’s order and argued that the superior court erred by failing to develop a factual record to determine whether DOC followed the court’s mandate. The State counters that DOC complied with the 2009 superior court order, and that its programming decisions are unreviewable under Rule 75. "The fact that a colorable constitutional claim implicates a programming decision committed to the DOC’s discretion does not insulate the alleged constitutional violation from judicial review. [. . .] To the extent that petitioner is not merely challenging the propriety of the programming decision here, but is raising a colorable constitutional claim, his claim is reviewable. [. . . ] Petitioner’s allegations state a claim sufficient to survive dismissal." The Court reversed and remanded. View "In re Girouard" on Justia Law

Defendants, in consolidated cases, challenged a recent amendment to Vermont's DNA-database statute as unconstitutional. As of July 2011, the amendment mandated warrantless, suspicionless DNA collection and analysis from anyone arraigned for a felony after a determination of probable cause. Defendants in these cases were all arraigned on qualifying charges and subsequently refused to give a DNA sample. All trial courts found the amendment authorized unconstitutional searches and seizures, either under the Vermont or federal constitutions. The Vermont Supreme Court emphasized that its holding pertained only to the State Constitution, and not the U.S. Constitution. "The marginal weight of the State's interest in DNA collection at the point of arraignment, balanced against the weight of the privacy interest retained by arraignees prior to conviction, persuad[ed] the [Vermont Supreme Court] to hold that 20 VSA 1933(a)(2), and associated sections, which expand[ed] the DNA sample requirement to defendants charged with qualifying crimes for which probable cause is found, violate[d] Chapter I, Article 11 of the Vermont Constitution." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial courts' holdings. View "Vermont v. Medina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Eric Williams pled guilty to four counts of involuntary manslaughter and was sentenced to serve forty to sixty years in prison. These charges stemmed from a fire in an apartment house in which petitioner lived. Three young children and their grandmother died in the fire. Petitioner was nineteen years old at the time of the fire. Petitioner sought to vacate his conviction on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. Following a twelve-day trial, the civil division ruled that although petitioner’s defense attorney provided adequate representation in connection with his guilty pleas, the assistance he provided to his client during sentencing fell below minimum standards of representation. Both petitioner and the State appealed the court's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the court's decision that petitioner failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel prior to his guilty plea. The Court also affirmed the ruling that his representation during the sentencing phase was inadequate and that he was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to provide more than perfunctory assistance. The Court agreed with the PCR court that petitioner's sentence should have been vacated and a new sentencing hearing scheduled. View "In re Williams" on Justia Law

In Fall 2013, defendant pled guilty to a felony charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child as well as four counts of prohibited acts. The court ordered a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) and a psychosexual evaluation. Sentencing occurred after submission of the PSI report and the evaluation. In the course of the sentencing hearing, the defense sought testimony from the victim, who was thirteen years old at the time the offense conduct began and sixteen at the time of sentencing. The victim was defendant's younger sister. The defense requested that the judge speak privately with the victim. The State objected although it agreed "to allow the victim to express her preference to the Court outside the presence of counsel." Specifically, the record reflected that when the judge inquired if anyone "would object to my meeting briefly with [the victim] to find out exactly what her comfort level is," the State responded that it had no objection. The judge met with the child in chambers. A record was kept of their conversation. Reading from a prepared statement, the victim told the judge that she did not want her brother to go to jail. During the conversation, the judge discussed general sentencing principles with the victim. The trial judge offered the victim a mixture of advice and sympathy and discussed ways to overcome traumatic experiences in life. At the close of the conversation, the victim stated that she did not want to provide any additional testimony in open court. The court sentenced defendant to two-to-eight years, all suspended except ninety days on the lewd-and-lascivious conduct charge. The State petitioned for extraordinary relief, raising two issues concerning defendant’s sentencing: an objection to a private meeting in chambers between the judge and the minor victim of the offenses and the court’s decision to impose a "split" probationary sentence on the charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child, first offense. The Supreme Court found no violation of the sentencing provisions applicable to this offense. Accordingly, it denied the State's petition for extraordinary relief. View "Vermont v. Fontaine" on Justia Law

Defendant Aidan Brunner appealed his conviction for possession of brass knuckles or a similar weapon with intent to use it. He argued arguing that the implement at issue is neither brass knuckles nor a similar weapon under State law. The weapon was described as having retractable blades. There was a slot that permitted the wielder to insert his or her fingers and hold the weapon. The concave curve of the metal fit against the palm; once grasped, one section is within the closed grip of the fist, and the remaining portions protrude along the front of the fingers/knuckles. The bar has sharp, serrated teeth. Finding that description fit the statutory definition of "brass knuckles" [or similar weapon], the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Brunner" on Justia Law