Justia Criminal Law Opinion Summaries

Robert Kinnaman pleaded guilty to attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. He also agreed to a special finding that supported a sentence enhancement. At sentencing Kinnaman moved to withdraw his agreement to the sentencing enhancement only. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Kinnaman. The Court of Appeals found the plea involuntary and indivisible and reversed, remanding the matter to the trial court for vacation of the entire plea. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court's holding that the entire plea should be vacated; neither party sought that result. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's order denying Kinnaman's motion to withdraw his agreement to the special finding. View "Washington v. Kinnaman" on Justia Law

Richard Sweat received an exceptional sentence pursuant to RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(i) as part of a domestic violence conviction. He believed the trial court erred and argued that the catchall definition of "victim" in RCW 9.94A.030 must be used in interpreting RCW 9.94A.535(3)(h)(i), precluding the application of the aggravating factor when the pattern of abuse was not perpetrated against the victim or victims of the currently charged offense. The Supreme Court disagreed with that reasoning and affirmed. View "Washington v. Sweat" on Justia Law

Petitioner Pamela Deskins challenged the sentence she received after a jury found her guilty of a misdemeanor violation of the cruelty to animals statute. On appeal to the Supreme Court, she argued: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it prohibited her from owning or living with animals as a condition of probation; (2) that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to forfeit any remaining animals to the Stevens County Sheriffs Office after giving her seven days to find them new homes; and (3) the trial court violated her due process rights by proceeding to sentencing 22 minutes after the verdict and imposing restitution to reimburse the county for animal care. The Supreme Court held that the forfeiture challenge was moot, and affirmed the Court of Appeals on all other issues. View "Washington v. Deskins" on Justia Law

Respondent Jeramie Owens and a friend visited a car dealership in Mount Vernon after seeing a 1967 Volkswagen (VW) Beetle with a high performance engine, roof rack and surfboard on top. They took the car on a test ride but left without purchasing the car or leaving their names. The next day, a salesman opened the dealership and discovered that the same 1967 VW Beetle that respondent test drove the day before had been stolen, and one of the dealer's keys was missing. The next business day, respondent registered a 1971 VW Beetle, the registration for which had expired in 1993. In response to a listing on Craig's List, Craig Sauvageau purchased the 1971 Beetle from respondent. Claiming that he had lost the title respondent provided Sauvageau an affidavit in lieu of title. Savageau took the car to his mechanic to have it inspected, and the mechanic discovered that the VIN registered by respondent a few days prior appeared to be brand new with reinstalled rivets. Savageau called police to report the car as potentially stolen. Police discovered the confidential VIN matched that of the stolen 1967 VW from the dealership. Respondent would later be charged with first degree taking a motor vehicle without permission, first degree trafficking in stolen property, possession of a stolen vehicle and bail jumping. A jury convicted respondent on all charges but taking a motor vehicle without permission. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review involved whether whether RCW 9A.82.050(1) described alternative means of committing first degree trafficking in stolen property, and if so, whether substantial evidence supported each of the alternative means in this case. The Court of Appeals held that RCW 9A.82.050 described eight alternative means of committing the crime, and because there was insufficient evidence to support at least one of those eight means, the court reversed respondent's conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstated the conviction, and held that RCW 9A.82.050 described only two alternative means, and in this case, each was supported by sufficient evidence. View "Washington v. Owens" on Justia Law

Robert Lee Yates Jr. agreed to plead guilty to thirteen counts of aggravated first degree murder and one count of attempted first degree murder in exchange for a 408-year prison sentence. Yates sought to withdraw those guilty pleas, claiming that he should technically have been sentenced to 408 years with a possible extension to life in prison rather than a determinate 408-year sentence. Because he did not show that he was prejudiced by this difference, the Supreme Court dismissed his personal restraint petition. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Yates" on Justia Law

In 1993 Petitioner Garth Snively pled guilty to a single count of indecent liberties and two counts of first degree child molestation. Relying on the plea agreement, the trial court imposed two years of community placement on each conviction. But community placement was not authorized for indecent liberties at that time. Snively did not appeal, making the judgment and sentence final when it was filed in the trial court. In 2003 the State relied on the 1993 convictions in filing a petition alleging that Snively was a sexually violent predator subject to civil commitment. In 2006 a jury found Snively to be a sexually violent predator, resulting in his civil commitment. In 2010 Snively filed a personal restraint petition in the Court of Appeals, challenging the commitment by way of collaterally attacking his 1993 convictions. He claimed specifically that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas due to the erroneous community placement term. The Court of Appeals allowed Garth Snively to withdraw his plea of guilty to indecent liberties because of a facially invalid sentence. Because Snively's sole remedy for the sentencing error was correction of the judgment and sentence, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals as to that issue. View "In re Pers. Restraint of Snively" on Justia Law

Timothy Dobbs engaged in a campaign of threats, harassment, and intimidation against his ex-girlfriend, C.R., that included a drive-by shooting at her home and warnings that she would "'get it"' for calling the police and she would "regret it" if she pressed charges against him. C.R. reported the increasingly violent activities of Dobbs against her. After Dobbs was arrested, he made yet another intimidating phone call to C.R., threatening that if she went forward and pressed charges against him, she would regret it. When C.R. failed to show up to testify at trial, the trial judge found that there was clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that Dobbs was the cause of her absence and thus had forfeited his confrontation right. Dobbs appealed the trial court's decision, but the Supreme Court, after its review, agreed with the trial court: "[w]hile Dobbs ha[d] the right to confront witnesses against him, he forfeited his right to confront C.R. when he chose to threaten her with violence for cooperating with the legal system. . . . To permit the defendant to profit from such conduct would be contrary to public policy, common sense and the underlying purpose of the confrontation clause." View "Washington v. Dobbs" on Justia Law

A police detective spent five to ten minutes looking at a cell phone taken from Daniel Lee incident to his arrest for possession of heroin. The officer saw several text messages from appellant Jonathan Roden, responded to one of Roden's messages with a new message, and set up a drug deal. When Roden arrived to complete the deal, officers arrested. On appeal of his eventual conviction, Roden contended that the officer's conduct violated the state privacy act and the state and federal constitutions. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the state privacy law was violated when the officer intercepted the private text message without Lee's or Roden's consent or warrant. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and Roden's conviction. View "Washington v. Roden" on Justia Law

Petitioner Abraham MacDicken was arrested carrying a laptop bag and pushing a rolling duffel bag. He was suspected of armed robbery. The officers moved the bags a car's length away to search them. MacDicken argued that search violated his state and federal constitutional rights. The Supreme Court recently held that police may search an arrestee's person and possessions closely associated with the person at the time of arrest without violating constitutional rights; MacDicken argued the bags were not closely associated with him at the time of arrest to give police the right to search them without a warrant. The Supreme Court disagreed held the police conducted a valid search. View "Washington v. MacDicken" on Justia Law

A police detective read text messages on a cell phone police seized from Daniel Lee, who had been arrested for possession of heroin. Among other things, the detective read an incoming text message from Shawn Hinton, responded to it posing as Lee, and arranged a drug deal. Hinton was consequently arrested and charged with attempted possession of heroin. Hinton argued on appeal of his conviction that the detective's conduct violated his rights under the state and federal constitutions. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that Hinton's rights were violated when the officer intercepted the private text message without Lee's or Hinton's consent or warrant. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and Hinton's conviction. View "Washington v. Hinton" on Justia Law