Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this appeal was whether a bail bondsman licensed in another state but not in Virginia had the authority to enter Virginia and apprehend a fugitive bailee. In a bench trial, Defendant, an out-of-state bail bondsman, was convicted of attempted abduction and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the General Assembly plainly manifested its intent to abrogate the common law rule allowing out-of-state bail bondsmen and bounty hunters to enter Virginia to apprehend fugitive bailees; and (2) there was sufficient evidence to establish the specific intent necessary to support a conviction of attempted abduction.

At a bench trial, the circuit court found Curtis Branham guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The court of appeals affirmed. Branham appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress the Commonwealth's evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in denying Branham's motion to suppress where the arresting officer's search of Branham's person and vehicle and the results of those searches were not fruits of an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (2) the circuit court did not err in admitting the certificate of analysis of the cocaine into evidence where the chain of custody evidence was sufficient.

A jury found Dustin Turner guilty of abduction with intent to defile and first-degree felony murder. Billy Brown, the other person implicated in the crime, later confessed in a signed affidavit that he alone killed the victim. Based on this recantation, Turner filed a petition for a writ of actual innocence based on non-biological evidence. After remanding the matter to the circuit court to further develop the facts, the court of appeals granted Turner's request for a writ of actual innocence and vacated his convictions. Subsequently, the court of appeals granted the Commonwealth's petition for a rehearing and dismissed Turner's petition for a writ of actual innocence. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in dismissing Turner's petition and in denying his request to vacate his convictions because Turner did not meet his evidentiary burden of providing that no rational trier of fact could find Turner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of abduction with intent to defile as nothing in Brown's recantation or the circuit court's factual findings had any bearing on the question presented in the petition.

James Proffitt was convicted of a felony sexual offense involving a minor and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The circuit court, shortly thereafter, appointed Melissa Doud as Proffitt's guardian and conservator. Doud then brought an action against the county, the sheriff, the sheriff's deputies and jailors, and the Commonwealth, alleging Proffitt suffered serious injuries during his incarceration at the county jail due to the negligence of the sheriff's deputies. Doud's theory of recovery against the Commonwealth was based entirely on respondeat superior. The circuit dismissed the action. At issue on appeal was whether the Commonwealth's express waiver of sovereign immunity for damage caused by the negligent act of any employee acting within the scope of his employment rendered the Commonwealth liable in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth was not waived with respect to Doud's tort claim because the sheriff was not an "employee" of the Commonwealth within the definitions contained in the Virginia Tort Claims Act.

Leslie Todd gave birth to a female child while incarcerated. Lucretia Copeland eventually became the baby's primary physical custodian. Approximately two years later, Copeland filed a petition to adopt the child without the consent of Todd pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 63.2-1202(H). The circuit court granted Copeland's petition, holding that Todd failed to maintain contact with the child for a period of six months prior to the filing of the petition as required by section 63.2-1202(H), and, in the alternative, that Todd had withheld her consent contrary to the child's best interests under Va. Code Ann. 63.2-1203 and -1205. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reinstated the final decree of adoption, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in reversing the circuit court's holding that Todd's consent to the adoption was not necessary under section 36.2-1202(H), but (2) the court of appeals erred in its judgment that the circuit court violated Todd's constitutional rights under sections 63.2-1203 and -1205 as the circuit court gave adequate consideration to Todd's due process rights and Todd's equal protection rights were not violated.

Derek Bell was declared by a jury in circuit court to be a sexually violent predator and was civilly committed to the custody of the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services for appropriate treatment. After Bell's first annual review, the circuit court found that Bell remained a sexually violent predator but that he satisfied the criteria for conditional release from the custody of the Department set forth under Va. Code Ann. 37.2-912. The Commonwealth appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the judgment of the circuit court was without evidence to support it as Bell had not satisfied the first criterion set forth in section 37.2-912(A) and continued to need secure inpatient treatment. Final judgment entered in favor of the Commonwealth.

These appeals arose out of two cases brought after Mother was shot and killed by her only child, Clayton Lynn. Mother's will identified Lynn as the sole beneficiary of her estate. Lynn's daughters (Granddaughters) filed separate actions seeking declaratory judgment that Lynn be declared a "slayer" for the purposes of the Slayer Statute and that the Granddaughters be declared the sole heirs of Mother's estate. The circuit court consolidated the two actions and held that Mother's mother was the sole and rightful heir to Mother's estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the version of the Slayer Statute in effect on the date of Mother's murder controlled the distribution of Mother's estate in this case, and as a result, the trial court was correct in concluding that under the laws of intestate succession at the time of Mother's death, as modified by the Slayer Statute in effect, Mother's estate passed to the next living person who was neither the slayer nor making a claim through the slayer; and (2) the version of the Slayer Statute in effect on the date of Mother's murder neither implicated nor violated Virginia's prohibition against corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.

Geoffrey Sanders was convicted by a jury of forcible sodomy, rape, object sexual penetration, and taking indecent liberties with a child. During the trial, the circuit court allowed the commonwealth's medical expert, a doctor, to rely on the results of a laboratory report as the basis of her opinion that the victim had a sexually transmitted infection. Sanders appealed, arguing that this portion of the expert's testimony violated his right to confront witnesses against him as guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The court of appeals found the laboratory report in this instance was not testimonial for purposes of Sixth Amendment confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the laboratory report was for medical treatment purposes as it was created to permit the doctor to medically diagnose and treat the victim for sexually transmitted infections and was thus non-testimonial; and (2) a laboratory technician under these circumstances would not have reason to believe the results of his or her testing would be used in later trial and thus the report and the expert's testimony as to its content were not subject to exclusion under Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.

Harry Kelso was convicted in the Circuit Court of Hanover County of three counts of causing a juvenile to assist in the distribution of marijuana to a third party in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2-255(A)(ii). Kelso appealed, arguing that venue in Hanover County was improper because he did not undertake any action relating to the sale of marijuana there. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed. Although Kelso's distribution of marijuana to the juvenile occurred solely in another county, the juvenile distributed the marijuana he received from Kelso to a third party in Hanover County. Because one of the acts which must occur for a violation of 18.2-255(A)(ii) is the juvenile's assistance in the distribution of the contraband to a third party, the Court held that the place where that act occurred is an appropriate venue for prosecution.

In 2005, David Eastlack was charged with malicious wounding. The circuit court found Eastlack not guilty by reason of insanity. In 2009, Eastlack filed a petition in the circuit court seeking expungement of the police and court records pertaining to the malicious wounding charge pursuant to Va. Code Ann. 19.2-392.2. The court denied the petition. Eastlack appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Eastlack failed to establish the existence of one of the three criteria listed in the statute as a prerequisite to his right to seek expungement. As Eastlack did not meet the other criteria, the Court confined its analysis to whether Eastlack was acquitted of his crime. Because a person found not guilty by reason of insanity has restraints upon his liberty and is not free to resume his life in the community as he would be if he had been acquitted in the usual sense, the Court held the term 'acquitted' in the statute does not include acquittals by reason of insanity.