Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, Javier Ruiz-Sanabria timely filed a motion in superior court to withdraw his guilty plea to several sex offenses. The court transferred his motion to Division One of the Court of Appeals, but without indicating the basis for the transfer and without transferring all records filed in relation to Ruiz-Sanabria's motion. Considering the motion as a personal restraint petition based solely on the partial record that was transmitted, and without requesting a response from the State, the acting chief judge of Division One dismissed the petition as frivolous. By way of this opinion, the Supreme Court clarified the criteria a superior court must consider before transferring a postconviction motion to the Court of Appeals, the relationship between the rules governing personal restraint petitions and evidentiary prerequisites that a petitioner must meet, and when the petitioner's allegations may require the court to consult existing court records that the petitioner has not produced: “We have said that the petitioner must demonstrate that he has competent, admissible evidence to establish the facts that entitle him to relief, and that bare assertions and conclusory allegations are insufficient. But if the petitioner makes specific and material factual allegations within the petitioner's knowledge about court proceedings that can be answered by the State, the Court of Appeals should require a response that includes the relevant court documents. In this instance, remand to the Court of Appeals is warranted.” View "In re Pers. Restraint of Ruiz-Sanabria" on Justia Law

The State charged Tammera Thurlby with three counts of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Thurlby was present when her two day trial started, but she failed to appear on the second day. The trial court found that Thurlby was voluntarily absent and exercised its discretion to proceed with trial. In Thurlby' s absence, the jury found her guilty on all three counts. Thurlby challenged the trial court's finding of voluntary absence. She also argued that the trial court erred because it failed to expressly state it was considering a presumption against waiver during its analysis of voluntary absence, as required by a recent opinion from the Court of Appeals. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Thurlby’s convictions. View "Washington v. Thurlby" on Justia Law

Mark Besola and Jeffrey Swenson lived together in Besola's house. After a friend of Swenson's, Kellie Westfall, was arrested, she told police that she had seen drugs and child pornography at Besola' s house. Besola was a veterinarian, and Westfall said that he provided prescription drugs from his veterinary clinic to Swenson, who was a drug addict. Based on the information provided by Westfall, a judge issued a search warrant for illegal drugs but declined to issue a search warrant related to child pornography at that time. At the scene, police saw CDs (compact disks) and DVDs (digital video disks) with handwritten titles that implied that they contained child pornography. On the basis of this observation, police requested and obtained an addendum to the search warrant. The language of that amended warrant (and whether it was sufficiently particular) is at the heart of the legal issue in this case. The Washington Supreme Court unanimously held that the warrant in “Washington v. Perrone,” 834 P.2d 611 (1992)) failed to meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment, in part because it provided for the seizure of items that were legal to possess, such as adult pornography. That holding was binding in this case, where the warrant similarly provided for the seizure of items that were legal to possess. The State argued that the warrant in this case was saved by a citation to the child pornography statute at the top of the warrant. The Supreme Court held that the State was incorrect because the statutory citation did not modify or limit the items listed in the warrant, so it did not save the warrant from being overbroad. “More importantly, the State's position conflicts with our reasoning in Perrone and would hinder the goals of the warrant particularity requirement.” Because the warrant failed to meet the Constitution's p View "Washington v. Besola" on Justia Law

In 2006, Mathew Moi was tried for the murder of Keith McGowan and for unlawful possession of the gun that killed McGowan. No physical evidence tied Moi to the gun, and perhaps because of that, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the murder charge. Based on the same evidence, Moi was acquitted of unlawful possession of the gun. On its second tryMoi was convicted of murder. In the second trial, the State still argued that McGowan was killed with the gun Moi was acquitted of possessing. The State conceded that the same issue of ultimate fact was decided in both trials but argued it would be unjust to apply double jeopardy against it because it was surprised by Moi' s testimony in the first trial that someone else shot McGowan and because Moi had moved to sever the two charges. Given the State's concession, the Supreme Court granted Moi’s personal restraint petition. Moi met his burden of showing actual and substantial prejudice following from having “be[en] twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” View "In re Pers. Restraint of Moi" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a deputy sheriff inadequately advised the defendant of his Miranda rights when he initially told the defendant that a lawyer would be appointed for him prior to questioning if he could not afford one but also said that no lawyer would be appointed for him unless he was arrested, jailed, and taken to court. The deputy did not clarify that the defendant was not obligated to respond to questions until he had the opportunity to confer with a lawyer. The Supreme Court held that although this Miranda advisement was contradictory and confusing and thus violated the defendant's Miranda rights, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming untainted evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and sustained defendant's conviction. View "Washington v. Mayer" on Justia Law

The State charged Joseph McEnroe and Michele Anderson with aggravated first degree murder and sought the death sentence for each of them. Roughly five and a half years after the State filed its notices of intent to seek the death penalty, the trial court ruled that the absence of "'sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency"' was an essential element of the crime of capital murder in Washington and that the State had allege the absence of sufficient mitigating circumstances in the charging information. The trial court gave the State two weeks to amend each charging information to allege insufficient mitigating circumstances; if the State failed do to so, the court would entertain a defense motion to dismiss the State's notices of intent to seek the death penalty. The State appealed that order. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision to compel the State to amend each information or face dismissal of the notice of special sentencing proceeding. The notice of special sentencing proceeding afforded the defendants constitutionally and statutorily adequate notice that the State intended to prove the absence of sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. View "Washington v. McEnroe" on Justia Law

In 1993, petitioner Lindsey Crumpton was convicted of five counts of first degree rape and one count of residential burglary. In 2011, he petitioned the court for post-conviction deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing. The superior court denied this motion, saying he had not shown a '"likelihood that the DNA evidence would demonstrate his innocence on a more probable than not basis"' as is required by RCW 10.73.170(3). The Court of Appeals affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was the standard the court should use to decide a motion for post-conviction DNA testing and whether a court should presume DNA evidence would be favorable to the convicted individual when determining if it is likely the evidence would prove his or her innocence. The Court held that a court should use such a presumption. View "Washington v. Crumpton" on Justia Law

The State charged Joseph Peltier in 2002 with two counts of second degree rape (as to B.M. and S.B.), one count of second degree child molestation (as to S.G.), and one count of second degree rape of a child (as to S.G.). The crimes occurred between 1993 and 2001. In 2003, to accommodate a negotiated settlement of his case, Peltier agreed to a stipulated trial on an amended information charging him with third degree rape (as to B.M. and J.D., a victim not referenced in the original information) and indecent liberties (as to S.B.). The charges as to S.G. were dismissed. In 2004, the trial judge found Peltier guilty and sentenced him. The statute of limitations on the four original charges had not yet run, but the statute of limitations for the charges he was convicted of had expired by January 1998, well before he was charged with and sentenced for them. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether a defendant could relinquish the rights conferred by the statute of limitations in a pretrial agreement. Upon review, the Court held that a defendant may expressly waive the criminal statute of limitations in a pretrial agreement when the statute of limitations on the underlying charge has not yet run at the time the defendant enters the agreement. "A statute of limitations does not affect a court's subject matter jurisdiction; it affects the authority of a court to sentence a defendant for a crime. A defendant may expressly waive a criminal statute of limitations when he or she agrees to do so when the statute of limitations has not yet run on the underlying charges. At that time, the court has authority over the charges so an express waiver is effective and will be upheld. Peltier waived the statute of limitations when the charges were still valid. We reverse the Court of Appeals and the trial court and hold that the State may refile the original charges." View "Washington v. Peltier" on Justia Law

In this case, the trial court granted a new trial after Edwin Hawkins produced new evidence that supported his defense theory that he was framed for possessing stolen farm equipment. The Court of Appeals did not give that decision its proper deference. The Supreme Court reversed because the trial court did not abuse its wide discretion in awarding Hawkins a new trial. View "Washington v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

Russell Homan was convicted of child luring. On appeal, Homan argued that his conviction violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because the evidence was insufficient for conviction and that RCW 9A.40.090 (the Washington luring statute) was unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction due to insufficiency of evidence. The State appealed the reversal, and the Supreme Court granted review on the sufficiency of evidence issue. The Court declined to rule on the overbreadth issue because it would benefit from additional briefing and argument. The Court found sufficient evidence to find that Homan lured a minor and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to decide the overbreadth issue. View "Washington v. Homan" on Justia Law