Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Chad Chenoweth was convicted of six counts of third degree child rape of his daughter and six counts of first degree incest. The incest counts and the rape of a child counts were based on six incidents, each involving a single act. At sentencing, Chenoweth moved the court to find the incest counts were the same criminal conduct as the corresponding rape of a child count. The trial court disagreed and counted each conviction separately for the purposes of sentencing, concluding the offender score exceeded nine. Sentences for each conviction were ordered to be served concurrently. Chenoweth appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed his sentence. The Supreme Court granted review on the same criminal conduct issue, found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Washington v. Chenoweth" on Justia Law

Cory Sundberg was charged with and convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine). The statute under which Sundberg was convicted set forth a strict liability crime in that knowledge of the possession was not an element of the offense that the State had to prove. To reduce the harshness of this offense, courts have created an "unwitting possession" defense and placed the burden on the defendant to establish the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. At trial, the thrust of Sundberg's argument was to assert an unwitting possession defense, assuming this burden of proof. He was convicted, and the issue his appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a prosecutor commits error when, during closing rebuttal argument, he comments that the defendant failed to call a witness to corroborate his affirmative defense of unwitting possession of a controlled substance. The Supreme Court held that in a criminal prosecution where the defendant has the burden to establish an affirmative defense, no error occurs where the prosecutor comments on the defendant's failure to present evidence or testimony in support of the defense. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Sundberg" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Spencer Miller of two counts of attempted first degree murder in 2002. The trial court imposed a 200-month sentence on each count, to run consecutively. In an untimely collateral attack, Miller argued that "In re Personal Restraint of Mulholland," (166 P.3d 677 (2007)), constituted a significant change in the law retroactively applicable to his sentence. The trial court agreed and ordered resentencing. The Supreme Court rejected Miller's argument and vacated the trial court order. View "Washington v. Miller" on Justia Law

Petitioner Johnny Fuller was charged with two counts of assault in the second degree, each count presenting an alternative means of committing the offense. The jury acquitted Fuller of one count and deadlocked on the other. The trial court declared a mistrial on that count, and the State sought to retry Fuller. Fuller moved to dismiss, arguing that retrial would subject him to re-prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal, in violation of double jeopardy. The superior court denied Fuller's motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Washington Supreme Court held that jeopardy never terminated as to the count the State sought to retry, and that the jury's acquittal on the other count was of no consequence. Because retrial did not implicate double jeopardy, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Washington v. Fuller" on Justia Law

In 1988, when petitioner John Anderson was 17 years old, he pled guilty in juvenile court to statutory rape in the first degree. The victim was two and a half years old. Anderson was sentenced to 100 weeks in a juvenile rehabilitation facility. When Anderson's juvenile sentence was about to expire in 1990, the State petitioned to have him involuntarily committed and he was transferred to Western State Hospital (WSH) for an evaluation. Before the evaluation period ended, Anderson voluntarily sought civil commitment. In February 2000, Anderson announced his intention to end his voluntary commitment and the State petitioned to have him involuntarily committed as a sexually violent predator (SVP) pursuant to chapter 71.09 RCW. Anderson was transferred to the Special Commitment Center (SCC) during the pendency of the State's petition in March 2001. In 2004, after a bench trial, the trial court found Anderson was an SVP. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to appoint Anderson's requested expert witness. The Supreme Court agreed. On remand, Anderson moved to dismiss, contending that his juvenile adjudication was not a conviction, and thus he could not be subject to an SVP petition under RCW 71.09.030(1)(e). He also contended that his sexual contacts with other patients at WSH were not recent overt acts as a matter of law. The trial court denied Anderson's motion to dismiss, and Anderson was retried by a jury. The jury concluded that Anderson was an SVP, and the trial court entered an order committing him to the SCC. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished decision. Anderson petitioned the Supreme Court to ask that his civil commitment under chapter 71.09 RCW be reversed. Specifically, he asked whether juvenile adjudication for a sexually violent offense was a predicate "convict[ion]" under RCW 71.09.030(1)(e). The Supreme Court held that it was, and affirmed his civil commitment. View "In re Det. of Anderson" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Andrea Rich of driving under the influence (DUI) and reckless endangerment. The evidence showed that Rich was speeding in traffic while highly intoxicated and with a young child in the front passenger seat. But the officer who arrested Rich followed her car because he believed that the car was stolen. Rich's manner of driving posed no observable danger. The Court of Appeals reversed the reckless endangerment conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Rich's driving created an actual, substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person. The Court of Appeals ruled, on an issue of first impression, that proof of a DUI does not necessarily establish proof of reckless endangerment. The Supreme Court agreed that proof of DUI alone did not necessarily establish proof of reckless endangerment. However, the Court found that a reasonable juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Rich created a substantial risk of death or injury to her passenger, knew of that risk and disregarded it. The Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed on the reckless endangerment conviction. View "Washington v. Rich" on Justia Law

Seattle Police Officer Michael Conners stopped a vehicle driven by Wayne Evans for speeding in the Central District of Seattle. As Conners approached Evans's vehicle, he observed furtive movements from Evans and his passenger, and smelled marijuana. Conners directed Evans to exit the vehicle and asked him whether he had any weapons. Evans responded that there was a knife in his pocket. Conners instructed Evans not to reach for the knife; Conners then reached into Evans's front right pocket, retrieved a fixed-blade knife with a black handle, and placed Evans under arrest for possession of a fixed-blade knife. The city of Seattle charged Evans with the unlawful use of weapons. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty, and Evans's conviction was affirmed by the superior court and the Court of Appeals. On appeal of that conviction, Evans argued that Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 12A.14.0801 violated his right to bear arms under article I, section 24 of the Washington Constitution and the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution because the ordinance does not permit him to carry a small, fixed-blade "paring" knife for the purpose of self-defense. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals but on different grounds: the Court held that Evans' paring knife was not an arm entitled to constitutional protection, and that Evans therefore could not establish that SMC 12A.14.080 was unconstitutionally applied to him. View "City of Seattle v. Evans" on Justia Law

Petitioner Zachary Larson was convicted under the statute for committing retail theft while in possession of wire cutters. He used the wire cutters to remove a security tag from a pair of Nike shoes worth $32 at a Marshall's store in Bellingham. The State elected to charge Larson under RCW 9A.56.360(1)(b) rather than the ordinary theft statute. Larson argued on appeal that as a matter of law, wire cutters do not constitute a device "designed to overcome security systems" as required by the statute and, therefore, the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for retail theft with extenuating circumstances. After review, the Washington Supreme Court held that the plain language of RCW 9A.56.360(1)(b) established the legislature's intent to target organized retail theft only where particular types of tools were utilized. "An item, article, implement, or device is 'designed to overcome security systems' if it is created-whether by the manufacturer or the defendant-with the specific purpose of disabling or evading security systems." The Court held that ordinary, unmodified wire cutters did not fall within this definition, so the evidence was insufficient to support petitioner Larson's conviction for retail theft with extenuating circumstances. View "Washington v. Larson" on Justia Law

Zahid Khan was tried, without an interpreter, for multiple counts of child molestation and rape. Khan was not a native English speaker, and his level of English fluency was disputed. It was undisputed that he was not offered an interpreter by the court or by his attorney. He was convicted, and on appeal to the Washington Supreme Court, Khan argued among other things, that his trial was unfair and that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not securing an interpreter. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that Khan had not made the requisite showing for the Court to vacate his sentence. In the alternative, Khan asked for an evidentiary hearing to develop the factual basis for his claims. The Court concluded that Khan did make the requisite showing for such a hearing. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals' order dismissing this personal restraint petition was vacated, and the case remanded for entry of an order transferring Khan’s petition to the Snohomish County Superior Court for a reference hearing. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Khan" on Justia Law

On the eve of Matthew Hampton's trial, Hampton moved to replace his appointed counsel with a new private attorney on the condition that the trial be continued so his new counsel could prepare. The trial court denied the continuance, so Hampton proceeded with his previously appointed counsel. He was ultimately convicted of third degree rape. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, holding that the trial court's decision violated Hampton's constitutional right to his choice of counsel because it considered Hampton's reasons for wanting a new attorney. The Court of Appeals relied on a United States Supreme Court opinion that held that when a defendant's right to choice of counsel was erroneously denied, a defendant need not show prejudice in order to obtain relief. The Supreme Court reversed: “[a] trial court has wide latitude to grant or deny a motion to delay trial related to a defendant's request to change counsel. . . . In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Hampton's request to delay trial to allow him to replace his counsel given that (1) he did not make his request until the day his trial was scheduled to start, (2) his trial had already been continued once, (3) the victim/witness opposed the continuance, and (4) he did not explain his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel.” View "Washington v. Hampton" on Justia Law