Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Jean Enriquez was found in a drunken condition in a parked motor vehicle with the keys in the ignition switch. Defendant was subsequently convicted of driving or operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. Defendant appealed, contending that the evidence was insufficient to convict him as a matter of law of the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when an intoxicated person is seated behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle on a public highway and the key is in the ignition switch, he is in actual physical control of the vehicle and, therefore, is guilty of operating the vehicle while under the influence of alcohol within the meaning of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-266; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Defendant was in actual physical control of the vehicle and to support his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

James Blaxton was convicted in 1989 of rape, forcible sodomy and attempted sodomy. In 2008, the Commonwealth filed a petition seeking Blaxton's civil commitment as a sexually violent predator. The trial court found that Blaxton was a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA). The circuit court subsequently entered an order granting Blaxton conditional release and transferred supervision of Blaxton to the state of Illinois after finding that the SVPA does not prohibit interstate transfers of sexually violent predators. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court's judgment was error pursuant to Commonwealth v. Amerson, in which the Court held that the SVPA does not authorize the conditional release of a sexually violent predator outside the Commonwealth. Remanded.

Defendant pled guilty to attempted rape, a felony. Defendant's sentencing order contained a provision stating that the sentencing court would reduce the conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor following Defendant's incarceration and successful completion of probation. After Defendant violated his probation, he filed a motion to vacate the sentencing order as void ab initio and to dismiss his charge of the probation violation, arguing that the circuit court did not have the power to reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor under the circumstances. The circuit court denied Defendant's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in this case, the circuit court did not have the power to render a judgment reducing Defendant's conviction from a felony to a misdemeanor more than five years after its entry of the sentencing order; and (2) the ultra vires provision in the sentencing order resulted in the entire sentencing order being void ab initio.

After Jennifer Bing was arrested on suspicion of drug possession and distribution, a lieutenant conducted a full cavity search on Bing. Almost two years later, Bing filed a complaint against several law enforcement officers, alleging assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that the search was illegal. The trial court found that the statute of limitations barred Bing's claim and dismissed with prejudice the cause of action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err when it granted Defendants' plea of the statute of limitations because Bing was "confined" within the meaning of Va. Code Ann. 8.01-243.2, and the body cavity search related to the conditions of her confinement. Therefore, a one-year statute of limitations applied.

Defendant Roger Stevens was found guilty of, among other crimes, two counts of murder, two counts of use of a firearm in the commission of murder, conspiracy to commit robbery, and malicious bodily injury. The court of appeals affirmed Stevens' conviction. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to suppress his statement to police during a custodial interrogation because, in light of the circumstances, Defendant's request for a lawyer was ambiguous and, therefore, the officers were entitled to ask further clarifying questions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the facts of this case, the officers could have reasonably viewed Stevens' statement as ambiguous, and thus they were permitted to ask Stevens clarifying questions.

The Supreme Court upheld two capital murder convictions against Alfredo Rolando Prieto as well as convictions for rape, grand larceny, and two counts of felonious use of a firearm. The Court remanded for resentencing based on a finding of error in the penalty phase of the trial. Following a new penalty phase, the circuit court entered a final order imposing the death penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed after addressing Prieto's several assignments of error, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment and that there was no reason to commute or set aside the sentences of death.

Mark Lahey was convicted of two counts of attempted first degree murder. The court of appeals and Supreme Court refused Lahey's petitions for appeal. Lahey subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Lahey submitted his habeas petition for filing on the last day of the limitations period but did not complete payment of the filing fee until days later. The circuit court dismissed the petition as untimely under Va. Code Ann. 8.01-654(A)(2) upon determining that, under the express requirements of Va. Code Ann. 8.01-655, the petition could not be filed, or deemed filed, without proper payment of the filing fee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Lahey's habeas petition was time-barred under section 8.01-654(A)(2).

In 1994, Michael Haas was convicted at a bench trial in the circuit court of sodomy committed upon his two sons in 1992 and 1993, when they were eleven and nine years of age, respectively. After Haas' petition for writ of habeas corpus was denied, Hass filed a petition for a writ of actual innocence based on non-biological evidence, including recantation evidence. The court of appeals denied Haas' request to refer the case to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing and dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in (1) declining to refer the case back to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing, and (2) finding that Haas failed to carry his burden of proof and, accordingly, granting the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss his petition.

Pursuant to a guilty plea, Steven DeMille was convicted of rape. Before DeMille's release from incarceration, the attorney general filed a petition seeking the civil commitment of DeMille as a sexually violent predator. After a bench trial, the circuit court entered an order declaring DeMille to be a sexually violent predator. At issue on appeal was whether in a proceeding under the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act, the determination that the respondent is likely to engage in sexually violent acts must be based solely on expert testimony that states an opinion to that effect in express terms. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the factual determination of whether a respondent is a sexually violent predator likely to engage in sexually violent acts is to be based on the totality of the record, including but not limited to expert testimony.

Following a bench trial, the circuit court found Jerrod Quarles guilty of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Quarles' motion to suppress where the police impermissibly reinitiated communication with Quarles after he invoked his right to counsel in violation of his rights under the Fifth Amendment, and therefore, Quarles' subsequent waiver of his Miranda rights was not voluntary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Quarles' motion to suppress where the police officer would not have known that Quarles was likely to respond to his statement and Quarles was not particularly susceptible to exposure to such statements.