Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

At Gary Meredith's trial, the trial court mistakenly gave the State and defense counsel one less peremptory challenge than they were entitled to under CrR 6.4(e)(1) and CrR 6.5. Meredith claimed his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the peremptory challenge violation on direct review. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals agreed with Meredith, reversing his convictions and remanding for a new trial. However, under RAP 2.5(a), the appellate court could have refused to hear the claim of error because it was not objected to at trial and it is not a type of structural error that requires automatic reversal. Thus, the Washington Supreme Court held Meredith's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise that claim of error. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Meredith" on Justia Law

Kevin Light-Roth was convicted of second degree murder in 2004, and the trial court sentenced him to 335 months' confinement. In an untimely personal restraint petition (PRP), Light-Roth argued Washington v. O'Dell, 358 P.3d 359 (2015), constituted a significant and material change in the law that applied retroactively to his sentence, excepting him from RCW 10.73.100’s time bar. The Court of Appeals granted Light-Roth's PRP and remanded for resentencing. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that O'Dell did not provide an exception to the time bar. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Light-Roth" on Justia Law

This case concerns the admissibility of expert testimony about whether the subject individual suffers from a mental abnormality. In 2011, the State filed a petition to civilly commit 40-year-old Mark Black as an sexually violent predator (SVP) prior to his scheduled release from prison. In support of its petition, the State included the evaluation of Dr. Dale Arnold, who diagnosed Black with sexual sadism; paraphilia NOS, persistent sexual interest in pubescent aged females, nonexclusive; and personality disorder NOS with antisocial and narcissistic characteristics. Prior to trial. Black moved to exclude evidence of hebephilia and paraphilia NOS, persistent sexual interest in pubescent aged females, arguing that hebephilia is inadmissible pursuant to Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46 (1923). The trial court excluded the expert testimony regarding "hebephilia" on the basis that such a diagnosis was not generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. The parties did not challenge that portion of the court's decision. However, Black argued the court committed reversible error by allowing expert testimony on a diagnosis of "paraphilia not otherwise specified (NOS), persistent sexual interest in pubescent aged females, non-exclusive." The Court of Appeals affirmed Black's civil commitment in an unpublished opinion. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals on different grounds and held that the trial court did not err as a matter of law when it admitted expert testimony on paraphilia NOS, nor did it abuse its discretion when it allowed an expert to describe Black's specific paraphilic focus as "persistent sexual interest in pubescent aged females." View "In re Det. of Black" on Justia Law

This case concerned the statutory interpretation of the portion of RCW 9.41.040 dealing with the requirements for restoration of firearm rights. In 1991, Edgar Dennis, III was convicted of second degree robbery, third degree assault and two counts of felony violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, chapter 69.50 RCW. In 1998, Dennis was convicted on third degree assault. The 1991 convictions disqualified him from possessing a firearm. After serving his sentence, he lived in the community for over fifteen years without a conviction. Then in 2014, he was convicted of misdemeanor first degree negligent driving. In 2016, Dennis petitioned for restoration of his firearm rights without disclosing the 2014 conviction. The State objected, informing the trial court of the 2014 conviction. The State argued the statutory requirement of a five-year conviction-free period had to immediately precede a petition for restoration. The superior court denied the petition. In moving for reconsideration, Dennis argued the trial court erred by not following the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the statute that any conviction-free five-year period satisfies the requirement. The Washington Supreme Court agreed that any five-year conviction-free period satisfied the requirement for eligibility to petition for restoration of firearm rights. View "Washington v. Dennis" on Justia Law

Washington State charged Christopher Blair with one count of theft of a motor vehicle, a Ford truck, that Blair purportedly stole in October 2011. Pursuant to that charge, he entered a drug court personal recovery program. Blair was terminated from the program in 2015. According to the record, Blair had five prior felony convictions in Washington, including second degree theft, second degree burglary, possession of a stolen vehicle, and two counts of theft of a motor vehicle at issue here. At sentencing, Blair argued for a "downward departure[from] the standard range" sought by the State and requested an exceptional sentence. Blair argued that although he had pleaded guilty to two counts of theft of a motor vehicle, both of those vehicles were snowmobiles, and therefore not "motor vehicles" as contemplated by RCW 9A.56.065. Blair asserted that his plea to the two counts were accordingly facially invalid. The Washington Supreme Court concluded Dennis should have alleged a constitutional defect of once of his prior convictions to challenge that conviction's validity for purposes of offender score calculation in an otherwise unrelated proceeding. The trial court declined to engage in statutory construction here and counted the two prior convictions at issue here for taking a motor vehicle. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court, and the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Blair" on Justia Law

Matthew Schley was sentenced under the a drug offender sentencing alternative (DOSA) after pleading guilty to first degree theft and second degree burglary. He was sentenced to 29.75 months of incarceration with chemical dependency treatment services, and 29.75 months of community custody that included a substance abuse treatment program. The DOSA statute provided that if a DOSA recipient fails to complete the treatment program or is administratively terminated from the program, the Department of Corrections shall revoke the DOSA. If revoked, the term of community custody is struck and the offender would serve the remainder of his or her sentence in prison. One week in, Schley received a fighting infraction, which set the stage for his DOSA revocation. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on what evidentiary standard due process requires when revoking that sentence. Schley filed a personal restraint petition alleging the DOSA revocation hearing violated his due process rights because the Department failed to prove the fighting infraction by the higher proof standard required at revocation hearings, preponderance of the evidence. The Court of Appeals granted relief, holding that a DOSA revocation indeed must be proved by a preponderance. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the appellate court. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Schley" on Justia Law

Joaquin Garcia was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm (UPFA) in the first degree. He moved for dismissal, arguing that the predicate offense was invalid because the convicting court did not notify him of his ineligibility to possess firearms. The trial court dismissed the charge, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Garcia had "otherwise had actual knowledge" of the firearm prohibition. This case presented two issues for the Washington Supreme Court’s review: (1) whether the trial court properly dismissed the UPFA charge on the basis that Garcia was not advised of the firearm prohibition flowing from Garcia's conviction at the time of his conviction, despite his later acquired knowledge that he was prohibited from possessing firearms; and (2) whether pretrial dismissal of a UPFA charge was proper where a defendant was not given notice of the firearm prohibition. The Court held that Garcia had "otherwise acquired actual knowledge" of his ineligibility to possess firearms, and whether a defendant received statutory notice that he was prohibited from possessing a firearm may properly be resolved pretrial. View "Washington v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on the pattern jury instruction on attempted first-degree robbery. Petitioner Edward Nelson argued the State had to prove that the employee he attempted to rob had ownership, representative or possessory interest in the property. Specifically, he argued the "essential element" of representative or possessory interest should have been included in the "to convict" instruction to the jury. The Court of Appeal agreed this essential element was missing, but that the error was harmless. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the outcome of the appellate court's decision, finding that the "to convict" instruction in this case was constitutionally adequate. View "Washington v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Michael Murray appealed his exceptional sentence for three counts of indecent exposure. His appeal raised two questions for the Washington Supreme Court’s review: (1) whether the sexual motivation aggravator, RCW 9.94A.535(3)(f), could apply to the crime of indecent exposure, RCW 9A.88.010; and (2) whether the rapid recidivism aggravator, ROW 9.94A.535(3)(t), was void for vagueness as applied to Murray. The Court held that because indecent exposure lacked an inherent sexual motive, the sexual motivation aggravator could apply. Second, because a reasonable person would not have to guess that reoffending 16 days after being released from jail is "shortly after," the Court held the rapid recidivism aggravator was not void for vagueness as applied to Murray. View "Washington v. Murray" on Justia Law

This case addressed the adequacy of the parole remedy available under RCW 9.94A.730, the Miller "fix" statute. Jai'Mar Scott was convicted by a jury in 1990 of first degree premeditated murder for killing his neighbor, a 78-year-old-woman who suffered from Alzheimer's disease. Scott was 17 years old when he committed the murder. The juvenile court declined jurisdiction, and Scott was tried, convicted, and sentenced as an adult. At sentencing, the parties agreed that the standard range was 240 to 320 months, with 240 months being the mandatory minimum sentence that could be imposed. The State requested an exceptional sentence above the standard range. The defense requested the low end of the standard range. The trial court sentenced Scott to an exceptional sentence of 900 months based on four independent findings: (1) that Scott's conduct constituted deliberate cruelty, (2) that his conduct was an abuse of trust, (3) that the crime involved multiple injuries, and (4) that the victim was particularly vulnerable. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the 900-month sentence imposed was not clearly excessive because the "aggravating factors are both numerous and individually and collectively egregious." The Court of Appeals also rejected Scott's assertion that his exceptional sentence was improper in light of his youth at the time of the crime. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed: consistent with the federal Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), the Washington Court held that RCW 9.94A.730's parole provision was an adequate remedy for a Miller violation, rendering unnecessary the resentencing of a defendant who long ago received a de facto life sentence as a juvenile. View "Washington v. Scott" on Justia Law