Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

These appeals presented the same question of law and were therefore considered together. The question presented involved the interplay between the Constitution of Virginia and Va. Code 18.2-308.2, relating to jurisdiction of the circuit courts to restore rights to ship, transport, possess or receive firearms to a person who has lost those rights by suffering a felony conviction. The question arose where the convicted person's political disabilities had subsequently been restored by the Governor. The Supreme Court reversed the judgments in both cases and remanded, holding (1) firearm rights may only be restored to a convicted felon by a permit issued by a circuit court; (2) the Fairfax County circuit court erred in ruling that the first defendant's petition must be denied because the Governor had not given him a full restoration of rights; and (3) the Buchanan County circuit court of erred in ruling that the second defendant's petition must be denied because the Governor, by excepting firearm rights from his order removing political disabilities, had placed a condition on the defendant's right to possess firearms that precluded the court from considering the defendant's petition.

Defendant was convicted of abduction with intent to defile and commission of a subsequent violent sexual assault and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress testimony of the police officers regarding their surveillance of Defendant on the evening of the attack. Defendant argued that the officers, without first obtaining a search warrant, unlawfully installed a GPS device on his vehicle and traced his movements through use of the device, and therefore, the officers' testimony was fruit of the poisonous tree of an unlawful search. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Before the appeal to the Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court decided United States v. Jones, which held that the government's placement of a GPS tracking device on a vehicle and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. In this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the installation of the GPS device on Defendant's van, without a valid search warrant, constituted an unconstitutional search; but (2) the admission of the officers' testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defendant Robert Charles Gleason, Jr. received two death sentences following pleas of guilty to capital murder in the killings of two fellow inmates, Harvey Grey Watson and Aaron Cooper. Although Defendant was found competent to waive appeal and did so, the Supreme Court conducted the required statutory review and affirmed the judgments of the circuit court, holding (1) the death sentences were not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and (2) the sentences were not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.

Defendant was indicted for aggravated malicious wounding and use of a firearm during an aggravated malicious wounding. During trial, the Commonwealth moved that the court declare a witness who claimed memory loss unavailable and admit the transcript of his preliminary hearing testimony. The court, relying on the court of appeals' decision in Jones v. Commonwealth, found the witness unavailable. Because the court ruled that the transcript was inadmissible, the court allowed Defendant's counsel at the hearing to testify about the witness's testimony. Defendant thereafter was convicted of both charges. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in declaring the witness unavailable, and the error was not harmless. Remanded.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of, inter alia, use of a firearm while committing burglary and participation in a criminal street gang. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed the convictions, concluding that the circuit court did not err by finding the evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant of gang participation. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed Defendant's convictions for gang participation and for use of a firearm in the commission of burglary, holding (1) the circuit court erred in admitting certain evidence offered to support the conviction of criminal street gang participation, and therefore, the Commonwealth failed to prove an essential element of the crime; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for use of a firearm in commission of burglary.

John Rives was arrested for using profane, threatening, or indecent language over public airways, a misdemeanor. Convicted in the general district court, Rives appealed to the circuit court where he was again convicted. The court of appeals affirmed after applying the Miller v. California test for the definition of obscenity and finding that the phone calls made by Rives' met the Miller test for obscenity because the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational fact-finder to conclude that Rives' language had as its dominant theme an appeal to the prurient interest in sex and was therefore obscene within the meaning of the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed but for a slightly different reason, holding (1) the question of whether language used in telephonic communications is obscene is immaterial in cases involving threats to commit illegal or immoral acts, where the threat is made with the intent to coerce, intimidate or harass any person; and (2) Rives' language was clearly sufficient to enable a rational fact-finder to conclude that he was threatening the complainant with physical injury in the form of a sexual offense, with the obvious intent to intimidate and harass her.

Defendant was convicted in the circuit court of felony failure to stop at the scene of an accident. Defendant commenced her appeal by filing a timely notice of appeal, but the court reporter failed to file transcripts of proceedings from the date on which the circuit court heard testimony and received evidence ("missing transcript"). The circuit court later entered an order making the missing transcript part of the record and ordering the clerk of court to transmit the missing transcript to the court of appeals. Defendant then filed a petition for appeal in the court of appeals. The court denied the petition, stating that Defendant did not timely file the missing transcript, and without the transcript, the record on appeal was insufficient to allow the court to review Defendant's assignments of error. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in failing to consider the missing transcript in its review of the petition of appeal, as (1) the missing transcript was clerical error; and (2) the circuit court thus had authority to make the transcript part of the record, and Defendant was not required to seek an extension of time from the court of appeals. Remanded.

On his wife's complaint, Defendant was arrested and tried on a misdemeanor warrant for sending emails to his wife accusing his wife of engaging in sexual acts with other men and soliciting sex on Craigslist. Defendant was convicted of harassment by a computer. A panel of the court of appeals reversed on the ground that Defendant's emails were not obscene under the definition of obscenity the court of appeals adopted in Allman v. Commonwealth. However, in its decision en banc, the court of appeals overruled its decision in Allman and adopted a newly broadened definition of obscenity, holding that Defendant's emails were obscene within that definition. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and vacated Barson's conviction, holding (1) the definition of "obscene" provided by the General Assembly in Va. Code Ann. 18.2-372 controlled this case, and accordingly, the court of appeals erred in substituting a dictionary definition for that provided by the General Assembly; and (2) Defendant's emails to his wife did not meet the standard of obscenity provided by section 18.2-372.

Thomas Porter was convicted in the circuit court of the capital murder of a law enforcement officer, use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and grand larceny. The trial court sentenced Porter to death plus twenty-two years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court subsequently dismissed Porter's petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding (1) Porter was not denied the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury because a juror failed to disclose during voir dire that his brother was employed as a deputy sheriff, as Porter failed to demonstrate that the juror failed to answer honestly a material question during voir dire; (2) the Commonwealth did not fail to disclose exculpatory information as required by Brady v. Maryland; and (3) Porter failed to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient for failing to investigate Porter's childhood and educational history.

Patricia LaCava was convicted in the circuit court of two counts of embezzlement. LaCava commenced her appeal pro se. LaCava filed a timely notice of appeal and asked the court reporter to order transcripts of the trial proceedings. LaCava subsequently secured representation by appellate counsel, who discovered that the transcripts had not been filed within the sixty-day period required by Va. R. Crim. App. 5A:8(a). After filing the transcripts by hand, counsel filed a motion to extend the deadline for filing transcripts. The court of appeals denied the motion and thereafter denied LaCava's petition for appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) the court of appeals abused its discretion in denying LaCava's motion to extend the deadline for filing her transcript, as LaCava showed good cause to extend the period for filing transcripts; and (2) the court of appeals erred in denying LaCava's petition for appeal because the order was predicated solely on the absence of a transcript or statement of facts.