Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Washington Supreme Court
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In 2016 and 2021, Steven Buck was convicted of felony failure to register as a sex offender and sentenced to prison terms followed by mandatory 36 months of community custody. The trial court ran Buck’s 2021 community custody term consecutively to the 2016 community custody term, requiring Buck to serve 72 months of community custody in total. Buck argued on appeal that the court exceeded its authority under RCW 9.94A.589(5), which limits nonexceptional consecutive terms of community supervision to 24 months in total.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the terms "community supervision" and "community custody" are synonymous within RCW 9.94A.589(5) for offenses that occurred after July 1, 2000. Thus, the statute prohibits consecutive terms of community custody exceeding 24 months in total for nonexceptional sentences.The court found that the trial court erred in imposing a total of 72 months of community custody for Buck's 2016 and 2021 sentences. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, vacated the community custody portion of Buck's sentence, and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing in compliance with this interpretation of RCW 9.94A.589(5). View "State v. Buck" on Justia Law

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The petitioner, Ricky Arntsen, was convicted of several crimes including second degree assault with a deadly weapon following a road rage incident where he forced another driver, Kim Koenig, to stop her car and then circled her vehicle while carrying an AK-47 assault rifle. Arntsen filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for the second degree assault charge. He argued that the State failed to prove that he had the specific intent required for second degree assault, given that the testimony showed he did not point the gun at another person, nor did it establish that Koenig actually experienced apprehension and imminent fear of bodily injury.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington rejected Arntsen's arguments, ruling that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The court noted that while Arntsen did not point the rifle directly at Koenig, the totality of his conduct, including his aggressive driving and approaching Koenig's car with the rifle after angrily forcing her to stop, provided sufficient basis for a rational trier of fact to infer that he intended to make her fear he might harm her. The court also held that Koenig's testimony that at times during the incident she thought Arntsen was going to shoot or harm her, demonstrated that she experienced actual apprehension and fear of injury. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals to address the other issues raised in Arntsen’s PRP. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Arntsen" on Justia Law

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In the State of Washington, two brothers, Alejandro S. Martinez and Eduardo S. Martinez, were charged with separate counts of sexually abusing their younger stepbrothers in their shared family home. The State of Washington sought to join the two cases for trial on the grounds that the charges and evidence were virtually identical, and to minimize the number of times the victims would have to testify. Despite objections from both brothers, the trial court granted the State's motion for joinder and both brothers were found guilty as charged. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that the trial court abused its discretion when it improperly joined the two cases without first meeting at least one of the two bases for joinder under CrR 4.3(b)(3) — whether the offenses were part of a common scheme or plan, or were so closely connected in respect to time, place, and occasion. The court found that the brothers acted independently, were charged with separate criminal acts occurring at separate times, and there was no evidence they acted in concert or as part of a common scheme or plan. The court also found that Alejandro, but not Eduardo, was prejudiced by the joinder. Consequently, the court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and remanded Alejandro's case to the trial court for further proceedings. The court found no violation of Eduardo's constitutional right to due process. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

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In the State of Washington, a man named Mitchell Heng was charged with murder, arson, and robbery. He was brought before a judge for a preliminary hearing without counsel, during which the judge set bail among other things. Heng argued that counsel should have been present at this hearing. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington agreed, noting that a person charged with a crime has a right to counsel under the state and federal constitutions and under court rules. However, the court found that Heng did not demonstrate that the hearing was a critical stage of the prosecution, and it believed that the absence of counsel did not contribute to the verdict. Consequently, the court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts.The facts of the case reveal that Heng was implicated in a robbery at Sifton Market during which Amy Hooser was killed. Surveillance footage showed Heng at the scene with a blood-stained shirt and a lighter in his hands. He was charged the next day with first degree murder, first degree robbery, and first degree arson. Heng was held in jail for 31 months before his trial, during which time he made inconsistent statements during recorded phone calls about the events of the night of the crime. He was eventually convicted of first degree murder and first degree arson and was sentenced to 374 months in prison.Heng appealed his conviction, arguing that his right to counsel had been violated at a critical stage of the prosecution. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that while Heng should have had counsel present at his preliminary hearing, this did not constitute a critical stage of the prosecution. The court also noted that in order for an error to be considered structural and thus necessitate automatic reversal, it must have substantively affected the outcome of the case. The court determined that Heng’s case was not demonstrably affected by his counsel’s absence. As such, the court applied constitutional harmless error analysis, which requires the court to reverse unless it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. The court concluded that the failure to have counsel present at Heng’s preliminary hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. View "State v. Heng" on Justia Law

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Michael Shawn Charlton was arrested and charged with third-degree child rape, third-degree child molestation, and indecent liberties. He appeared in preliminary hearings without counsel, which he argued on appeal was a denial of his constitutional right to counsel at critical stages of the prosecution. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that while the absence of counsel was indeed a constitutional error, it did not constitute a critical stage of litigation requiring automatic reversal. The court reasoned that nothing in the record suggested that Charlton's rights were lost, defenses were waived, privileges were claimed or waived, or that the outcome of the case was otherwise substantially affected by the absence of counsel. Furthermore, the court concluded that any error in not having counsel present was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This is because there was no evidence to suggest that the lack of counsel affected the verdict in any way. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Charlton" on Justia Law

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In a prior case before the Washington Supreme Court, the Court rejected Petitioner Amanda Knight’s claim her separate convictions for felony murder (based on first-degree robbery) and first degree robbery violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Double jeopardy did not apply because Knight’s felony murder and robbery convictions were premised on different conduct: the felony murder charge was based on the robbery of a safe whereas the first degree robbery was based on the robbery of a ring. Knight moved for reconsideration and that petition was denied. Here, Knight argued that given the Court’s previous holding, her conviction for felony murder had to be reversed because the jury was presented with insufficient evidence to justify a conviction for robbery of the safe. The Supreme Court concluded the basis for the felony murder conviction could not be sustained, granted Knight’s petition for relief, vacated the felony murder conviction and remanded for resentencing. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Knight" on Justia Law

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A jury convicted Respondent Vanessa Valdiglesias LaValle of two counts of criminal solicitation after she told her minor son, S.G., that he could be with her “forever” if he poisoned his father. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the ground that Valdiglesias LaValle’s offer to live with S.G. “forever” if S.G. killed his father did not constitute a “thing of value” within the meaning of RCW 9A.28.030(1). The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court held the plain meaning of “money or other thing of value” in RCW 9A.28.030(1) unambiguously included both money and things that were not money but that, like money, possessed utility, desirability, significance, and/or economic value. "Nothing in the plain language or context of the statute indicates that 'other thing of value' must be limited to things with a traditional economic or market value." View "Washington v. Valdiglesias LaValle" on Justia Law

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Respondent John McWhorter pleaded guilty in adult court to crimes he committed when he was a juvenile. He later moved for resentencing to enable the trial court to consider the mitigating qualities of his youth. The superior court granted the motion for a resentencing hearing, and the State appealed this order to the Court of Appeals. That court ruled that the superior court’s order was not appealable by the State, so it dismissed the appeal. The State filed a petition for review to the Washington Supreme Court, who reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to that court to consider the State’s appeal. View "Washington v. McWhorter" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Dominique Avington argued his own trial testimony was sufficient to require a lesser included offense instruction for the shooting death of Terrance King. Specifically, Avington testified that although he fired his gun, he was not aiming directly at anyone, and he argued that his credibility should have been determined by the jury. The undisputed evidence at trial showed that the bullet that killed King did not come from Avington’s gun. As a result, Avington’s testimony about the direction of his aim did not create a question of fact for the jury as to whether he participated in King’s death under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court was whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it declined to instruct the jury on first degree manslaughter as a lesser included offense of first degree murder by extreme indifference. Consistent with Washington v. Coryell, 483 P.3d 98 (2021), the answer was yes. "The record shows that the trial court carefully reviewed all of the evidence admitted at trial in light of the charged offenses, properly instructed the jury on accomplice liability, and properly exercised its discretion in declining to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense of first degree manslaughter." View "Washington v. Avington" on Justia Law

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Michael Reynolds Jr. received a mandatory sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole for a crime he committed at age 33. The events triggering that sentence, though, were his two “strikes” under Washington’s “three strikes” law—one of which Reynolds committed at age 17, when he was a juvenile. If Reynolds’ current sentence constituted punishment for his earlier offense committed at age 17, then it would be unconstitutional under case law. But under the Washington Supreme Court’s more recent precedent, his current sentence did not constitute punishment for that prior offense. In Washington v. Moretti, decided two years after Bassett, the Supreme Court held that a “three strikes” sentence of mandatory life in prison without possibility of parole constituted punishment for the last crime or third “strike,” not the earlier first or second “strikes.” “And for years, we have held that our state’s ‘three strikes’ law as applied to adults does not violate article I, section 14.2 That assessment could certainly change over time. But in this case, the parties have not asked us to overrule it.” The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Reynolds" on Justia Law