Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In an interlocutory appeal, the issue presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review was whether the superior court erred by denying the State’s request to order a psychiatric evaluation of defendant Brent Boyajian before holding a competency hearing. In November 2019, the State charged defendant with burglary of an occupied dwelling, misdemeanor possession of stolen property, and simple assault of a protected professional. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to suppress evidence but asked the court to delay holding a hearing on the motion to allow defense counsel time to determine defendant’s competency to stand trial, indicating that he planned to hire an expert. At a status conference, defense counsel explained that defendant was raising the issue of competency because he had a significant traumatic brain injury and recently suffered an aneurysm. For this reason, counsel noted that defendant was being evaluated by a medical provider with a memory clinic that could perform neurological testing. The experts’ report concluded that “although [defendant] has many specific capacities necessary for adjudicative competence, his limitations in verbal memory and other aspects of cognitive processing are likely to create significant problems effectively communicating with counsel and assisting in his defense.” The experts opined that defendant was therefore not competent to stand trial. The State then filed its own motion for psychiatric evaluation, contending the court should not rely only on defendant's evaluation to determine competency. The court denied the State's request. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the State contended that 13 V.S.A. 4817(b) required the trial court to order an evaluation before holding a competency hearing when the court has reason to believe that a defendant may be incompetent due to mental disease or defect, and an evaluation by a defense-retained expert did not satisfy this requirement. To this the Supreme Court agreed, and therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Boyajian" on Justia Law

In January 2018, defendant Scott Vogel was charged with one count of luring a child. According to the charging affidavit, in September 2017, defendant was in an online chatroom dedicated to “daddaughtersex.” He began a chat with a Vermont undercover law enforcement officer who was posing as the mother of two daughters aged seven and thirteen years old. In a series of messages exchanged with the officer, defendant discussed having sex with her two daughters, specifically expressing interest in the thirteen-year-old. He provided details of what sexual acts he would perform with the child and stated that he would bring a special alcoholic punch for the child to drink. The issue this interlocutory appeal presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review centered on whether a defendant could be tried on a charge of violating 13 V.S.A. 2828, which prohibited solicitation of a child or another person believed to be a child to engage in sexual activity, where the defendant believed that he was communicating with another adult to arrange sexual contact with a minor child but the child turned out to be fictitious. The Supreme Court concluded the facts alleged by the State in this case were sufficient to make out a prima facie case that defendant violated section 2828. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court’s decision denying defendant’s motion to dismiss, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Vogel" on Justia Law

Petitioner Joseph Bruyette appealed an April 2021 Department of Corrections ("DOC") declaratory ruling, made after his case staffing in June 2019, in which the DOC stated that it would “continue to rely on evaluations and reports that refer to [an] expunged offense when assessing [an] individual’s risk to make programming, classification and release decisions.” The DOC further stated in its declaratory ruling that it would also “maintain a record of such evaluations and reports to support its decisions . . . until [the individual in question] ha[s] reached their maximum release date whether or not the offense has been expunged.” Petitioner had several felony convictions expunged prior to reclassifications in June and August 2021, and alleged that the declaratory ruling violated Vermont’s expungement statute, 13 V.S.A. 7606. The State argued petitioner lacked standing to bring this case because it did not rely on petitioner's expunged convictions during his final reclassification in August 2021. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that because the disputed facts were vital for consideration of petitioner’s standing, it remanded the case for further development of the record. View "In re Joseph Bruyette" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Piquette appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to the State in his petition for post-conviction relief. Specifically, petitioner appealed that portion of the order concluding that even if petitioner’s trial counsel erred by not informing him of a plea offer, petitioner was not prejudiced by the error. The Vermont Supreme Court determined that because petitioner did not file a response to the State’s motion for summary judgment until after the superior court issued its order granting the motion and did not challenge the court’s subsequent order denying his request to set aside the judgment and reopen, judgment was affirmed. View "In re David E. Piquette" on Justia Law

Petitioner Anthony Davey appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition filed after the Department of Corrections (DOC) revoked his community-reentry furlough status. Petitioner argued that DOC’s procedural errors following his arrest, after he absconded from furlough for more than eighteen months, constituted a denial of his due process rights. He also contended that legislation governing appeals of community-reentry furlough revocations did not apply to him. While the Vermont Supreme Court agreed that DOC’s procedural errors raised legitimate concerns, petitioner did not avail himself of an appropriate alternative avenue to challenge DOC’s decision regarding his furlough status. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. View "Davey v. Baker" on Justia Law

The State appealed a PCR court’s order granting petitioner’s motion to amend its previous order and vacate all thirteen convictions for which petitioner Brian Shannon entered pleas in 2014. Petitioner had two prior felony convictions when he was charged with three felony counts of aggravated domestic assault in June 2012. In June 2013, while the June 2012 case was awaiting trial, petitioner was charged with two new counts of aggravated domestic assault; one count of felony driving while intoxicated (DWI), third or subsequent offense; and seven misdemeanors. In January 2014, the State’s attorney sent petitioner’s lawyer a letter stating that if petitioner was convicted of the 2012 charges, the State would seek a sentence enhancement in connection with the 2013 charges. However, the law would not have permitted a habitual offender enhancement to be added to the 2013 charges, because a defendant could only be charged as a habitual offender if they committed a felony at a time when they already have three felony convictions. Despite this mistake of law, the State, petitioner’s two attorneys, and the trial judge in the 2012 case failed to catch the error. Although petitioner initially refused to plead guilty to a felony before trial, several concerns arose at trial which motivated him to enter a plea for the 2012 and 2013 cases. In February 2014, petitioner agreed to plead no contest to three felonies, for which the court sentenced him to one-to-five years on the three counts, two of the sentences to run consecutively. On the remaining ten charges, petitioner pled no contest and received deferred sentences with no required domestic-violence programming. The State argued that the PCR court erred because contract law required petitioner to be returned to the same position he was in before the plea agreement as to all thirteen charges even though petitioner received and completed deferred sentences for ten of these charges under the plea agreement. The Vermont Supreme Court found that because the PCR court did not have jurisdiction over petitioner’s deferred sentences charges, it properly did not address the State’s substantive contract claims regarding those charges. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "In re Brian Shannon" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, defendants A.P. and Z.P. challenged a superior court’s denial of their motions for expungement. They argued the court erred by interpreting V.S.A. 7603(g) to provide an avenue for expungement only to individuals who have been arrested or cited, but not charged with criminal offenses by information or indictment. To this, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed and reversed and remanded. View "Vermont v. A.P." on Justia Law

Defendant Elizabeth MacFarland appeals convictions for resisting arrest and unlawful trespass following a bench trial in which the trial court refused to consider her diminished-capacity defense. Defendant was arrested following a night of drinking at a Brattleboro bar. In apparent response to the bouncer’s question, defendant spoke incoherently about politics and her family. The bouncer persisted and again asked her to speak with him outside. Defendant refused. The bouncer then pulled on defendant’s bar stool and told her she “had to leave.” Defendant stood up from her stool, ran to a corner, and muttered to herself. Soon thereafter, the bouncer called the police, and two Brattleboro police officers arrived a few minutes later. Officers asked defendant to step outside; officers stood defendant up by her arm but she went limp and had to be carried out. Relying on Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.1 and its own scheduling and discovery order, the trial court found that defendant failed to properly notify the State of her intention to argue diminished capacity. Defendant argued the plain meaning of Rule 12.1 did not require notice of diminished capacity when a defendant does not rely on expert witnesses, that the trial court’s scheduling order did not independently provide a basis for notice, and that, as charged, the notice element of misdemeanor unlawful trespass denoted a subjective standard. The Vermont Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in refusing to consider diminished capacity, and that the error was not harmless. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. MacFarland" on Justia Law

Defendant Devan Calabrese appealed his convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, unlawful possession of a firearm, and violation of conditions of release, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of a bullet on the ground at the site of the alleged crimes, and permitting the State to introduce evidence that he made certain racially charged statements. After its review, the Vermont Supreme Court concluded the trial court applied the incorrect legal standard to the suppression question, and remanded for additional factfinding and a reassessment of the motion. With respect to the court’s admission of evidence that defendant made statements evincing racial animus, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony. The Court thus reversed the trial court’s ruling denying defendant’s motion to suppress and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vermont v. Calabrese" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the State contested a trial court’s order granting defendant Shannon Barry’s motion to suppress statements she made to law enforcement officers before her arrest. In June 2019, the Barre City Police Department launched an investigation after Heather Larocque died from taking fentanyl-laced heroin. The investigation led the officers to believe defendant sold the fentanyl-laced heroin to Larocque. Officers found defendant enter a convenience store and asked to talk to her as she exited. At no point during the discussion, which lasted between ten and twenty minutes, did the officers tell defendant she was free to leave or to not answer their questions. Defendant never requested to leave but believed she would have been arrested if she had tried to do so. She did not feel threatened and did not feel the officers were being dishonest in their conversation with her. Throughout the conversation, defendant was not handcuffed, and the officers’ weapons remained holstered. At the conclusion of the conversation, the officers arrested defendant. At no time prior to her arrest was defendant informed of her Miranda rights. Defendant was charged with selling or dispensing a regulated drug with death resulting. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that defendant was in custody and had not been advised of her Miranda rights outside the convenience store, therefore the Court affirmed the suppression order. View "Vermont v. Barry" on Justia Law