Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In the State of Washington, a man named Mitchell Heng was charged with murder, arson, and robbery. He was brought before a judge for a preliminary hearing without counsel, during which the judge set bail among other things. Heng argued that counsel should have been present at this hearing. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington agreed, noting that a person charged with a crime has a right to counsel under the state and federal constitutions and under court rules. However, the court found that Heng did not demonstrate that the hearing was a critical stage of the prosecution, and it believed that the absence of counsel did not contribute to the verdict. Consequently, the court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts.The facts of the case reveal that Heng was implicated in a robbery at Sifton Market during which Amy Hooser was killed. Surveillance footage showed Heng at the scene with a blood-stained shirt and a lighter in his hands. He was charged the next day with first degree murder, first degree robbery, and first degree arson. Heng was held in jail for 31 months before his trial, during which time he made inconsistent statements during recorded phone calls about the events of the night of the crime. He was eventually convicted of first degree murder and first degree arson and was sentenced to 374 months in prison.Heng appealed his conviction, arguing that his right to counsel had been violated at a critical stage of the prosecution. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that while Heng should have had counsel present at his preliminary hearing, this did not constitute a critical stage of the prosecution. The court also noted that in order for an error to be considered structural and thus necessitate automatic reversal, it must have substantively affected the outcome of the case. The court determined that Heng’s case was not demonstrably affected by his counsel’s absence. As such, the court applied constitutional harmless error analysis, which requires the court to reverse unless it is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. The court concluded that the failure to have counsel present at Heng’s preliminary hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. View "State v. Heng" on Justia Law

Michael Shawn Charlton was arrested and charged with third-degree child rape, third-degree child molestation, and indecent liberties. He appeared in preliminary hearings without counsel, which he argued on appeal was a denial of his constitutional right to counsel at critical stages of the prosecution. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that while the absence of counsel was indeed a constitutional error, it did not constitute a critical stage of litigation requiring automatic reversal. The court reasoned that nothing in the record suggested that Charlton's rights were lost, defenses were waived, privileges were claimed or waived, or that the outcome of the case was otherwise substantially affected by the absence of counsel. Furthermore, the court concluded that any error in not having counsel present was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This is because there was no evidence to suggest that the lack of counsel affected the verdict in any way. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "State v. Charlton" on Justia Law

In a prior case before the Washington Supreme Court, the Court rejected Petitioner Amanda Knight’s claim her separate convictions for felony murder (based on first-degree robbery) and first degree robbery violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. Double jeopardy did not apply because Knight’s felony murder and robbery convictions were premised on different conduct: the felony murder charge was based on the robbery of a safe whereas the first degree robbery was based on the robbery of a ring. Knight moved for reconsideration and that petition was denied. Here, Knight argued that given the Court’s previous holding, her conviction for felony murder had to be reversed because the jury was presented with insufficient evidence to justify a conviction for robbery of the safe. The Supreme Court concluded the basis for the felony murder conviction could not be sustained, granted Knight’s petition for relief, vacated the felony murder conviction and remanded for resentencing. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Knight" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Respondent Vanessa Valdiglesias LaValle of two counts of criminal solicitation after she told her minor son, S.G., that he could be with her “forever” if he poisoned his father. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the ground that Valdiglesias LaValle’s offer to live with S.G. “forever” if S.G. killed his father did not constitute a “thing of value” within the meaning of RCW 9A.28.030(1). The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court held the plain meaning of “money or other thing of value” in RCW 9A.28.030(1) unambiguously included both money and things that were not money but that, like money, possessed utility, desirability, significance, and/or economic value. "Nothing in the plain language or context of the statute indicates that 'other thing of value' must be limited to things with a traditional economic or market value." View "Washington v. Valdiglesias LaValle" on Justia Law

Respondent John McWhorter pleaded guilty in adult court to crimes he committed when he was a juvenile. He later moved for resentencing to enable the trial court to consider the mitigating qualities of his youth. The superior court granted the motion for a resentencing hearing, and the State appealed this order to the Court of Appeals. That court ruled that the superior court’s order was not appealable by the State, so it dismissed the appeal. The State filed a petition for review to the Washington Supreme Court, who reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to that court to consider the State’s appeal. View "Washington v. McWhorter" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dominique Avington argued his own trial testimony was sufficient to require a lesser included offense instruction for the shooting death of Terrance King. Specifically, Avington testified that although he fired his gun, he was not aiming directly at anyone, and he argued that his credibility should have been determined by the jury. The undisputed evidence at trial showed that the bullet that killed King did not come from Avington’s gun. As a result, Avington’s testimony about the direction of his aim did not create a question of fact for the jury as to whether he participated in King’s death under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court was whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it declined to instruct the jury on first degree manslaughter as a lesser included offense of first degree murder by extreme indifference. Consistent with Washington v. Coryell, 483 P.3d 98 (2021), the answer was yes. "The record shows that the trial court carefully reviewed all of the evidence admitted at trial in light of the charged offenses, properly instructed the jury on accomplice liability, and properly exercised its discretion in declining to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense of first degree manslaughter." View "Washington v. Avington" on Justia Law

Michael Reynolds Jr. received a mandatory sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole for a crime he committed at age 33. The events triggering that sentence, though, were his two “strikes” under Washington’s “three strikes” law—one of which Reynolds committed at age 17, when he was a juvenile. If Reynolds’ current sentence constituted punishment for his earlier offense committed at age 17, then it would be unconstitutional under case law. But under the Washington Supreme Court’s more recent precedent, his current sentence did not constitute punishment for that prior offense. In Washington v. Moretti, decided two years after Bassett, the Supreme Court held that a “three strikes” sentence of mandatory life in prison without possibility of parole constituted punishment for the last crime or third “strike,” not the earlier first or second “strikes.” “And for years, we have held that our state’s ‘three strikes’ law as applied to adults does not violate article I, section 14.2 That assessment could certainly change over time. But in this case, the parties have not asked us to overrule it.” The Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Dahndre Westwood entered A.B.’s house around 4:30 a.m. A.B. saw Westwood standing in her hallway and holding a knife in his hand. Westwood told her to get undressed and threatened to kill her if she did not cooperate. A.B. screamed for help and pleaded for her life; she clawed at Westwood and knocked the knife out of his hand. During the struggle, Westwood nicked A.B. with the knife, leaving a scar on her cheek. Westwood choked and suffocated A.B. to muffle her screams for help and hit her repeatedly on the head. Several cars passed A.B.’s house while this transpired, and the headlights shone in the window. Westwood stopped his assault after the second or third set of headlights passed. He threatened A.B. that if she told anyone about the assault he would come back to kill her. Westwood then ran into the living room and out the front door. A.B. called 911 and was taken to the hospital by first responders shortly after. A jury convicted Westwood of attempted rape in the first degree, assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, and burglary in the first degree. At sentencing, Westwood argued that his convictions encompassed the same criminal conduct for scoring purposes. The State disagreed and asked the court to apply the analysis from Washington v. Chenoweth, 370 P.3d 6 (2016). The trial court determined that the three convictions did not constitute the same criminal conduct because each of the crimes required a different statutory intent. Westwood appealed, arguing that Washington v. Dunaway, 743 P.2d 1237, 749 P.2d 160 (1987) controlled. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for determination of whether the convictions encompassed the same criminal conduct under the analysis of Dunaway. Some lower courts found conflict between the analysis in Dunaway and that in Chenoweth. The Washington Supreme Court took the opportunity to provide guidance on the relationship between these cases and found no conflict existed. Here, the objective statutory intent analysis was the proper test. The Court affirmed the sentencing court’s decision and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Westwood" on Justia Law

Respondent Peter Ansell was serving an indeterminate life sentence in community custody. The Indeterminate Sentencing Review Board (ISRB) sought review of a Court of Appeals decision invalidating certain community custody conditions. After review, the Washington Supreme Court concluded the conditions relating to sexually explicit materials, dating, and relationships were not unconstitutionally vague. However, the Court determined the ISRB exceeded its authority in imposing the cannabis condition, to which the ISRB conceded was not related to Ansell’s crimes. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Ansell" on Justia Law

Petitioner Paul Rivers, a Black man, was convicted on two criminal charges in King County, Washington by a jury drawn from a panel that lacked any Black potential jurors. Rivers argued this venire, as well as certain aspects of the King County jury selection system that produced this venire, violated his state and federal fair cross section rights. “No one in this case disputes that jury diversity is lacking in Washington and that more can and must be done to promote juror diversity statewide.” Because Rivers did not show that the Washington Constitution required the heightened test he proposed for assessing fair cross section claims, the Court analyzed his claim using the existing Sixth Amendment framework, and that Rivers’ venire and King County’s jury selection system satisfied constitutional minimums. The case was remanded for resentencing, because the Court found Rivers was entitled to the benefit of RCW 9.94A.647, which no longer allowed a persistent offender life sentence based on prior second-degree robbery convictions. View "Washington v. Rivers" on Justia Law