Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

In 1993 Petitioner Garth Snively pled guilty to a single count of indecent liberties and two counts of first degree child molestation. Relying on the plea agreement, the trial court imposed two years of community placement on each conviction. But community placement was not authorized for indecent liberties at that time. Snively did not appeal, making the judgment and sentence final when it was filed in the trial court. In 2003 the State relied on the 1993 convictions in filing a petition alleging that Snively was a sexually violent predator subject to civil commitment. In 2006 a jury found Snively to be a sexually violent predator, resulting in his civil commitment. In 2010 Snively filed a personal restraint petition in the Court of Appeals, challenging the commitment by way of collaterally attacking his 1993 convictions. He claimed specifically that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas due to the erroneous community placement term. The Court of Appeals allowed Garth Snively to withdraw his plea of guilty to indecent liberties because of a facially invalid sentence. Because Snively's sole remedy for the sentencing error was correction of the judgment and sentence, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals as to that issue. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Snively" on Justia Law

Timothy Dobbs engaged in a campaign of threats, harassment, and intimidation against his ex-girlfriend, C.R., that included a drive-by shooting at her home and warnings that she would "'get it"' for calling the police and she would "regret it" if she pressed charges against him. C.R. reported the increasingly violent activities of Dobbs against her. After Dobbs was arrested, he made yet another intimidating phone call to C.R., threatening that if she went forward and pressed charges against him, she would regret it. When C.R. failed to show up to testify at trial, the trial judge found that there was clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that Dobbs was the cause of her absence and thus had forfeited his confrontation right. Dobbs appealed the trial court's decision, but the Supreme Court, after its review, agreed with the trial court: "[w]hile Dobbs ha[d] the right to confront witnesses against him, he forfeited his right to confront C.R. when he chose to threaten her with violence for cooperating with the legal system. . . . To permit the defendant to profit from such conduct would be contrary to public policy, common sense and the underlying purpose of the confrontation clause." View "Washington v. Dobbs" on Justia Law

A police detective spent five to ten minutes looking at a cell phone taken from Daniel Lee incident to his arrest for possession of heroin. The officer saw several text messages from appellant Jonathan Roden, responded to one of Roden's messages with a new message, and set up a drug deal. When Roden arrived to complete the deal, officers arrested. On appeal of his eventual conviction, Roden contended that the officer's conduct violated the state privacy act and the state and federal constitutions. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the state privacy law was violated when the officer intercepted the private text message without Lee's or Roden's consent or warrant. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and Roden's conviction. View "Washington v. Roden" on Justia Law

Petitioner Abraham MacDicken was arrested carrying a laptop bag and pushing a rolling duffel bag. He was suspected of armed robbery. The officers moved the bags a car's length away to search them. MacDicken argued that search violated his state and federal constitutional rights. The Supreme Court recently held that police may search an arrestee's person and possessions closely associated with the person at the time of arrest without violating constitutional rights; MacDicken argued the bags were not closely associated with him at the time of arrest to give police the right to search them without a warrant. The Supreme Court disagreed held the police conducted a valid search. View "Washington v. MacDicken" on Justia Law

A police detective read text messages on a cell phone police seized from Daniel Lee, who had been arrested for possession of heroin. Among other things, the detective read an incoming text message from Shawn Hinton, responded to it posing as Lee, and arranged a drug deal. Hinton was consequently arrested and charged with attempted possession of heroin. Hinton argued on appeal of his conviction that the detective's conduct violated his rights under the state and federal constitutions. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that Hinton's rights were violated when the officer intercepted the private text message without Lee's or Hinton's consent or warrant. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and Hinton's conviction. View "Washington v. Hinton" on Justia Law

Petitioner Phillip Garcia Jr. appealed his convictions for kidnapping in the first degree, burglary in the second degree, and criminal trespass in the first degree. He argued that that the evidence was insufficient to support each of the alternative means of kidnapping presented to the jury, that the trial court violated his confrontation rights by limiting his cross-examination of an adverse witness, that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of a prior crime of dishonesty, and that the prosecutor incorrectly defined "burglary" during closing arguments. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed petitioner's convictions for kidnapping in the first degree because there was insufficient evidence to support that conviction. The Court reversed the conviction for burglary in the second degree because of prejudicial trial error. But the Court affirmed his conviction for criminal trespass in the first degree because the errors petitioner claimed were harmless. View "Washington v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The State prosecuted petitioner David Gower for sex crimes against his 17-year-old stepdaughter S.E.H. In accordance with ER 404(b) and RCW 10.58.090, the State offered evidence that petitioner had committed other similar crimes against two other alleged juvenile victims, C.M. (his biological daughter) and J.K. (another stepdaughter). In a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of that evidence, the trial court ruled it was all inadmissible under ER 404(b). But the trial court acknowledged that admissibility of that evidence under RCW 10.58.090 was a separate question and concluded that although the evidence of other sex offenses was inadmissible under ER 404(b), the evidence of the prior crimes relating to C.M. was admissible under RCW 10.58.090. In 2009, between the statute's enactment arid subsequent invalidation in 2012, the trial court admitted evidence of petitioner's prior sex offenses against him at trial. He was ultimately convicted. Because that evidence was improperly admitted and considered by the trial judge in finding petitioner guilty, the Supreme Court reversed his conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Washington v. Gower" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a secretly recorded conversation between defendant William Kipp and his brother-in-law in violation of Washington's privacy act. Kipp was convicted of two counts of rape of a child and one count of child molestation in the second degree. Before trial, Kipp moved to suppress the recording, relying on the privacy act. The trial court ruled that the recording was not a private conversation and, therefore, not subject to suppression. A jury found Kipp guilty and he appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that for purposes of the privacy act, when facts are undisputed, the question of whether a particular communication is private is a matter of law reviewed de novo. In this case, Kipp's conversation with his brother-in-law was private and therefore should have been suppressed. View "Washington v. Kipp" on Justia Law

In this case, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a conviction must be vacated even if it were shown that eavesdropping (an "odious practice" when done between an attorney and her client), did not result in any prejudice to the defendant. In this case, the police detective eavesdropped on attorney-client conversations after the trial was complete and the jury had found the defendant guilty. Thus, while the conduct was "unconscionable," there was no way for the eavesdropping to have any effect on the trial itself. Further, the prosecutor submitted a declaration stating that the detective on the case never communicated any information about the attorney-client conversations to the prosecution. Upon review of this case, the Supreme Court held that eavesdropping is presumed to cause prejudice to the defendant unless the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the eavesdropping did not result in any such prejudice. In this case, the record did not provide enough information to make this determination, and the Court remanded the case for additional discovery. View "Washington v. Fuentes" on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Stockwell sought to withdraw his guilty plea to a 1986 charge of first-degree statutory rape. Petitioner's plea statement and judgment and sentence misstated the statutory maximum sentence. The Supreme Court held that in a personal restraint petition, a petitioner must show actual and substantial prejudice in a challenge to a guilty plea based on such a misstatement. Because petitioner failed to make this showing, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Stockwell" on Justia Law