Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Chase Tetrault and friends broke into a remote camp owned by A.C. (camp owner), damaging appliances and personal items. Defendant pled guilty to one count of unlawful trespass and the State requested restitution. At the restitution hearing, Defendant argued that the camp owner should be able to recover only the actual value of the damaged items at the time of the trespass, not their replacement cost. He also argued restitution could not be had for items that were not damaged, but "merely used." The trial judge disagreed, and awarded the camp owner the full amount of claimed damages. On appeal, Defendant raised the same two arguments, along with a new argument that restitution was not appropriate at all in this case, because the crime of unlawful trespass did not include an element of destruction of property. "While the value of a used microwave or toaster would be lower than the value of the identical appliances in new condition, Defendant’s suggestion that the replacement cost can be estimated by what the items might fetch at a yard sale is pettifoggery. . . .[a] victim of a home invasion should not have to visit local thrift stores or pore through the classifieds to determine the value of a used blender." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court was well within its discretion in awarding the camp owner restitution in the amount sought.

Defendant Jeffory Hammond appealed his convictions for sexual assault and lewd and lascivious conduct. Defendant argued that: (1) he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal based on the complainant's contradictory and otherwise incredible testimony; (2) alternatively, he was entitled to a new trial for the same reasons; (3) the court's jury instructions were erroneous; (4) the court erred under Vermont's Rape Shield by allowing the State to present testimony from the complainant about her lack of sexual experience; and (5) the court erred by allowing non-expert and expert "anecdotal" testimony about the manner in which teenage victims sometimes report sexual assault. Finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed.

Plaintiff Moira Lamay, a former Vermont state trooper, appealed the grant of summary judgmet in favor of the State on her claim of employment discrimination. On appeal, Plaintiff contended the trial court erred in: (1) finding that she had presented insufficient evidence of gender bias as a motivating factor in her discharge; and (2) declining to consider the allegations in her complaint to the Vermont Human Rights Commission. "Plaintiff's difficulty here is that her evidence, whether characterized as direct or circumstantial, was insufficient to support a finding that gender or gender stereotyping was a motivating factor in her termination." The Supreme Court, after its review, upheld the grant of summary judgment in favor of the State.

Defendant Jason Mead was convicted of attempted second-degree murder following a jury trial. He appealed that conviction on four grounds: (1) a State’s witness and a juror had improper contact during trial; (2) the trial court admitted excerpts of defendant’s testimony at a relief-from-abuse (RFA) hearing at which defendant was not represented by counsel; (3) the trial court admitted evidence of prior bad acts of defendant; and (4) the jury charge did not require the jury to identify which gunshot supported its conviction. Finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction.

Pro se defendant James Burke appealed his sexual assault conviction under 13 V.S.A. 3252(a)(1) and resulting eighteen-to-twenty-year sentence. Defendant contended that: (1) he was denied a speedy trial; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence that complainant made false accusations of sexual assault in the past; (3) the court erred by refusing to allow him to present evidence of complainant’s past convictions; (4) the court erred by denying his motion to proceed pro se and by ordering him shackled in court; (5) the court improperly imposed a fixed term of imprisonment; and (6) the court should have granted his motion for a new trial. Finding no abuse of the trial court's discretion and sufficient evidence in the record support the jury's verdict and the trial court's decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction.

Defendant Eddie Sinclair filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis in the criminal division, seeking to vacate a conviction from 1993 on the ground that his plea was not entered voluntarily. The court denied the motion, concluding there was no basis for a collateral attack on Defendant's plea. Defendant appealed, arguing his plea should be vacated because the sentencing court did not substantially comply with Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. In October 1992, the State charged Defendant with assault and robbery. Defendant entered a plea agreement with the State in which he agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of two-to-twelve years. In March 1993, the trial court held a change-of-plea hearing and engaged Defendant in plea colloquy. The court then accepted the plea and subsequently sentenced Defendant in accordance with the agreement. In November 2010, long after his sentence had been served, Defendant filed a pro se motion in the criminal division "pursuant to coram nobis" to "vacate/bring to trial/set aside" his 1993 conviction. Defendant claimed the plea was entered involuntarily because he was not told that the plea could be used to enhance a future sentence and he was under the influence of narcotics at that time. The motion alleged that he was currently serving a federal sentence that was enhanced based on his 1993 Vermont conviction. In a written order, the court denied the motion, ruling that Defendant had failed to demonstrate the plea colloquy was inadequate and that there was no basis for a collateral attack on the plea. The State contended that Defendant's petition was improperly brought in the criminal division because Defendant may not avail himself of coram nobis when postconviction relief (PCR) proceedings are available to him, and that they were available in this case. Thus, the State argued that the petition should be dismissed without reaching the merits of Defendant's arguments. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the State and concluded that Defendant was eligible to file a PCR petition and thus precluded from seeking relief through coram nobis. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the criminal division's denial of Defendant's motion.

Defendant Robert Kolibas was convicted by a jury of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child and two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal of his conviction, Defendant claimed the trial court in its instructions to the jury eliminated the element of intent from the State's burden of proving the aggravated assault charges. Defendant is the father of twelve-year-old A.K., who invited her thirteen-year-old friend, T.F., to a sleep-over. That evening, Defendant made smoothies for the two girls, his wife, and himself. At trial, Defendant testified that he placed one Ambien (a sleep aid) and half of a Valium (an anti-anxiety medication) into his wife's drink because she was "stressed out" and he "didn't want her bothering [him]." Defendant's wife testified that after Defendant left the kitchen to bring two smoothies to the girls, she poured her part of her drink into Defendant's cup. The girls drank the smoothies as they lay on a futon in A.K.'s bedroom and watched a movie. She soon felt dizzy and tired, and fell asleep in about thirty minutes. T.F. fell asleep and woke to Defendant touching her chest and genitals. The court instructed the jury that "[t]he State is not required to prove, but may prove, that the Defendant intended that a specific person be harmed in this [drugging] manner." Defendant admitted at trial he deliberately gave "stupefying drugs" to his wife. With the court's instruction, the Supreme Court concluded it was virtually assured the jury would find Defendant guilty of aggravated assault. "This is constitutional error: [b]ecause the State built its case around the theory that Defendant intended to drug the girls, Defendant built his defense on the theory of mistake. . . . However, after Defendant testified, the court decided that the State did not have to prove that he intended to drug a particular person, and that Defendant would not be permitted to argue to the jury a defense of mistake. As a result, the jury could have found Defendant guilty of aggravated assault against T.F. and A.K. if they did not believe he actually intended to drug them." Defendant's ability to defend against the specific charges brought by the State was so substantially prejudiced that the Court ordered a new trial. Because Defendant did not challenge his conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct, the Court did not disturb that conviction.

Defendant Joseph McCarthy appealed his conviction of involuntary manslaughter. Defendant set up a dangerous shooting range on his property and invited others to join him in firing weapons at the site. An errant bullet struck and killed a neighbor in his nearby home. Defendant argued on appeal that: (1) a jury view of the scene presented misleading and prejudicial evidence and was not conducted with the necessary procedural and evidentiary safeguards; (2) the trial judge impermissibly assumed the roles of an advocate and a witness in reviewing the jury view; (3) the court erred by failing to excuse one of the jurors; and (4) his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction.

Juvenile Defendant A.C. appealed an adjudication of delinquency. On the basis of an incident at school, the State filed a delinquency petition against him, alleging that he engaged in open and gross lewdness and lascivious conduct towards the complaining witness, A.R. A.C. raised several evidentiary issues and argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the court's ruling. Upon review, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence to support the trial court's ruling, and affirmed the adjudication of delinquency.

Plaintiff-Appellee the Rutland Herald appealed a trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to Defendants the Vermont State Police (VSP) and the Office of the Attorney General (collectively the State), and to deny disclosure of records related to a criminal investigation of possession of child pornography by employees of the Criminal Justice Training Council at the Vermont Police Academy. The court concluded that the records sought by the Herald, which included inquest records, were exempt from disclosure as "records dealing with the detection and investigation of crime." The Herald asserted on appeal that a strong policy in favor of public oversight of law enforcement actions should have lead to a different result. It argued that the Legislature could not have intended that records relating to the investigation and detection of crime be confidential forever. The Supreme Court rejected the Herald's arguments, finding the investigatory records were entitled to a blanket exemption under 1 V.S.A. 317(c)(5) and upheld the trial court's decision.