Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Andrea Rich of driving under the influence (DUI) and reckless endangerment. The evidence showed that Rich was speeding in traffic while highly intoxicated and with a young child in the front passenger seat. But the officer who arrested Rich followed her car because he believed that the car was stolen. Rich's manner of driving posed no observable danger. The Court of Appeals reversed the reckless endangerment conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Rich's driving created an actual, substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person. The Court of Appeals ruled, on an issue of first impression, that proof of a DUI does not necessarily establish proof of reckless endangerment. The Supreme Court agreed that proof of DUI alone did not necessarily establish proof of reckless endangerment. However, the Court found that a reasonable juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Rich created a substantial risk of death or injury to her passenger, knew of that risk and disregarded it. The Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed on the reckless endangerment conviction. View "Washington v. Rich" on Justia Law

Seattle Police Officer Michael Conners stopped a vehicle driven by Wayne Evans for speeding in the Central District of Seattle. As Conners approached Evans's vehicle, he observed furtive movements from Evans and his passenger, and smelled marijuana. Conners directed Evans to exit the vehicle and asked him whether he had any weapons. Evans responded that there was a knife in his pocket. Conners instructed Evans not to reach for the knife; Conners then reached into Evans's front right pocket, retrieved a fixed-blade knife with a black handle, and placed Evans under arrest for possession of a fixed-blade knife. The city of Seattle charged Evans with the unlawful use of weapons. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty, and Evans's conviction was affirmed by the superior court and the Court of Appeals. On appeal of that conviction, Evans argued that Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 12A.14.0801 violated his right to bear arms under article I, section 24 of the Washington Constitution and the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution because the ordinance does not permit him to carry a small, fixed-blade "paring" knife for the purpose of self-defense. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals but on different grounds: the Court held that Evans' paring knife was not an arm entitled to constitutional protection, and that Evans therefore could not establish that SMC 12A.14.080 was unconstitutionally applied to him. View "City of Seattle v. Evans" on Justia Law

Petitioner Zachary Larson was convicted under the statute for committing retail theft while in possession of wire cutters. He used the wire cutters to remove a security tag from a pair of Nike shoes worth $32 at a Marshall's store in Bellingham. The State elected to charge Larson under RCW 9A.56.360(1)(b) rather than the ordinary theft statute. Larson argued on appeal that as a matter of law, wire cutters do not constitute a device "designed to overcome security systems" as required by the statute and, therefore, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for retail theft with extenuating circumstances. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held that the plain language of RCW 9A.56.360(1)(b) established the legislature's intent to target organized retail theft only where particular types of tools were utilized. "An item, article, implement, or device is 'designed to overcome security systems' if it is created-whether by the manufacturer or the defendant-with the specific purpose of disabling or evading security systems." The Court held that ordinary, unmodified wire cutters did not fall within this definition, so the evidence was insufficient to support petitioner Larson's conviction for retail theft with extenuating circumstances. View "Washington v. Larson" on Justia Law

Zahid Khan was tried, without an interpreter, for multiple counts of child molestation and rape. Khan was not a native English speaker, and his level of English fluency was disputed. It was undisputed that he was not offered an interpreter by the court or by his attorney. He was convicted, and on appeal to the Washington Supreme Court, Khan argued among other things, that his trial was unfair and that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not securing an interpreter. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that Khan had not made the requisite showing for the Court to vacate his sentence. In the alternative, Khan asked for an evidentiary hearing to develop the factual basis for his claims. The Court concluded that Khan did make the requisite showing for such a hearing. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' order dismissing this personal restraint petition was vacated, and the case remanded for entry of an order transferring Khan’s petition to the Snohomish County Superior Court for a reference hearing. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Khan" on Justia Law

On the eve of Matthew Hampton's trial, Hampton moved to replace his appointed counsel with a new private attorney on the condition that the trial be continued so his new counsel could prepare. The trial court denied the continuance, so Hampton proceeded with his previously appointed counsel. He was ultimately convicted of third degree rape. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, holding that the trial court's decision violated Hampton's constitutional right to his choice of counsel because it considered Hampton's reasons for wanting a new attorney. The Court of Appeals relied on a United States Supreme Court opinion that held that when a defendant's right to choice of counsel was erroneously denied, a defendant need not show prejudice in order to obtain relief. The Supreme Court reversed: “[a] trial court has wide latitude to grant or deny a motion to delay trial related to a defendant's request to change counsel. . . . In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Hampton's request to delay trial to allow him to replace his counsel given that (1) he did not make his request until the day his trial was scheduled to start, (2) his trial had already been continued once, (3) the victim/witness opposed the continuance, and (4) he did not explain his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel.” View "Washington v. Hampton" on Justia Law

In this case, Javier Ruiz-Sanabria timely filed a motion in superior court to withdraw his guilty plea to several sex offenses. The court transferred his motion to Division One of the Court of Appeals, but without indicating the basis for the transfer and without transferring all records filed in relation to Ruiz-Sanabria's motion. Considering the motion as a personal restraint petition based solely on the partial record that was transmitted, and without requesting a response from the State, the acting chief judge of Division One dismissed the petition as frivolous. By way of this opinion, the Supreme Court clarified the criteria a superior court must consider before transferring a postconviction motion to the Court of Appeals, the relationship between the rules governing personal restraint petitions and evidentiary prerequisites that a petitioner must meet, and when the petitioner's allegations may require the court to consult existing court records that the petitioner has not produced: “We have said that the petitioner must demonstrate that he has competent, admissible evidence to establish the facts that entitle him to relief, and that bare assertions and conclusory allegations are insufficient. But if the petitioner makes specific and material factual allegations within the petitioner's knowledge about court proceedings that can be answered by the State, the Court of Appeals should require a response that includes the relevant court documents. In this instance, remand to the Court of Appeals is warranted.” View "In re Pers. Restraint of Ruiz-Sanabria" on Justia Law

The State charged Tammera Thurlby with three counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Thurlby was present when her two day trial started, but she failed to appear on the second day. The trial court found that Thurlby was voluntarily absent and exercised its discretion to proceed with trial. In Thurlby' s absence, the jury found her guilty on all three counts. Thurlby challenged the trial court's finding of voluntary absence. She also argued that the trial court erred because it failed to expressly state it was considering a presumption against waiver during its analysis of voluntary absence, as required by a recent opinion from the Court of Appeals. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Thurlby’s convictions. View "Washington v. Thurlby" on Justia Law

Mark Besola and Jeffrey Swenson lived together in Besola's house. After a friend of Swenson's, Kellie Westfall, was arrested, she told police that she had seen drugs and child pornography at Besola' s house. Besola was a veterinarian, and Westfall said that he provided prescription drugs from his veterinary clinic to Swenson, who was a drug addict. Based on the information provided by Westfall, a judge issued a search warrant for illegal drugs but declined to issue a search warrant related to child pornography at that time. At the scene, police saw CDs (compact disks) and DVDs (digital video disks) with handwritten titles that implied that they contained child pornography. On the basis of this observation, police requested and obtained an addendum to the search warrant. The language of that amended warrant (and whether it was sufficiently particular) is at the heart of the legal issue in this case. The Washington Supreme Court unanimously held that the warrant in “Washington v. Perrone,” 834 P.2d 611 (1992)) failed to meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, in part because it provided for the seizure of items that were legal to possess, such as adult pornography. That holding was binding in this case, where the warrant similarly provided for the seizure of items that were legal to possess. The State argued that the warrant in this case was saved by a citation to the child pornography statute at the top of the warrant. The Supreme Court held that the State was incorrect because the statutory citation did not modify or limit the items listed in the warrant, so it did not save the warrant from being overbroad. “More importantly, the State's position conflicts with our reasoning in Perrone and would hinder the goals of the warrant particularity requirement.” Because the warrant failed to meet the Constitution's p View "Washington v. Besola" on Justia Law

In 2006, Mathew Moi was tried for the murder of Keith McGowan and for unlawful possession of the gun that killed McGowan. No physical evidence tied Moi to the gun, and perhaps because of that, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the murder charge. Based on the same evidence, Moi was acquitted of unlawful possession of the gun. On its second tryMoi was convicted of murder. In the second trial, the State still argued that McGowan was killed with the gun Moi was acquitted of possessing. The State conceded that the same issue of ultimate fact was decided in both trials but argued it would be unjust to apply double jeopardy against it because it was surprised by Moi' s testimony in the first trial that someone else shot McGowan and because Moi had moved to sever the two charges. Given the State's concession, the Supreme Court granted Moi’s personal restraint petition. Moi met his burden of showing actual and substantial prejudice following from having “be[en] twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” View "In re Pers. Restraint of Moi" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a deputy sheriff inadequately advised the defendant of his Miranda rights when he initially told the defendant that a lawyer would be appointed for him prior to questioning if he could not afford one but also said that no lawyer would be appointed for him unless he was arrested, jailed, and taken to court. The deputy did not clarify that the defendant was not obligated to respond to questions until he had the opportunity to confer with a lawyer. The Supreme Court held that although this Miranda advisement was contradictory and confusing and thus violated the defendant's Miranda rights, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming untainted evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and sustained defendant's conviction. View "Washington v. Mayer" on Justia Law