Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Scott Blaise appealed a superior court decision that he violated three conditions of his probation for his alleged failure to: (1) adequately participate in counseling as directed by his probation officer; (2) pay required fines; and (3) complete 140 hours of community service.  On appeal, Defendant argued that neither the court nor his probation officer imposed upon him a probation condition requiring him to attend and complete counseling at Teen Challenge, the program he stopped attending, and that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that he violated conditions related to community service or the payment of fines.  Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the State failed to prove that Defendant violated any of the probation conditions for which he was charged and that the errors were not harmless because of a later admitted-to violation. 

Defendant Matthew Voog pled guilty to simple assault and reckless endangerment. He appealed the trial court's denial of his motions to strike surplusage from the information and affidavit of probable cause, and sought the return of property seized from him. Following sentencing, Defendant was placed in the custody of the Department of Corrections (DOC). In 2010, Defendant filed a pro se motion petitioning the court to "strike from the court, adjudicative, and incarcerative records, the unsubstantiated and non-adjudicated allegations" that he alleged were in the arrest affidavit and information "to prevent their continued use by [DOC] and other agencies in a substantially prejudicial manner." Defendant claimed that DOC was improperly using the information and the affidavit of probable cause that supported the assault charge to increase his "incarcerative level," which, in turn, resulted in his transfer to an out-of-state maximum security facility. The trial court denied Defendant's motion explaining that it did not have authority over DOC's decisions "regarding level of incarceration." On its face, nothing in the information was found as irrelevant or surplusage. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to strike "surplusage" from the information was appropriately denied. With regard to his seized property, the Court reversed and remanded the case for consideration of whether Defendant was entitled to return of his lawfully seized property, directing the trial court to consider whether "the government ha[d] a continuing [legitimate] interest" in Defendant's property.

The State appealed a superior court's interlocutory order that granted Defendant Bruce Carrolton's motion to merge two counts of lewd-and-lascivious conduct into one. Relying on "State v. Perillo," (649 A.2d 566 (1994)), which involved facts very similar to this case, the trial court ruled that because the alleged offensive touching occurred continuously without any intervening act over a short period of time, the State could not charge defendant with multiple counts of lewd-and-lascivious conduct. Recognizing that the Supreme Court's holding in "Perillo" governed this case, the State on appeal asks the Court to overrule "Perillo" and hold that the touching of two distinct intimate parts of the body are two separate offenses as a matter of law. The Court declined to overrule "Perillo" and accordingly, affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Plaintiff David Lay appealed a superior court’s order that granted summary judgment to Defendants William J. Pettengill, Elizabeth F. Novotny, and Daniel K. Troidl on his complaint. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from an internal investigation into his behavior as a state trooper and his subsequent resignation from the Vermont State Police (VSP). Plaintiff argued that the superior court erred in granting judgment to Defendants on his claims of fraudulent nondisclosure, retaliatory prosecution, malicious prosecution, and negligent referral. He also challenged several discovery rulings made by the court. Plaintiff was suspended from duty due to an ongoing investigation by the Internal Affairs Unit. He would later hire a lawyer and settle charges against him which included falsification and misuse of property and evidence; making a false statement; failing to follow-up or make reports in numerous cases; and abuse of authority for conducting a warrantless search. The Windham County State Attorney's office became involved in commencing a criminal prosecution against Plaintiff. A judge found probable cause to issue a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest. At the time the second investigation was pending, Plaintiff had found new work by a private company. He was terminated from his job as a result of the arrest warrant. Upon returning to Vermont, he was charged with numerous crimes. He reached a plea agreement. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed suit against defendants raising numerous claims, including fraudulent nondisclosure, violation of his civil rights, and malicious process. In April 2010, the court issued the summary judgment decision from which Plaintiff appealed. Finding no legal basis for Plaintiff's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court and dismissed his case.

Defendant Diana Charland appealed her sentence following her jury conviction on a charge of driving while intoxicated (DWI), third or subsequent offense.  She argued that the trial court improperly enhanced her sentence, without advance notice to her, based on its unsupported assumptions that her husband gave perjured testimony at her trial and that she suborned that false testimony.  Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "[a]lthough we have addressed each of defendant's arguments, we acknowledge that the United States Supreme Court held in 'Dunnigan' that when a defendant objects to sentence enhancement resulting from the court's conclusion that the defendant committed perjury at trial, the trial court 'must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice, or an attempt to do the same, under the perjury definition we have set out.'  In this case, the trial court made no findings meeting the standards of Dunnigan.  The court concluded that defendant had suborned her husband's perjured trial testimony, but offered no rationale for that conclusion other than that it was obvious.  While defendant's failure to object meant that the Dunnigan findings requirement was not triggered, we do not suggest that the court's bare conclusion would have been sufficient if there had been an objection.  We affirm on this record because the record demonstrates that the court could reach the conclusion that it did."

Defendant Yai Bol appealed his conviction for giving false information to a police officer and possession of cocaine. He argued that the trial court erred by preventing his counsel from using a peremptory challenge to strike a black member of the jury pool. After it was seated and the trial conducted, the jury acquitted Defendant of the assault charges but convicted him of providing false information to a police officer and possession of cocaine. On appeal, Defendant contended that the trial court misstated federal constitutional jurisprudence in maintaining that the United States Supreme Court had ruled it impermissible to strike the sole black juror from the venire without stating a reason. He concluded that the court's erroneous denial of his peremptory challenge should result in a new trial because this ruling denied him a fair trial. Having found that the court erred in barring Defendant's peremptory challenge, the Supreme Court turned to the question of appropriate remedy: "[i]t is settled Vermont law that when a defendant is left with an undesired juror after exhausting his peremptory challenges in response to the trial court's failure to remove a juror properly challenged for cause, the court's error is reversible error." The Court remanded the case for a new trial.

Defendant Trevor Herrick was convicted by a jury on second-degree murder charges and sentenced to twenty-two years to life.  Defendant was romantically involved with the victim's wife, and fatally stabbed the victim following a verbal and physical altercation. As the jury entered the courtroom to be sworn, three people walked in wearing t-shirts memorializing the victim.  Following voir dire, Defendant moved for mistrial, which the trial court denied.  On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury to consider his individual characteristics in connection with its "adequate provocation" charge for the mitigating defense of "passion-provocation manslaughter," and that the court erred in denying Defendant's motion for mistrial when the jury was exposed to potentially prejudicial extraneous influence by the t-shirts. Upon review of the trial court's record, the Supreme Court found that the trial court effectively concluded that the potential jurors did not demonstrate a state of mind inconsistent with deciding the case fairly: "[i]t made this decision based on its individual voir dire of the prospective jurors, none of whom stated that he or she would be unable to remain impartial.  The trial court is in a unique position to evaluate juror bias, and we defer to its conclusions." With regard to the trial court's ruling to the "adequate provocation" defense, the Court found the jury instructions "track[ed] our case lawâ¦and are not plain error." The Court affirmed the lower court's decisions and Defendant's conviction.

Petitioner Allen Rheaume is currently serving a life sentence as a habitual offender. He has forty-eight convictions, five of which either involve sex crimes or have a sexual element. He also has had sixty-three disciplinary report convictions while incarcerated. He challenged his classification by the Department of Corrections (DOC) as a "high risk" sex offender and that designation's concomitant programming requirements. The trial court granted respondent's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that review under the state rules of civil procedure was unavailable for classification and programming decisions made by the DOC. The question of whether an inmate designated as "high risk" can appeal his programming requirements through Vermont Rule of civil Procedure 75 is one of first impression for the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court found that no statute provides for review of DOC programming decisions, "so the question becomes whether these fall within the class of decisions appealable at common law under one of the extraordinary writs." The Court concluded that while an inmate may have review of his designation under Rule 75, the particular programming requirements promulgated after that designation becomes final are a matter of DOC discretion and as such are non reviewable under Rule 75. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court's determination that the programming requirements are not reviewable under Rule 75.

Defendant Graham Simmons appealed a district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence of a computer and other stolen items discovered in the execution of a search warrant at his residence. Probable cause supporting the warrant was obtained through subpoenas requiring production of internet addresses and data from internet service providers. Defendant challenged the subpoena of internet records as a warrantless search in violation of the state constitution. Furthermore, Defendant contended that information in the warrant was supplied by an unknown tipster whose reliability was not reasonably established. Upon review of the evidence and the trial record, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant failed to properly preserve his first contention and held that the trial court's refusal to suppress the evidence was not plain error. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the informant's input and credibility was ultimately irrelevant to issuing the warrant. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Defendant Edward Charbonneau unsuccessfully challenged his conviction on simple assault. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying him a new trial over evidence that was not available at the time of trial. The Supreme Court emphasized that the decision to grant a motion for a new trial was within the discretion of the trial court, and absent plain error in the record, the Supreme Court would not disturb the decision. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.