Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Vermont Supreme Court
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The State appealed a family division’s order granting juvenile E.S.’s motion to suppress a statement given to law enforcement in this delinquency proceeding. In July 2021, the state’s attorney filed a delinquency petition alleging E.S. engaged in behavior designated as the crime of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child. E.S. subsequently moved to suppress statements he made during an interview with law enforcement, arguing that he was in custody during the interview and therefore should have been provided with Miranda warnings and the ability to consult with an independent interested adult. The State opposed the motion. The family division granted E.S.’s motion, concluding that he was in custody during the interview because a reasonable juvenile in his circumstances would not have felt free to terminate the interview and leave. The State argued on appeal of the suppression motion that the family court used the wrong standard to determine whether E.S. was in custody during the interview. E.S. argued 13 V.S.A. § 7403(c) did not provide a right for the State to appeal an order granting a motion to suppress in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with E.S. and dismissed this appeal. View "In re E.S., Juvenile" on Justia Law

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The State of Vermont appealed a family division court's dismissal of three juvenile delinquency petitions against S.D. for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The State argued the family division retained jurisdiction to transfer them to the criminal division even after S.D. reached the age of twenty years and six months. S.D. argued 13 V.S.A. § 7403 did not provide a right for the State to appeal the dismissal of a delinquency petition. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with S.D. and dismissed this appeal, overruling precedent to the contrary in In re F.E.F., 594 A.2d 897 (1991). View "In re S.D." on Justia Law

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In a consolidated appeal, petitioner E.C. challenged two trial court orders denying his requests to expunge his criminal-history records. Petitioner’s criminal-history records included several felony and misdemeanor convictions, as well as several charges that were dismissed before trial. First,hearguedthathisdismissedchargesshouldbeexpungedunder 13 V.S.A. § 7603(e)(1)(B), which directs a court to expunge a record “related to the citation or arrest of a person . . . within 60 days after the final disposition of the case if . . . the charge is dismissed with prejudice,” unless a party objects in the interests of justice. Petitioner explained that the three-year statute of limitations had expired for each of his dismissed charges, and that the dismissals therefore were with prejudice by operation of the statute and thus were eligible for expungement. Second, he argued that his convictions for offenses committed when he was seventeen years old, including misdemeanor possession of marijuana, should be expunged under 13 V.S.A. § 7602(a)(1)(B), which permits a person to request expungement if they were “convicted of an offense for which the underlying conduct is no longer prohibited by law or designated as a criminal offense.” The Vermont Supreme Court concluded Petitioner’s petitions were properly denied under the governing law and therefore affirmed, but remanded for the Windham criminal division to expunge any of petitioner’s convictions eligible under 2019, No. 167 (Adj. Sess.), § 31. View "Vermont v. E.C." on Justia Law

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The State appealed a trial court order granting defendants Michael Sinquell-Gainey and David Vaz's motion to suppress evidence obtained by law enforcement after an automobile stop. The State argued a Newport police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendants because he observed a traffic violation and because the totality of the circumstances supported reasonable suspicion of impaired driving. After review of the trial court record, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed that the stop was justified based on reasonable suspicion of impairment. The Court therefore reversed and remanded. View "Vermont v. Sinquell-Gainey, Vaz" on Justia Law

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Defendant Austin Burnett appealed the Vermont criminal division’s order revoking his probation. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the court’s determination that defendant violated probation conditions prohibiting him from possessing or using a device with access to the internet or having a social-media account and from possessing or using pornography. However, the Supreme Court reversed the court’s determination that defendant violated a condition governing where he could reside, and remanded for the court to reconsider its disposition without that violation. View "Vermont v. Burnett" on Justia Law

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Defendant Roy Kuhlmann appealed the denial of his pro se motion for a new trial filed during the pendency of his appeal of his sentence and final judgment. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider defendant’s motion and therefore affirmed. View "Vermont v. Kuhlmann" on Justia Law

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Defendant Jayveon Caballero was convicted by a jury of second- degree murder. On appeal, he argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove that he acted intentionally or in knowing disregard of a deadly risk to the victim when he fired a gun into the victim’s car; (2) the trial court deprived him of a fair trial by excluding a statement of remorse that he made to his cousin three hours after the shooting; and (3) the State showed three graphic crime scene photographs to the jury that were not admitted into evidence. After review of the trial court record, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded there was adequate evidence of intent to support the verdict, and that the alleged evidentiary errors did not require reversal. View "Vermont v. Caballero" on Justia Law

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At about 1:40 a.m. on March 24, 2018, defendants Michael Sinquell-Gainey and David Vaz were in a vehicle that pulled into a gas station in Newport, Vermont. The officers parked nearby were having a conversation, noticing that defendants pulled into the gas station through an exit-only access. He watched defendants drive past a set of gas pumps, circle around, and return to park next to the first set of pumps. Officer LeClair testified that he could not recall how long defendants’ vehicle remained at the gas pumps, or whether defendants actually pumped gas. When defendants left the gas station a few moments later, Officer LeClair followed. Defendants came to an intersection controlled by a flashing yellow light for traffic approaching from their direction. The operator activated the left turn signal shortly before reaching the intersection, but then “stopped for quite some time,” even though no stop was required. The vehicle made a few more turns onto the interstate, "swinging wide" and crossing the centerline, at which time Officer LeClair stopped defendants under suspicion of reckless driving. After obtaining a search warrant, officers found heroin and fentanyl in the engine compartment. The State appealed a trial court order granting defendants’ motion to suppress evidence obtained by law enforcement after that automobile stop. The State argued the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendants because he observed a traffic violation and because the totality of the circumstances supported reasonable suspicion of impaired driving. After review, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed that the stop was justified based on reasonable suspicion of impairment. The Supreme Court therefore reversed and remanded. View "Vermont v. Sinquell-Gainey & Vaz" on Justia Law

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In an interlocutory appeal, the issue presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review was whether the superior court erred by denying the State’s request to order a psychiatric evaluation of defendant Brent Boyajian before holding a competency hearing. In November 2019, the State charged defendant with burglary of an occupied dwelling, misdemeanor possession of stolen property, and simple assault of a protected professional. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to suppress evidence but asked the court to delay holding a hearing on the motion to allow defense counsel time to determine defendant’s competency to stand trial, indicating that he planned to hire an expert. At a status conference, defense counsel explained that defendant was raising the issue of competency because he had a significant traumatic brain injury and recently suffered an aneurysm. For this reason, counsel noted that defendant was being evaluated by a medical provider with a memory clinic that could perform neurological testing. The experts’ report concluded that “although [defendant] has many specific capacities necessary for adjudicative competence, his limitations in verbal memory and other aspects of cognitive processing are likely to create significant problems effectively communicating with counsel and assisting in his defense.” The experts opined that defendant was therefore not competent to stand trial. The State then filed its own motion for psychiatric evaluation, contending the court should not rely only on defendant's evaluation to determine competency. The court denied the State's request. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the State contended that 13 V.S.A. 4817(b) required the trial court to order an evaluation before holding a competency hearing when the court has reason to believe that a defendant may be incompetent due to mental disease or defect, and an evaluation by a defense-retained expert did not satisfy this requirement. To this the Supreme Court agreed, and therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Boyajian" on Justia Law

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In January 2018, defendant Scott Vogel was charged with one count of luring a child. According to the charging affidavit, in September 2017, defendant was in an online chatroom dedicated to “daddaughtersex.” He began a chat with a Vermont undercover law enforcement officer who was posing as the mother of two daughters aged seven and thirteen years old. In a series of messages exchanged with the officer, defendant discussed having sex with her two daughters, specifically expressing interest in the thirteen-year-old. He provided details of what sexual acts he would perform with the child and stated that he would bring a special alcoholic punch for the child to drink. The issue this interlocutory appeal presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review centered on whether a defendant could be tried on a charge of violating 13 V.S.A. 2828, which prohibited solicitation of a child or another person believed to be a child to engage in sexual activity, where the defendant believed that he was communicating with another adult to arrange sexual contact with a minor child but the child turned out to be fictitious. The Supreme Court concluded the facts alleged by the State in this case were sufficient to make out a prima facie case that defendant violated section 2828. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s decision denying defendant’s motion to dismiss, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Vogel" on Justia Law