Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Steven Yelovich and Faith De Armond dated for more than five years. Relevant to this appeal, Yelovich had an active restraining order against him, prohibiting him from coming near De Armond or having any contact with her. One day Yelovich saw someone through the fence of his son's house as he was moving boxes in the garage; he went to his car and discovered a window had been broken and some contents (including his cell phone) were missing. Yelovich saw De Armond walking down the street and had a hunch she broke the window and took his possessions. Yelovich was aware of the restraining order, but did not believe police would arrive in enough time to recover his phone. He chased her, and a struggle ensued. De Armond was treated for minor injuries; the responding police officer noted De Armond seemed intoxicated at the time of the incident. Yelovich was charged with one count felony violation of the no-contact order predicated on his assault of De Armond, and one count of bail jumping. At trial, he argued he was entitled to a jury instruction on defense of property because he was protecting his cell phone, which he believed De Armond had stolen. Yelovich appealed when the trial court denied his request. The Washington Supreme Court determined an instruction on defense-of-property is not available when there is a valid order prohibiting defendant from contacting the protected party. View "Washington v. Yelovich" on Justia Law

A jury convicted David Ramirez of third degree assault and possession of a controlled substance, and found by special verdict that he committed the assault with sexual motivation and displayed an egregious lack of remorse. After sentencing, Ramirez presented a notice of appeal and a motion for an order of indigency, which the the trial court granted. Prior to imposing his legal financial obligations, the trial court asked only two questions relating to Ramirez' then-current and future ability to pay, both of which were directed to the State. The trial court did not ask Ramirez directly about his ability to pay at any point during sentencing. The Washington Supreme Court found that a trial court has an obligation to conduct an individualized inquiry into a defendant's current and future ability to pay before imposing legal financial obligations at sentencing. An adequate inquiry must include consideration of certain mandatory factors, including the defendant's incarceration and other debts, and the court rule GR34 criteria for indigency. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded this case for the trial court to strike the improperly imposed LFSs from Ramirez's judgment and sentence. View "Washington v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

Adrian Sassen Van Elsloo appealed the dismissal of an impaneled juror excused midtrial because she had a minor connection to an important defense witness. The Washington Supreme Court concluded the trial judge erred by dismissing the juror because there was no evidence the juror was biased. The Court decided as remedy for the erroneous dismissal was to grant defendant a new trial if the dismissal stemmed from the juror's views on the merits of the case. No new trial should be granted if the State could establish the error was harmless. The Court surmised there was a reasonable possibility the juror was dismissed because of her views on the merits of the case, so it granted a new trial. View "Washington v. Sassen Van Elsloo" on Justia Law

Defendants Hai Nguyen and Dominique Norris' cases were consolidated for the Washington Supreme Court's review; the issue they shared was whether the community custody conditions imposed by their respective sentencing courts were sufficiently crime related or unconstitutionally vague. Each case involved a defendant convicted of sexually assaulting a minor. For Nguyen, the sentencing court imposed a condition prohibiting defendant from possessing or viewing sexually explicit material. The Supreme Court determined that condition was not unconstitutionally vague and crime related. For Norris, the sentencing court imposed conditions requiring defendant to inform community corrections officers of any "dating relationship" and prohibited defendant from entering any "sex-related business." The Supreme Court determined the dating condition was unconstitutionally vague but that the sex-related business condition was crime related. View "Washington v. Nguyen" on Justia Law

The Washington civil forfeiture statute allows law enforcement agencies to seize and take ownership of property that had a sufficient factual nexus to certain controlled substance violations; if law enforcement cannot prove the forfeiture is authorized, the claimant would be entitled to have the property returned and receive reasonable attorneys' fees incurred to get the property back. This case presented two issues of first impression for the Washington Supreme Court regarding the attorney fee provision of the statute: (1) who qualifies as a claimant when the property at issue is owned by a corporation; and (2) is a substantially prevailing claimant's fee award strictly limited to fees incurred in the forfeiture proceeding itself? The Court held: (1) a corporate shareholder who did not file a claim in the forfeiture case is not a claimant and cannot recover fees pursuant to the statute's plain language; and (2) the award is not strictly limited to fees incurred in the forfeiture proceeding itself - the statute gives courts discretion to award fees from the related criminal case if reasonably incurred for the primary purpose of resisting the forfeiture. View "Olympic Peninsula Narcotics Enf't Team v. Junction City Lots 1 through 12 Inclusive" on Justia Law

Sixteen-year-old Tyler Watkins was charged with first degree burglary as an adult. The former RCW 13.04.030(1) (2009) provided that juvenile courts had to automatically decline jurisdiction over 16- and 17-year-olds charged with certain offenses. Watkins argued his due process rights were violated because the automatic decline component of the statute applied without him first having a hearing on whether the juvenile court should have retained jurisdiction. The Washington Supreme Court held the automatic decline did not violate due process because juveniles did not have a constitutional right to be tried in juvenile court. View "Washington v. Watkins" on Justia Law

Kenneth Linville, Jr. was charged with leading a wave of burglaries throughout Thurston County, Washington. The State charged Linville with one count of "leading organized crime," in addition to 137 other offenses. Some of those 127 were listed in RCW 9A.82.010(4) as predicate offenses, which when combined, formed the requisite "pattern of criminal profiteering" on which "leading organized crime" was based. Some of the 127 were not listed in the statute as predicate crimes at all. The issue for the Washington Supreme Court's contemplation was whether the "joinder bar" rule of RCW 9A.80.085, permitted both predicate and nonpredicate crimes to be joined in a single "leading organized crime" information. Linville argued the State was barred from joining charges outside of the predicated offenses listed in RCW 9A.82.010(4). Linville also argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not move to sever the unlisted offenses. The Supreme Court determined the Criminal Profiteering Act supported Linville's interpretation. However, the Court did not find Linville showed counsel was ineffective for choosing to defend against these crimes in one prosecution rather than several. The Court reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Linville" on Justia Law

After unsuccessfully representing himself at trial, Jerome Curry Jr. appealed his drug convictions to the Court of Appeals, challenging the trial court's decision to allow Curry to represent himself. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court should not have granted Curry's request to proceed pro se. The State appealed. Before the Washington Supreme Court could determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Curry's request for self-representation, it first had to determine whether Curry's request to represent himself was unequivocal. The Court held that it was, therefore reversing the Court of Appeals and remanding to the appellate court to resolve the remaining outstanding issues. View "Washington v. Curry" on Justia Law

Robert Tyler challenged his conviction for possessing a stolen vehicle. He contended the State was required to prove he engaged in all the actions that constitute "possession" of a stolen vehicle because these were listed in the to-convict jury instruction. Further arguing that the evidence is insufficient to prove he "disposed of a stolen vehicle, Tyler contended his conviction had to be reversed and the case dismissed with prejudice. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed Tyler's conviction, although on different grounds than those relied on by the Court of Appeals, which viewed the jury instructions as setting alternative means of possessing stolen property, which became the “law of the case” under Washington v. Hickman, 954 P.2d 900 (1998). The appellate court held Hickman was abrogated by Musacchio v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 709 (2016). The Washington Supreme Court determined that was error in light of the Washington Court’s decision in Washington v. Johnson, 399 P.3d 507 (2017). In Johnson, the Washington Court confirmed Hickman remained good law. Because it was undisputed that the evidence established possession, the jury's verdict stood, and the Court affirmed Tyler's conviction. View "State v. Tyler" on Justia Law

In 2006, William Schorr pled guilty to first degree murder, first degree robbery, second degree arson, and first degree theft. Eleven years later, he filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) challenging the convictions of both first degree murder and first degree robbery on double jeopardy grounds. The Court of Appeals dismissed the PRP as untimely and treated the double jeopardy claim as waived. The Washington Supreme Court adhered to its decisions in prior cases holding that challenges to sentences that exceed the court's authority (like the double jeopardy challenge to the sentence in this case) cannot be waived. The Supreme Court also reaffirmed that double jeopardy claims were exempt from the one- year time bar on collateral challenges. Schorr's simultaneous convictions of first degree murder and first degree robbery did not violate double jeopardy clause protections: even though first degree felony murder predicated on first degree robbery would merge with the first degree robbery on which it is predicated, that was not the only means of first degree murder to which Schorr pleaded guilty. He also pleaded guilty to the alternative means of premeditated murder. “A first degree robbery conviction certainly does not merge with a first degree premeditated murder conviction.” The Supreme Court therefore dismissed Schorr’s personal restraint petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Schorr" on Justia Law