Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted on and convicted of one count of capital murder in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape or attempted rape, and one count of capital murder in the commission of abduction with the intent to defile. The sentencing court imposed two sentences of death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not commit prejudicial error in (a) limiting questioning during voir dire, (b) excluding evidence during the penalty phase of trial, and (c) instructing the jury; (2) the evidence was sufficient to prove the elements of the offenses charged and the aggravating factors required for imposition of a sentence of death; (3) the imposition of the death penalty was constitutional and met the relevant statutory factors; and (4) the sentences of death were not imposed under mistake and were not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. View "Lawlor v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

In 2009, Alexander Nobles pled guilty to driving while intoxicated (DWI) before Judge Thomas Kelley in district court. The case was continued until 2011. At the 2011 hearing, Judge Kelley found Nobles guilty of reckless driving and fined him $250. The Commonwealth objected to Judge Kelley's decision to find Nobles guilty of reckless driving instead of finding him guilty and sentencing him for DWI. Theophani Stamos, the chief deputy Commonwealth's attorney, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking an order compelling Judge Kelley to sentence Nobles on the charge of DWI. The circuit court issued the writ. Judge Kelley appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court and dismissed the petition, holding that the circuit court erred in issuing the writ ordering Judge Kelley to sentence Nobles on the charge of DWI, as the 2011 order had become final, and Judge Kelley consequently lost jurisdiction to modify the order. View "Kelley v. Stamos" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of robbery and use of a firearm. Less than a month after Defendant was released from prison on probation, Defendant was arrested on a new robbery charge. After a revocation hearing, the circuit court found that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, revoked the probation, and entered an order requiring Defendant to serve the remaining eighteen years and four months of his original sentence. After a rehearing, the court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the judgment violated his constitutional right to confront his accusers and the rule against hearsay. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in admitting testimonial hearsay evidence in this probation revocation proceeding, as the evidence comported with the constitutional requirements for admitting the testimonial hearsay evidence and denying Defendant his confrontation rights for "good cause." View "Henderson v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Alison Dressner was issued a summons for possession of marijuana. The Commonwealth amended the charge to possession of marijuana. Dressner was then arraigned on the amended charge, and entered a guilty plea to that charge. Dressner subsequently filed a petition for expungement of police and court records pertaining to the possession of marijuana charge. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in concluding that expungement of the possession of marijuana charge would distort the record, as the possession of marijuana charge was necessarily "otherwise dismissed"; and (2) Dressner satisfied the requirements of the expungement statute, where she demonstrated the existence of manifest injustice with the continued existence of information relating to the marijuana charge, and was entitled to have the police and court records relating to the marijuana charge expunged. View "Dressner v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Respondent was convicted of aggravated sexual battery. Subsequently, Respondent was determined to be a sexually violent predator and ordered committed to the custody of the Department of Behavioral Health and Development Services. The circuit court later held an annual assessment hearing of Respondent's status that was conducted by two-way electronic video and audio communications pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 37.2-910(A). At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court found that Respondent remained a sexually violent predator and ruled that he should remain in secure inpatient treatment. Respondent appealed, arguing because he was not physically present at the hearing his due process and statutory rights were violated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the provision in Code 37.2-910(A) for conducting annual assessment hearings under the Sexually Violent Predator Act by video conference was neither unconstitutional facially nor unconstitutional as applied in Respondent's case; and (2) the circuit court correctly found that Respondent remained a sexually violent predator in need of secure inpatient treatment. View "Shellman v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the circuit court erred when it held that Defendant was not entitled to credit toward his Virginia sentence for the period he was detained in a Virginia jail awaiting trial. At that time, he was a West Virginia prisoner receiving credit toward his West Virginia sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it held Defendant was not entitled to credit toward his Virginia sentence; and (2) the court erred in recharacterizing Defendant's pleading without providing him notice and the opportunity to be heard, but the error was harmless because Defendant was not required to challenge the recharacterization on the appeal, and he was not entitled to credit toward his Virginia sentence. View "Dorr v. Clark" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted in the district court of a felony third offense, DUI after being twice convicted of the same offense within ten years. The circuit court subsequently granted Appellant's motion to dismiss the second DUI case for denial of Appellant's right to a speedy trial. Appellant then filed a petition in the court of appeals for a writ of actual innocence with respect to his felony conviction, contending he was innocent of the felony because one of the requisite predicate misdemeanor convictions had been dismissed with prejudice. A court of appeals panel remanded the case for resentencing on the lesser-included offense of DUI, second conviction. The court of appeals thereafter granted the Commonwealth's petition for a rehearing en banc. The court of appeals, with ten judges sitting en banc, dismissed the writ of actual innocence without opinion by an equally-divided court and withdrew the previous order by the panel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the panel's judgment could only have been withdrawn and thus reversed by a majority of the judges sitting in the court en banc. Remanded with direction to reinstate the judgment of the panel. View "Conley v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of three counts of robbery and three counts of use or display of a firearm in committing those felonies. The circuit court ran the firearm sentences consecutively based upon what it interpreted as court of appeals precedent. Appellant appealed, arguing that neither the language of the use or display of a firearm statute, Va. Code Ann. 18.2-53.1, nor the language of the mandatory minimum sentencing statute prohibited the sentences imposed for such firearm charges from being run concurrently with each other. The court of appeals denied Appellant's appeal. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) multiple sentences imposed pursuant to Code 18.2-53.1 may be run concurrently; and (2) to the extent that the holding in Bullock v. Commonwealth was inconsistent with the holding here, that portion of the court of appeals' decision was reversed. Remanded for resentencing. View "Brown v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of three counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-308.2(A). Defendant appealed, arguing that he should have been convicted of only one continuous possession. The court of appeals upheld all three possession convictions, holding that each of the convictions was based on "distinguishable incidents." At issue on appeal was whether evidence of the possession of one firearm on three separate occasions can constitute three separate charges for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the incidents at issue constituted distinct acts or occurrences, each reflecting an enhanced danger to the public, and convictions for the three separate charges on the facts of this case were therefore valid under Code 18.2-308.2(A). View "Baker v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Defendant entered an Alford plea of guilty to an indictment charging him with grand larceny. Before the sentencing order became final, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court ultimately denied the motion. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for habeas corpus, claiming that he had been denied he effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel had failed to base his motion to withdraw the guilty plea on the specific grounds of mistake, fear, misunderstanding, and misrepresentation. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court granted Defendant the writ. In granting the writ, the court relied on Justus v. Commonwealth. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the writ, holding (1) the circuit court applied an inapplicable standard in granting the writ, and (2) there was no evidence to support a conclusion that Defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel or that manifest injustice occurred.