Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Washington Supreme Court
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The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether Samuel Piatnitsky unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent when he told police investigating a murder that, "I don't want to talk right now" but that he would "write it down." The Court concluded that it was, "at best," an equivocal invocation of the right to remain silent, and thus, the trial judge did not err in admitting Piatnitsky' s written confession. View "Washington v. Piatnitsky" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Cesar Trochez-Jimenez appealed his conviction for murder in the second degree, arguing the statements he made during custodial interrogation should have been suppressed because they were taken in violation of his Miranda rights. The case law petitioner cited on appeal held that prior to custodial interrogation, a suspect must be informed of his right to remain silent and right to counsel, and once the suspect invokes his right to counsel, no further interrogation about any offense by any authorities could be conducted until counsel was present or the suspect initiated communication. These cases, however, involved only domestic investigations regarding domestic crimes. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the same rule applied when a suspect requests an attorney during an interrogation conducted outside the United States by foreign authorities regarding a foreign crime. Both the trial court and Court of Appeals said it did not. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. View "Washington v. Trochez-Jimenez" on Justia Law

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Respondent-cross-petitioner J.C. Johnson was convicted of five crimes related to several days of ongoing domestic violence against his wife. A jury convicted Johnson for holding his wife “J.J.” under his control, allowing her only to leave their apartment when Johnson left, using his Rottweiler to restrain her movements, and keeping a knife and icepick near the bed to intimidate her. For three days, Johnson severely injured his wife by choking her, hitting her with rocks, and allowing the dog to bite her. J.J. managed to escape and receive treatment for her injuries. On appeal, Johnson argued: (1) the information for the unlawful imprisonment charges were insufficient because it did not include a definition of the word “restraint;” and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial lawyer proposed a definition of “reckless” in jury instructions that did not include charge-specific language when the “to convict” instruction included the specific language. The Court of Appeals overturned Johnson’s unlawful imprisonment conviction because the State omitted the definition of “restrain.” The appellate court agreed with Johnson that it was error to give a jury instruction on a generic definition of “reckless,” but that trial counsel was not ineffective for proposing it. The Supreme Court reversed on the “restraint” issue, holding that charging documents need only contain essential elements of a crime, not related definitions. With regard to the “reckless” issue, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, but for a different reason: it was not error to instruct a jury on the generic definition as long as the jury was given a “to convict” instruction that lists every element of the crime the State needs to prove in order to convict the defendant. View "Washington v. Johnson" on Justia Law

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While petitioner Mario Medina was awaiting retrial on charges of second degree murder, he was ordered to participate in two King County Community Center for Alternative Programs (CCAP): "CCAP Enhanced" and "CCAP Basic." Petitioner participated in these programs for approximately five years before his second trial resulted in a conviction. He argued that he was entitled, as a matter of both statutory and constitutional law, to credit for time served in the alternative programs. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals rejected this argument. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Medina" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review in this case was whether Ronald Mendes was "compelled" to waive his constitutional right not to testify as a witness in his own criminal case after the trial court refused to rule on whether the evidence presented during the State's case in chief entitled Mendes to a self-defense instruction. Mendes challenged his conviction for felony murder based on allegations that he shot and killed Danny Saylor after an altercation at Saylor's home. At trial, Mendes's theory of the case was that he acted in self-defense after Saylor came at him with a baseball bat. After the State rested, Mendes's counsel asked the court to make a preliminary ruling on whether enough evidence had been presented through the State's witnesses to warrant a self-defense instruction. The State objected, and the trial court declined to rule on Mendes's request. Mendes then testified on his own behalf. Mendes was convicted of felony murder. On appeal, Mendes argued that the trial court improperly compelled him to testify when it declined to rule on whether the State's evidence alone entitled him to a self-defense instruction. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument and held that Mendes was not entitled to an advisory ruling on jury instructions before the close of all the evidence and that Mendes's decision to testify was voluntary and tactical. Agreeing with the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Washington v. Mendes" on Justia Law

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Robert Kinnaman pleaded guilty to attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. He also agreed to a special finding that supported a sentence enhancement. At sentencing Kinnaman moved to withdraw his agreement to the sentencing enhancement only. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Kinnaman. The Court of Appeals found the plea involuntary and indivisible and reversed, remanding the matter to the trial court for vacation of the entire plea. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court's holding that the entire plea should be vacated; neither party sought that result. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's order denying Kinnaman's motion to withdraw his agreement to the special finding. View "Washington v. Kinnaman" on Justia Law

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Richard Sweat received an exceptional sentence pursuant to RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(i) as part of a domestic violence conviction. He believed the trial court erred and argued that the catchall definition of "victim" in RCW 9.94A.030 must be used in interpreting RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(i), precluding the application of the aggravating factor when the pattern of abuse was not perpetrated against the victim or victims of the currently charged offense. The Supreme Court disagreed with that reasoning and affirmed. View "Washington v. Sweat" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Pamela Deskins challenged the sentence she received after a jury found her guilty of a misdemeanor violation of the cruelty to animals statute. On appeal to the Supreme Court, she argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it prohibited her from owning or living with animals as a condition of probation; (2) that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to forfeit any remaining animals to the Stevens County Sheriffs Office after giving her seven days to find them new homes; and (3) the trial court violated her due process rights by proceeding to sentencing 22 minutes after the verdict and imposing restitution to reimburse the county for animal care. The Supreme Court held that the forfeiture challenge was moot, and affirmed the Court of Appeals on all other issues. View "Washington v. Deskins" on Justia Law

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Respondent Jeramie Owens and a friend visited a car dealership in Mount Vernon after seeing a 1967 Volkswagen (VW) Beetle with a high performance engine, roof rack and surfboard on top. They took the car on a test ride but left without purchasing the car or leaving their names. The next day, a salesman opened the dealership and discovered that the same 1967 VW Beetle that respondent test drove the day before had been stolen, and one of the dealer's keys was missing. The next business day, respondent registered a 1971 VW Beetle, the registration for which had expired in 1993. In response to a listing on Craig's List, Craig Sauvageau purchased the 1971 Beetle from respondent. Claiming that he had lost the title respondent provided Sauvageau an affidavit in lieu of title. Savageau took the car to his mechanic to have it inspected, and the mechanic discovered that the VIN registered by respondent a few days prior appeared to be brand new with reinstalled rivets. Savageau called police to report the car as potentially stolen. Police discovered the confidential VIN matched that of the stolen 1967 VW from the dealership. Respondent would later be charged with first degree taking a motor vehicle without permission, first degree trafficking in stolen property, possession of a stolen vehicle and bail jumping. A jury convicted respondent on all charges but taking a motor vehicle without permission. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review involved whether whether RCW 9A.82.050(1) described alternative means of committing first degree trafficking in stolen property, and if so, whether substantial evidence supported each of the alternative means in this case. The Court of Appeals held that RCW 9A.82.050 described eight alternative means of committing the crime, and because there was insufficient evidence to support at least one of those eight means, the court reversed respondent's conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstated the conviction, and held that RCW 9A.82.050 described only two alternative means, and in this case, each was supported by sufficient evidence. View "Washington v. Owens" on Justia Law

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Robert Lee Yates Jr. agreed to plead guilty to thirteen counts of aggravated first degree murder and one count of attempted first degree murder in exchange for a 408-year prison sentence. Yates sought to withdraw those guilty pleas, claiming that he should technically have been sentenced to 408 years with a possible extension to life in prison rather than a determinate 408-year sentence. Because he did not show that he was prejudiced by this difference, the Supreme Court dismissed his personal restraint petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Yates" on Justia Law