Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Juvenile defendant Trey M. challenged his three convictions for felony harassment under RCW 9A.46.020. The Court of Appeals certified the issue to the Washington Supreme Court of whether the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Elonis v. United States," (135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015)) had any impact on the Washington Court's "reasonable person standard" for what constituted a "true threat" under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Washington Supreme Court held that because "Elonis" expressly avoided any First Amendment analysis, it provided no basis for the Court to abandon its established First Amendment precedent. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Trey M." on Justia Law

Kenneth Slert was convicted three times of killing John Benson. His first two convictions were reversed on appeal. Potential jurors in his third trial were given an initial written questionnaire in an attempt to determine whether any knew of Slert's prior convictions. Based on the written answers and after a discussion in chambers and out of Slert's presence, four jurors were dismissed. For the first time on appeal, Slert challenged his conviction on the grounds that the discussion in chambers violated his right to be present at a critical stage of his own trial. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Slert waived his right to raise his exclusion from the in chambers discussion by not raising it at trial. The Court also concluded that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as it was clear the dismissed jurors had disqualifying knowledge of Slert's prior convictions or held disqualifying opinions about his guilt. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed his conviction. View "Washington v. Slert" on Justia Law

Jerry Swagerty raped a child in 2004, but he was not identified until DNA tests were done in 2012. Swagerty was charged well within the relevant statutes of limitations with first degree rape of a child and first degree child molestation. Because of his criminal history, he faced a life sentence if convicted as charged. In order to avoid a life sentence, Swagerty pleaded guilty to four lesser offenses in 2013. However, the statute of limitations had run on three of the amended charges. Swagerty sought to vacate those three convictions and be resentenced only on the one remaining charge. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant may expressly waive an expired statute of limitations on lesser charges during plea negotiations to take advantage of a favorable plea offer. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and remanded this case back to the trial court with direction to allow Swagerty a choice of two options: (1) he could withdraw his personal restraint petition (effectively keeping to the plea bargain he made); or (2) he could keep the victory he won at the Court of Appeals and move to vacate the 2013 judgment and sentence, and the State would have the opportunity to refile the original charges. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Swagerty" on Justia Law

In this personal restraint petition (PRP), the petitioner Bobby Colbert challenged his 2005 conviction for second degree rape, arguing the Washington Supreme Court's decision in "Washington v. W.R.," (336 P.3d 1134 (2014)), which held that instructing the jury that the defendant bears the burden to establish the victim's consent was error, should apply retroactively, and to his case. He argued: (1) that his PRP overcame the one-year time limit under chapter 10.73 RCW because the decision in "W.R." either involved statutory interpretation exempt from the time bar; or (2) was a significant change in the law material to his conviction that required retroactive application. The Court held that W.R. did not apply retroactively and denied the petition as time barred. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Colbert" on Justia Law

In "Taggert v. Washington," (822 P.2d 243 (1992)), the Washington Supreme Court held that the State could be held liable for crimes committed by parolees if those crimes resulted from the State's negligence in supervising the parolees. Plaintiffs asked the Court to extend "Taggert" to hold that a county jail could be held liable for crimes committed by a former inmate. The crimes at issue in this matter were committed well after the inmate served his time, and long after the county had any duty (or ability) to supervise him. The former inmate in this case was incarcerated for nonviolent crimes, and released approximately one year later. Shortly after release, the former inmate had a psychotic episode and went on a shooting spree, killing six people and injuring several others. Some of his victims and their families (plaintiffs) sued a number of parties, thus implicating the "Taggert" holding. Plaintiffs argued that the jail could have prevented the inmate from committing crimes after he was released, but the Court concluded a jail's duty to supervise and control inmates during incarceration did not include a general duty to somehow prevent inmates from committing crimes after they are lawfully released from incarceration. The Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment order in favor of Skagit County. View "Binschus v. Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the circumstances officers making a lawful arrest may seize a companion of the arrestee in the absence of reasonable suspicion to independently justify a "Terri" stop of the companion. The Court held that where officers have an objective rationale predicated on safety concerns to seize a companion to secure the scene of the arrest, article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution allowed for the seizure, so long as it remained reasonable in scope and duration. Based on this holding, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that evidence of a gun taken from respondent Cody Flores during his brief seizure should not have been suppressed. View "Washington v. Flores" on Justia Law

Petitioner Michael Goss argued that the charging document the State used to accuse him of second degree child molestation failed to pass constitutional muster because it violated his right to know the "nature and cause of the accusation" made against him, and failed to give notice of every fact that increased any penalties he faced. Specifically, Goss contended the State's charging document failed to allege that the victim was "at least twelve years old," the lower limit of the age range for that degree of the crime. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the fact that the victim was "at least twelve years old" was not an essential element of second degree child molestation, and that Goss had notice of every fact that exposed him to a greater penalty. View "Washington v. Goss" on Justia Law

Petitioner Adrian Sutlej Samalia fled on foot from a stolen car during a lawful traffic stop, leaving his cell phone behind in the vehicle. After Samalia successfully escaped, the police searched the cell phone without a warrant and made contact with one of the numbers stored in the cell phone. That contact led to Samalia's identification as the owner of the phone and driver of the stolen vehicle. The State used this evidence against Samalia at trial. Samalia contends that his right to be free from unreasonable searches was violated when the State introduced the identification evidence derived from the search of his cell phone. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held that although Samalia initially had a constitutionally protected privacy interest in the cell phone and its data, he abandoned that interest when he voluntarily left the cell phone in a stolen vehicle while fleeing from a lawful traffic stop. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Samalia" on Justia Law

A city of Lakewood police officer saw petitioner Robert Willis walk into the traffic lanes at Interstate 5's (I-5) northbound exit ramp on Gravelly Lake Drive. Willis carried a sign saying he was disabled and needed help. The officer issued Willis a criminal citation, not for walking into the traffic lane, blocking traffic, or disrupting pedestrian or vehicle progress, but for begging. Willis raised several challenges to the anti-begging ordinance under which he was charged (and later convicted). After review, the Washington Supreme Court found that Willis could challenge LMC 9A.04.020A(1) and (2) as facially overbroad regardless of his own conduct when cited. Because both provisions imposed a content-based speech restriction in a substantial number of traditional public forums, Willis' facial challenge succeeds. Thus, his conviction was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "City of Lakewood v. Willis" on Justia Law

Two police officers were dispatched to defendant Sayiden Mohamed's residence to follow up on several 911 hang-up calls that had originated from the house. Upon speaking with him, the officers observed that defendant was intoxicated but determined that no further action was needed. Shortly after ending the initial contact, the officers received information that there was an outstanding warrant for the defendant's arrest. When the officers returned to carry out the arrest, the defendant became hostile and belligerent and resisted the officers' attempts to place him in the patrol car. While the officers were in the process of forcibly subduing him until backup arrived, defendant spit in both of the officers' faces. He continued to spit at the officers even after a spit mask was placed over his head. Once defendant was restrained, the officers were able to place him in the patrol car and take him to jail. Defendant was charged with two counts of third degree assault for spitting on the arresting officers. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether it was permissible to impeach a hearsay declarant with his or her prior convictions under certain circumstances. In this case, defendant did not testify and his own out-of-court statements were admitted into evidence through his expert witness' testimony. Defense counsel expressly declined a limiting instruction offered by the trial court regarding the purpose of defendant's statements. The State then cross-examined the expert witness with the defendant's previously admitted prior convictions pursuant to ER 806. Defendant contended that his out-of-court statements were not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, barring impeachment pursuant to ER 806. Because defense counsel declined an instruction that would have limited the evidence to its proper purpose, the Supreme Court held that the statements were also offered for their truth and that impeachment of the defendant's credibility was therefore permissible pursuant to ER 806. Consequently, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the convictions. View "Washington v. Mohamed" on Justia Law