Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Jameel Padilla was convicted for communicating with a minor for immoral purposes. At issue was Padilla's community custody condition prohibiting him from "possess[ing] or access[ing] pornographic materials, as directed by his supervising Community Corrections Officer" (CCO). Padilla argued the condition and its accompanying definition of "pornographic materials" were unconstitutionally vague. Although the condition included a definition of "pornographic materials," the Washington Supreme Court determined the definition itself was vague and overbroad. “A condition cannot be saved from a vagueness challenge merely because it contains a definition when that definition itself suffers the same weakness. Moreover, an overbroad definition does not sufficiently put the offender on notice of what materials are prohibited and subjects him to possible arbitrary enforcement.” The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision upholding the condition and remand to the trial court for further definition of the term "pornographic materials" following a determination of whether the restriction was narrowly tailored based on Padilla's conviction. View "Washington v. Padilla" on Justia Law

Hollis Blockman was charged with and convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver within 1,000 feet of a school bus stop. Blockman was discovered in Patricia Burton's apartment during a protective sweep by police, which Burton consented to, in response to a report of an assault and robbery committed in the apartment by Burton and two men. On appeal. Blockman contended the sweep exceeded the scope of the "protective sweep" exception to the warrant requirement under Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), and therefore the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered in the course of the protective sweep. The Washington Supreme Court found that because Burton's unchallenged consent fit within the consent exception to the warrant requirement, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. View "Washington v. Blockman" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Robert James of second degree rape. James timely filed a personal restraint petition with supporting documents. The acting chief judge of Division Two of the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition as frivolous, and the Washington Supreme Court's commissioner denied James's motion for discretionary review. Based on the evidence included in James's pleadings and the State's subsequent statements, the Supreme Court granted James's motion to modify the commissioner's ruling, grant discretionary review, and remand to the Court of Appeals for further consideration. “The acting chief judge likely was correct in determining that the majority of James's claims for relief are frivolous, but James's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel's failure to understand the DNA evidence may not be frivolous, and it is not clear that the evidence presented and the State's statements regarding a plea offer were fully considered below.” View "In re Pers. Restraint of James" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether the duration of a domestic violence (DV) no-contact order entered by a court of limited jurisdiction was limited to the length of the underlying suspended sentence. A jury convicted Wendy Granath in King County District Court of two gross misdemeanor DV crimes - cyberstalking and violation of a DV no-contact order -based on e-mails she sent to her estranged husband. The judge did not enter an expiration date, and so, by the terms of the pattern form order, it expired by default five years later. Granath completed her sentence in December 2014. She thereafter moved to vacate the no-contact order on the basis that it ended when she was no longer subject to the underlying no-contact condition of the sentence. The State appealed the published Court of Appeals decision that vacated the no-contact order and held that the district court lacked authority pursuant to RCW 10.99.050 to enter a no-contact order exceeding the duration of the underlying sentence. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that RCW 10.99.050 authorized a district court to issue a DV no-contact order that lasts for the duration of the defendant's suspended sentence. The no-contact order issued in this case was not enforceable after Granath completed her suspended sentence in December 2014, and the district court should have granted her motion to vacate. View "Washington v. Granath" on Justia Law

Teacher Tanya James-Buhl was charged with failure to comply with the mandatory reporting law that requires specified professionals to report incidents of child abuse when they have reasonable cause to believe a child has suffered abuse or neglect. James-Buhl received notice of child abuse from her three daughters alleging that they were being touched inappropriately within the home by their stepfather, but she did not make an immediate report. At issue is whether James-Buhl's employment status as a teacher required her to report the alleged abuse of her own children, who were not her students, when the abuse occurred within the home and was perpetrated by another family member. The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that a teacher's failure to comply with the mandatory reporting duty must have some connection to his or her professional identity. View "Washington v. James-Buhl" on Justia Law

Evan Bacon, a juvenile, pleaded guilty to second degree robbery and received a suspended disposition. The State challenged the juvenile court's authority to enter such a disposition, arguing that the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (JJA), chapter 13.40 RCW, does not give trial courts the statutory authority to suspend juvenile dispositions (except in specific situations that are absent here). The Court of Appeals agreed, and so did the Washington Supreme Court. The Court therefore affirmed, holding that juvenile court judges lack statutory authority to suspend JJA dispositions, even manifest injustice JJA dispositions, unless the disposition fits under one of the specifically listed exemptions in RCW 13.40.160(10). View "Washington v. Bacon" on Justia Law

Conner Schierman was convicted of four counts of aggravated first degree murder and sentenced to death. He appealed his convictions and sentences on multiple grounds. Schierman was convicted for the 2006 stabbing deaths of members of the Milkin family; he was also charged with the first-degree arson of their house. The Washington Supreme Court reviewed all of Schierman’s challenges to trial and his death sentence. The Court affirmed all convictions; a majority of the Court rejected Schierman's challenges to his death sentence. View "Washington v. Schierman" on Justia Law

Justin Vanhollebeke drove his truck the wrong way down a one-way street. An officer stopped him. Vanhollebeke ignored the officer's command to stay in the vehicle, got out and locked the vehicle behind him, left a punched out ignition and apparent drug paraphernalia behind in plain view of the police, and had no key. The police asked Vanhollebeke for consent to search the vehicle. Vanhollebeke refused. A police officer then contacted the truck's owner, received the absent owner's consent and a key to search, and then returned to search the vehicle. Vanhollebeke was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm found in the truck, and he challenged the legality of the vehicle search. Vanhollebeke moved to suppress evidence found in the vehicle, citing his refusal at the scene and the officer’s subsequent search of the vehicle as a violation of his Constitutional rights. The officer lacked a warrant; the State relied instead on the consent of the owner as an exception to the warrant requirement. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held the present driver's refusal to consent to the search of his or her vehicle generally had to be respected. But where, as here, circumstances like a punched out ignition and a driver with no key raises a significant question about whether the driver had any legitimate claim to the vehicle at all, the police could contact the absent owner and get that owner's consent to search instead. View "Washington v. Vanhollebeke" on Justia Law

Justin Vanhollebeke drove his truck the wrong way down a one-way street. An officer stopped him. Vanhollebeke ignored the officer's command to stay in the vehicle, got out and locked the vehicle behind him, left a punched out ignition and apparent drug paraphernalia behind in plain view of the police, and had no key. The police asked Vanhollebeke for consent to search the vehicle. Vanhollebeke refused. A police officer then contacted the truck's owner, received the absent owner's consent and a key to search, and then returned to search the vehicle. Vanhollebeke was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm found in the truck, and he challenged the legality of the vehicle search. Vanhollebeke moved to suppress evidence found in the vehicle, citing his refusal at the scene and the officer’s subsequent search of the vehicle as a violation of his Constitutional rights. The officer lacked a warrant; the State relied instead on the consent of the owner as an exception to the warrant requirement. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held the present driver's refusal to consent to the search of his or her vehicle generally had to be respected. But where, as here, circumstances like a punched out ignition and a driver with no key raises a significant question about whether the driver had any legitimate claim to the vehicle at all, the police could contact the absent owner and get that owner's consent to search instead. View "Washington v. Vanhollebeke" on Justia Law

The issue in this case was whether there were any limitations on the scope of a community corrections officer’s search. “It is well established that an individual on probation has a reduced expectation of privacy, and a community corrections officer (CCO) may conduct a warrantless search if he or she suspects the individual has violated a probation condition.” The Washington Supreme Court held article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution required a nexus between the property searched and the suspected probation violation. There was no nexus in the search at issue here. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and petitioner Curtis Cornwell’s convictions. View "Washington v. Cornwell" on Justia Law